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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the potential and limits of European air power in 
multinational operations and assesses how potential problems encountered in the 
course of multinational cooperation may be overcome. Looking specifically at 
the cases of the UK, Poland and Sweden, it argues that the benefits European air 
forces gain from their participation in multinational operations outweigh the 
challenges they face when involved in that form of military activity. Ultimately, 
the thesis demonstrates that, considering the significant capability and capacity 
limitations experienced by European air forces, developing multinational 
cooperation is essential for maintaining national security and defence of all states 
involved. 
Multinational operations have become the dominant form of Western 
military intervention in the post-Cold War period and this trend is likely to 
continue. The main objective of the thesis is to provide a deeper understanding 
of the potential and limitations of European air forces in multinational 
operations, a subject which has, to date, been understudied. Air power 
scholarship remains heavily dominated by studies of the US Air Force and US 
experience in air warfare. As such, the thesis makes a significant contribution to 
knowledge in providing a systematic study on European air power in 
multinational operations. The analysis revolves around three case studies – 
British, Swedish and Polish air power. All three countries experienced similar 
challenges in building air forces fit for the post-Cold War security environment, 
but their efforts were also coined by specific geopolitical, financial and political 
circumstances. Framed within relevant concepts from international relations, 
strategic studies and military sociology, the analysis is based on the extensive 
analysis of relevant documentary materials as well as on fieldwork research 
conducted in all three countries.  
In its empirical part, the thesis gives a perspective on the state of the British, 
Polish and Swedish Air Forces in the post-Cold War period, showing that each 
of them underwent a process of concentration and transnationalisation, adapting 
them to participation in multinational operations. This took the form of their 
increased participation in various forms of multinational cooperation ranging 
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from expeditionary military operations, through pooling and sharing initiatives 
to collective trainings and exercises. All of these processes have raised 
interoperability and interdependence between European air forces. However, as 
the thesis also shows, multinational cooperation is complex and poses various 
problems for the involved air forces which, to large extent, stem from their 
cultural background. These are inevitable, but may be minimised by even more 
intensive multinational cooperation.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 This thesis investigates the involvement of European air forces in 
contemporary multinational operations, assessing the potential and limits of such 
cooperation and considering the ways in which potential problems can be 
overcome. The main research question for the project is: what is the potential 
and limitations of European air power in contemporary multinational 
operations? It is being answered by addressing several sub-questions which are 
given attention in subsequent chapters of the thesis. These are: (1) Why has the 
end of the Cold War led to an increasing number of multinational operations? 
(2) Why have the UK, Swedish and Polish Air Forces specifically been used 
predominantly in multinational operations since the end of the Cold War? (3) 
How have European countries sought to create the conditions required for the 
effective cooperation of their air forces in multinational operations? (4) What 
role have collaborative initiatives, such as Smart Defence and Pooling and 
Sharing, played in the creation of these conditions? (5) What are the ongoing 
problems encountered by European air forces when they participate in 
multinational operations? (6) How can these problems be overcome? 
This thesis argues that although the participation of European air forces 
in multinational operations faces significant challenges, the benefits of such 
cooperation predominate. Given the ongoing limitations in the capacity and 
capabilities of individual European states’ air forces, their cooperation with 
partners and involvement in multinational initiatives is inevitable if their security 
is to be ensured. Hence the increasing dominance of multinational operations as 
the form of contemporary military ventures. As discussed in the thesis, the 
process of adaptation of the European air forces to that new situation after 1990 
took form of their concentration and transnationalisation. The concept of 
concentration is understood in the thesis as the air forces’ reduction in size 
leading to creation of smaller but more specialised and professional units. 
Transnationalisation then, is recognised as cooperation on multinational level 
leading to the air forces’ increased interconnectedness and interoperability but 
also interdependence. Although it has been argued that both concentration and 
transnationalisation have meant that contemporary air forces are of a different, 
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better quality when compared to the mass armies known during the Cold War,1 
the thesis makes a point that increased multinational cooperation, despite 
undoubtedly beneficial, is also challenging and may present several difficulties 
for the involved air forces. These, to a large extent, stem from variations in 
cultural background, and as such, cannot be completely eliminated. However, 
they can be anticipated and then minimised in the course of, paradoxically, 
intensive cooperation on multinational level. At this point, the thesis makes a 
full circle arguing that the benefits European air forces gain from the 
involvement in multinational operations outweigh the problems they may 
encounter. 
Since the end of the Cold War, the majority of conflicts fought by 
European states have been multinational operations. Yet there is little literature 
available assessing the potential and limits of such operations – i.e. the problems 
faced in operations fought by a multinational coalition and how to overcome 
them. The subject has been understudied in a two-fold way. Firstly, the majority 
of the existing literature on air power has focused and continues to revolve 
around the US Air Force (USAF) with very little attention given to European air 
forces.2 Such situation is not surprising given that USAF is the most advanced 
air force in the world. Secondly, if the latter ones are studied at all, such work is 
usually limited to particular air forces (predominantly the more powerful ones) 
and the assessment of their involvement in specific military operations what, as 
such, does little to contribute towards a more systematic understanding of the 
subject.3 Therefore, the central objective of the thesis is to address this important 
gap in the literature. Multinational operations are likely to stay and continue 
being the major form of conflict European air forces are involved in. Some recent 
                                                             
1 Anthony King, The Transformation of Europe’s Armed Forces. From the Rhine to Afghanistan. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 
2 For example, Benjamin S. Lambeth, Air Power against Terror: America’s Conduct of 
Operation Enduring Freedom. Santa Monica: RAND, 2005; Benjamin S. Lambeth, The 
Transformation of American Air Power. Cornell University Press, 2000; John A. Olsen, ed. 
Airpower applied: U.S., NATO, and Israeli combat experience. Naval Institute Press, 2017; John 
A. Olsen, ed., Global Air Power. Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2011; Martin van Creveld, 
The Age of Airpower. New York: PublicAffairs, 2011; Tim Ripley, Air War Afghanistan. US 
and NATO Air Operations from 2001. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Books Ltd., 2011. 
3 See, for example, Christian F. Anrig, The Quest for Relevant Air Power: Continental European 
Responses to the Air Power Challenges of the Post-Cold War Era. Maxwell Air Force Base, 
Alabama: Air University Press, 2011; Joel Hayward, ed., Air Power, Insurgency and the “War 
on Terror”. Cranwell: Royal Air Force Centre for Air Power Studies, 2009; John A. Olsen, ed., 
European Air Power: Challenges and Opportunities. Potomac Books, 2014. 
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examples of such multinational operations have revealed some shortcomings 
arising from their multinational nature that have limited their effectiveness. It is 
therefore important to have a deeper understanding of the potential and 
challenges of multinational operations in order to increase their effectiveness in 
the future. 
The aforementioned research question as well as the sub-questions for 
the project are being answered using the three cases of the Royal Air Force 
(RAF), Polish Air Force and Swedish Air Force. In order to keep the thesis 
focused, the research questions are being answered by looking at European air 
power through the prism of the Air Forces only and omitting the Army or Navy 
air components. The cases of the British, Polish and Swedish Air Forces were 
chosen not only because all three are European countries with long air force 
history and traditions. On the one hand, these three cases were chosen, because, 
although they have all participated widely in multinational operations – often 
together – since the end of the Cold War, they are also very different in many 
ways. The project begun by examining the British and the Polish air power as 
case studies offering an opposing perspective on European air power at the point 
of the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the course of the research, the idea 
emerged to add an additional, contrasting perspective to those two cases in order 
to achieve a comprehensive and more comparative perspective on the potential 
and limitations of European air power, therefore Sweden was chosen as the third 
case study. At the time of the Cold War ending, all three countries found 
themselves in a very different political and strategic situation – the UK being a 
NATO and European Union (EU) member, Poland being a former Warsaw Pact 
member and aspiring to join the Western structures, and Sweden willing to join 
the EU but also to maintain its non-allied status with NATO. On the other hand, 
all three Air Forces also share important similarities. Firstly, despite the different 
geostrategic situations the three states were in in the early 1990s, all of them 
underwent similar changes and faced similar challenges since then, namely 
reduction of defence budgets and, following that, concentration and 
transnationalisation of their military forces. As a result, the three Air Forces 
ultimately became part of a professional Armed Forces focused on the idea of 
jointness understood as participating of at least two military services together in 
an operation. Secondly, all three of them actively participate in various 
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multinational ventures, whether military operations, pooling and sharing 
initiatives of multinational trainings and exercises considering these as an 
important form of gaining operational and tactical experience as well as building 
new and strengthening the existing national capabilities. Finally, in all three 
states international organisations, especially NATO and the EU, are perceived 
as guarantors of their national security. Hence their willingness to be part of 
these frameworks, participate in the aforementioned initiatives and, in effect, 
contribute to and benefit from collective security. Therefore, using the RAF, 
Polish and Swedish Air Forces as case studies allows for investigating the same 
processes from very different perspectives what results in a comprehensive view 
of the involvement of European air forces in multinational operations in the post-
Cold War period. 
 
1.1 The post-Cold War strategic context of the UK, Poland and 
Sweden 
 
The three European countries that are the subject of this thesis came out of 
the Cold War with different experiences and faced a rapidly changing strategic 
environment. The situation in Europe was very clear during the Cold War – there 
were easily defined opponent blocks (NATO and Warsaw Pact) preparing for a 
large-scale, symmetric conflict.4 The end of the bi-polar order marked a shift in 
defence policies and transformation of western militaries leading them towards 
an increased engagement in multinational operations. First of all, after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, Europe was no longer raising primary security 
concerns for the US and these were directed to other parts of the globe, including 
Middle East, North Asia and the Pacific region.5 From focusing on a potential 
conventional conflict the Soviet Union, the US shifted their concern towards 
more asymmetric threats to global security such as ‘failed states’, terrorism, 
ethnic and religious conflict, and the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD).6 The situation looked very different for the European states. 
To quote Gordon Adams and Guy Ben-Ari, in the 1990s ‘Europe’s armed forces 
                                                             
4 Anrig, The Quest for Relevant Air Power., p. 14. 
5 Gordon Adams and Guy Ben-Ari, Transforming European Militaries. Coalition Operations 
and the Technology Gap. London: Routledge, 2006, p. 2. 
6 Ibid., p. 2. 
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suffered from a kind of “identity crisis”’ – the post-Cold War situation presented 
new challenges calling for developing new capabilities and keeping up with the 
US military in order to maintain interoperability. European militaries did not 
shift their interests towards the global dimension as quickly and smoothly as the 
US and therefore their primary focus remained national and regional security.7 
For example, the UK, Poland and Sweden did not have relevant air doctrines in 
place and 1990 marks the point when such documents were started to be 
developed in order to answer the threats arising in newly emerged security 
environment. What is more, the diversion of strategic interests between the US 
and Europe revealed significant limitations of European armed forces calling for 
developing multinational cooperation in order to fill these gaps. The different 
struggles on personnel, equipment and doctrinal level that all three, the RAF, 
Polish and Swedish Air Force had to face are discussed in more detail in Chapter 
3. 
Facing a changing security environment in Europe after the end of the Cold 
War, European countries started to re-define their strategic thinking. As Hew 
Strachan argued, lacking the already well-known threat in their neighbourhood 
as well as still vivid memory of the Second World War, European countries were 
faced with uncertainty as of what to expect from future conflicts.8 The early 
1990s were, generally, characterised with very different, often contradicting, 
feelings about the future ranging from optimistic hopes for a liberal, peaceful 
world to much more pessimistic visions of a chaotic, anarchical reality.9 These 
feelings were obviously not confined to Europe but present on both sides of the 
Atlantic. The insecurity about the possible state of the future of international 
relations and security in Europe was widespread. Dandeker called the post-Cold 
War period as a “violent peace” describing it as characterised with instability 
originating from ethnic and religious conflicts, irregular threats and terrorism 
rather than traditional state-on-state aggression.10 Similarly, Hura et al. argue 
                                                             
7 Adams and Ben-Ari, Transforming European Militaries. pp. 3–4. 
8 Hew Strachan, The Direction of War. Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 18 and 122. 
9 Saki Ruth Dockrill, The End of The Cold War Era: The Transformation of The Global Security 
Order. London: Hodder Education, 2005, pp. 212–213. 
10 Christopher Dandeker, “Building Flexible Forces for the 21st Century. Key Challenges for the 
Contemporary Armed Services.” In Handbook of the Sociology of the Military. ed. by Giuseppe 
Caforio, 405–416, Springer, 2006, p. 407. 
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that the years after 1990 were, in fact, much more stressful for the international 
community that the Cold War used to be.11 That is because of the 
abovementioned insecurity about the future conflicts requiring increased 
interoperability on international level as well as greater flexibility of the military 
forces to be able to respond to dynamic changes in security environment and 
wider range of threats.12 This situation, although the same for both the US and 
Europe, implied different solutions for their air forces. The USAF, as the most 
advanced air force in the world, found it much easier to adapt to the changing 
security focus and, with available adequate investment, was able to engage 
globally. European air forces, as their land and maritime counterparts, remained 
focused on regional security, what, together with financial deficiencies and 
significant reductions in size, prevented them from addressing the new 
challenges on a global scale. 
The new security context was described in 1991 in NATO’s New Strategic 
Concept. The publication acknowledged the changing character of security 
environment in which the Alliance will be operating. Noting that the possibility 
of a full-scale conventional attack on European members of NATO no longer 
existed, it characterised the new threats as ‘multi-faceted’ and ‘multi-directional’ 
originating from instability, whether of economic, social or political 
background.13 In fact, post-Cold War conflicts took form more apparent to 
Rupert Smith’s concept of ‘war among the people’ than traditionally understood 
conventional warfare.14 That means they are more often being fought among the 
civilian populations and between non-state opponents that are often part of these 
populations rather than on a battlefield between regular armies. Considering the 
complex nature of those new potential risks, the New Concept stressed that 
NATO should use this as an opportunity to adopt a strategy15 representing a 
                                                             
11 Myron Hura, Gary W. McLeod, Eric V. Larson, James Schneider, Dan Gonzales, Daniel M. 
Norton, Jody Jacobs, Kevin M. O'Connell, William Little, Richard Mesic, Lewis Jamison, 
Interoperability: A Continuing Challenge in Coalition Air Operations. Santa Monica: RAND, 
2000, p. 23. 
12 See ibid., pp. 23–24. 
13 The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept, NATO, November 1991, paragraphs 7–9. 
14 See Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force. The Art of War in the Modern World. London: Penguin 
Books, 2006, pp. 267–370. 
15 Strategy is generally understood as an employment of various tools, including military, to 
reach national objectives set by the state’s politics. This definition is concurrent with the 
definition of ‘grand strategy’ proposed by Colin Gray. It should be differentiated from military 
strategy, which according to both, Gray and Strachan, is understood as the use of the armed 
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broader approach to security than one focusing on regular conventional 
conflict.16 This document was re-visited in 1999 when another Strategic Concept 
was issued by NATO. It re-affirmed that a large-scale conventional conflict is 
rather unlikely to occur and pointed to non-state actors and the proliferation of 
WMD as the main threats to Alliance’s security.17 At the same time, unlike the 
1991 publication, the Concept from 1999 recognised the global dimension of 
those risks and acknowledged that therefore NATO should consider it operates 
in a global context now.18 The approach to that newly emerging security 
environment represented by particular countries differed depending on their 
situation and position in Europe at that time. The next sections will show the 
different perspectives of three countries, two of which are coming from opposite 
sides of the former barricade – NATO (the UK), former Warsaw Pact (Poland) 
and one which maintained its neutral status during the Cold War, namely 
Sweden. 
The post-Cold War Strategic Concept defined in NATO publications was 
reflected in British Strategic Defence Review (SDR) conducted in 1997–1998. 
The document produced by the Labour Government followed two defence 
reviews by its Conservative predecessors – Options for Change from 1990–1991 
and Front Line First from 1994. The latter two were looking predominantly into 
reducing defence budgets while the Labour’s SDR set the direction for the 
transformation of British Armed Forces.19 It recognised the changed security 
environment in Europe. However, it did not dismiss completely the risk of a 
direct threat to the UK and Europe placing it, similarly to NATO Strategic 
                                                             
forces to achieve the abovementioned objectives. Following that differentiation, the Polish 
National Security Strategy mentioned later in the thesis would fall under the grand strategy 
classification as it encompasses not only military actions aimed at preserving state’s security but 
also political, social and economic means. The British SDR from 1998 would then fit more into 
the definition of military strategy as it discusses in detail how to adapt and employ the armed 
forces to achieve the set national security objectives. See Colin S. Gray, Airpower for Strategic 
Effect, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 2012, pp. 35–40 and Strachan, 
The Direction of War. pp. 12–13. 
For more discussion on strategy including the evolution of the very meaning of this term, see 
Strachan, The Direction of War. 
16 The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept, paragraph 14. 
17 The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, NATO, April 1999, paragraphs 20–24. 
18 Ibid., paragraph 24. 
19 Theo Farrell and Tim Bird, “Innovating within Cost and Cultural Constraints: The British 
Approach to Military Transformation.” In A Transformation Gap? American Innovation and 
European Military Change, ed. by Terry Terriff, Frans Osinga and Theo Farrell, 35–58. Stanford, 
California: Stanford Security Studies, 2010, p. 36. 
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Concept, within asymmetric factors increasing instability within region such as 
proliferation of WMD, terrorism, organised crimes, ethnic and religious 
conflicts, failing states.20 The British review characterised future threats as 
causing instability within countries and across their borders, rather than taking 
place between particular states.21 Interestingly, SDR recognised the global scale 
of those factors (a year before that was done in the NATO Strategic Concept) 
pointing out that instabilities outside of Europe may indirectly threaten the UK’s 
security.22 In order to respond to those new risks, an internationalist approach 
was stressed throughout the document. This reliance on expeditionary 
capabilities within the field of the Navy and Air Force and short-term 
interventions was repeated in the next Strategic Defence and Security Review 
(SDSR) issued in 2010.23 As a founding member of NATO since 1949, a member 
of the, what was then, European Economic Community24 since 1973 and as a 
Permanent Member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, the UK has 
always supported and promoted multinational cooperation within these 
constructs as well as outside of them in order to reinforce and maintain 
international stability – primarily within Europe.25 Here, SDR perceived NATO 
as the primary guarantor of the country’s security pointing to its continued 
relevance in the post-Cold War security environment.26 
Poland was facing a very different set of challenges. As a former member 
of the dissolved Warsaw Pact, the country was challenged by the need 
of adjusting to the new security environment and preparing for the new form of 
potential threats. Poland had to find its place in Europe after the old structures 
collapsed. First issue was posed by the creation of new countries in its closest 
neighbourhood. After the re-unification of Germany (1990), dissolution of the 
Soviet Union – USSR (1991) and Czechoslovakia (1993) the number of Poland’s 
neighbours rose from three (USSR, Czechoslovakia and German Democratic 
Republic) to seven: Russia (Kaliningrad Oblast), Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, 
                                                             
20 The Strategic Defence Review, Cm 3999, London: The Stationary Office, July 1998, 
paragraphs 3–9 and 29.  
21 Ibid., paragraph 30. 
22 Ibid., paragraph 7. 
23 Strachan, The Direction of War., pp. 240–241. 
24 EEC was incorporated into the EU under the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993. 
25 The Strategic Defence Review, 1998, paragraphs 18, 21 and 36. 
26 Ibid., paragraphs 37–38. 
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Slovakia, Czech Republic and Germany. The country signed relevant bi-lateral 
treaties with its new neighbours during the years 1991–1994.27 On top of that, 
Poland was very actively involved in the process of building international 
cooperation within the region, in such forms as the Weimar Triangle (with 
France and Germany) and the Visegrád Group (with Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary) in 1991, as well as the Central European Free Trade Agreement 
CEFTA (involving the former two groups) in 1992. 
Equally challenging for Poland at that time was to learn how to function 
independently from the USSR, like all the former members of the Warsaw Pact 
which experienced a prolonged process of transformation of their political 
systems and assimilation into the Western structures.28 For example, Poland 
neither had its own national security (and defence) strategy nor foreign policy 
and the documents that were in force then were nothing else than executive to 
doctrinal publications of that organisation and the Soviet Union itself.29 
Therefore the elections of 1989 marked the point when the country gained 
political independence, but also begun a process of learning and developing its 
very own strategic thought. It resulted in issuing series of national strategic 
documents acknowledging the new security context, formulating the national 
approach to security and defence and setting out the main strategic goals. Along 
these efforts, Poland also started to re-orientate its political course from the 
former Eastern- into more Western-European focus in order to make itself even 
more independent from the influence of Moscow.30 The efforts towards 
integrating with Western Europe started almost immediately and, as early as 
1991, Poland joined the Council of Europe. The same year it signed the 
European Agreement establishing an association between the European 
Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of 
Poland, of the other part. However, the main goal here became joining the 
structures of NATO and the EU. One can see similarity between British and 
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Polish defence interests – the UK, being already the member of both 
organisations, stressed the need to strengthen the country’s links with them. For 
Poland joining NATO and EU became the primary strategic goal which was 
achieved respectively in 1999 and 2004. But for both countries these 
memberships formed the basis for ensuring national (and regional) security. For 
Poland that meaning was also two-fold. Joining NATO and the EU not only 
strengthened the country’s security but also significantly changed its geopolitical 
position in Europe. After Poland took a completely independent place among 
other European states and its eastern border became the NATO and EU border, 
one could no longer call it an outlying state.31 
There was similarly significant change in Swedish strategic thinking after 
1991 resulting in shifting the main focus from national to international context 
– from national, territorial defence to international crisis management.32 The end 
of the Cold War also marked a change in Swedish defence policy from complete 
neutrality to a stance described as ‘non-alignment in peacetime aiming at 
neutrality in war.’33 That meant that the country adapted an approach which gave 
it freedom in deciding whether or not they wanted to get involved in a conflict 
rather than being dragged into it by an obligation to an alliance.34 Sweden 
became a member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme in 1994 
what allowed them to adapt the Swedish Armed Forces to the standards set out 
by the Alliance.35 However, joining NATO itself was then, and still remains, out 
of the question for the Swedish Government since it would be an obvious 
contradiction of the country’s non-alignment policy although the country aims 
at developing international cooperation with the Alliance since it proved to 
positively influence Swedish military capabilities.36 The Government’s stance 
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was widely represented in the popular opinion of the Swedish society which used 
to strongly oppose the possibility of joining NATO. According to a survey 
conducted by the SOM Institute at the University of Gothenburg that trend 
started to change in 2013 when the support for Sweden becoming a member of 
the Alliance begun to slightly rise reaching 33 per cent in 2016.37 Although 
increasing, that number is still quite low compared to the support expressed for 
NATO by public opinion in the UK and Poland the same year, which equaled 
respectively 61 and 70 per cent.38  
Another argument widely used by the Swedes against joining the Alliance 
in the early 1990s was the ‘Finland argument’ which in fact was later part of a 
wider concept called ‘Nordic Balance’. The reasoning behind that was that if 
Sweden joined NATO, the Soviet Union would respond with establishing 
military bases (or occupying the territory) in Finland.39 As a result the tension in 
the region between the two opposite blocks would significantly increase. Such 
an effect was also the focal point to be avoided in the Nordic Balance concept. 
The logic was very similar however spread to all the Nordic countries. It 
indicated that the Soviet Union could occupy Finland if Denmark and Norway 
allowed for establishing permanent US military bases on their territories.40 As a 
result of escalating tension between those countries Sweden would also need to 
revise its defence policy accordingly. Therefore, keeping the balance in the 
region was in the common interest and the concept was very much alive among 
Swedish, Danish and Norwegian policymakers. Interestingly, the same argument 
was regarded as not valid by the British and Americans since they would expect 
the USSR to behave in an offensive not defensive way and act rather when 
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NATO shows any signs of weakness or confusion, not when it is strong and 
united.41  
Interestingly, the above arguments did not interrupt the process of 
Sweden’s accession to the EU. Similarly, as in case of Poland, preparations to 
join the structures of European Communities begun as early as 1990.42 They 
were finalised on 1st January 1995 when Sweden became a member of the EU. 
It happened despite earlier reservations initially expressed by both parties in 
relation to the Swedish neutrality and non-alignment policy.43 Such a move was 
possible by a change in strategic thinking among Swedish political leaders, who 
started to perceive the EU as an organisation responsible for shaping the 
European security system through deepened integration and therefore regarded 
it as desirable, or even required, that Sweden contributed to the collective 
effort.44 Besides, one should point out that there is a significant difference 
between NATO being a solely military alliance, and the EU focusing on political 
and economic integration therefore joining the latter one was much more 
imaginable for Sweden willing to maintain its non-alignment policy. 
However, even though neutral, Sweden did cooperate with Western 
Europe during the Cold War but, for obvious reason to maintain its neutral 
credibility, kept that fact secret. And so, for example, close cooperation between 
Swedish, Danish and Norwegian Air Forces was established focusing on 
gathering and exchanging intelligence during peacetime and aiming at 
improving interoperability in case of a war.45 Another example could be the use 
of different flight paths over Swedish territory by NATO aircraft. That would 
involve both, the plans made for wartime46 as well as use of such flight paths 
during peacetime for regular communication of Alliance’s (mostly US) aircraft 
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between Germany, Denmark and Norway and frequent use of two Swedish 
airports (Torslanda and Bromma).47 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the bi-polar divide in 
Europe, Swedish policymakers came to the conclusion that the new security 
environment does not involve any threat to the country’s territorial integrity and 
therefore it allows for a change in focus from national defence to international 
crisis and conflict management.48 Such an expeditionary employment of 
Swedish Armed Forces and developed cooperation on international level is used 
as an instrument for both, foreign and defence policies pursued by Sweden. That 
approach finds its best expression in the Swedish Declaration of Solidarity 
stating that: 
Sweden will not remain passive if another EU Member State or 
Nordic country suffers a disaster or an attack. We expect these 
countries to take similar action if Sweden is affected. Sweden should 
therefore be in a position to both give and receive civil and military 
support.49 
Therefore, active participation in multinational military operations should 
enhance and strengthen the solidarity and cooperation between nations in general 
so that Sweden can count on the help of other countries in return.50 There is also 
a practical dimension of that clause. According to Gen. Sverker Göranson, in 
case of an attack Sweden can defend its territory for a week and then an external 
support would be necessary.51 It should not come as a surprise then, that active 
involvement in multinational cooperation is crucial for Swedish security. That 
results in a situation when, despite its non-alignment approach, the country 
participates in operations led by EU, NATO (as a PfP member) and UN and, in 
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fact, similarly to the UK and Poland perceives them as the guarantors of Swedish 
security.52 
As described above, all the three countries found themselves in a 
different situation when facing the new, post-Cold War security environment, 
yet all of them moved into the direction of increasingly cooperating militarily 
with other European countries and participating in multinational operations. The 
UK was looking into strengthening their cooperation with NATO perceiving the 
Alliance as primary guarantor of European security, Poland was re-directing its 
political course and making efforts to integrate with the Western Europe, 
Sweden changed its politics from national to multinational focus. However, as 
this thesis argues, one could spot certain similarities in the course their actions 
took.  
One common thing for all three of them that accelerated the growing 
importance of multinational cooperation was the general trend in decreasing 
national defence budgets. It resulted from the ‘peace dividend’ adapted with the 
end of the Cold War and aimed at reduction of military spending and conversion 
of military production into civilian.53 Table 1. illustrates the process for the 
period between 1990 and 2017 and presents the military expenditure as a 
percentage of the GDP. During that timeframe, expenses made towards defence 
dropped from 3.6 to 1.8 per cent in the UK; 2.6 to 2.0 per cent in Poland, and 2.6 
to 1.0 per cent in Sweden.54 There was a marginal rise from 2.2 to 2.3 per cent 
in the British military expenditure in 2001 and the next three years due to the 
9/11 events. A similar slight increase in defence budget can also be noted in 
Poland’s expenditures. After reaching the level of 1.8 per cent in 2000, there was 
a steady rise to 2.0 per cent in 2007. This is accounted for by the military 
expenditure being increased in response to the new terrorism threat. However, 
in case of Poland, this trend indicates the country’s attempt to adapt to 
recommendations set by NATO. Poland joined the Alliance in 1999 and so its 
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defence budget in years 2000–2017 fluctuates between 1.8 per cent and the 
recommended 2 per cent of GDP. Currently Poland is among only 5 out of 29 
NATO members whose defence spending meets the Alliance threshold (next to 
the US, the UK, Greece and Estonia).55 There were no similar changes in 
Swedish military expenditure. After the end of the Cold War, its defence budget 
has been steadily decreasing from 1990 to 2017. 
 
Table 1 Military expenditure in the UK, Poland and Sweden as a percentage 
of the GDP, 1990-2017 
 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2017 
United Kingdom 3.6% 2.6% 2.2% 2.2% 2.4% 1.9% 1.8% 
  
Poland 2.6% 2.0% 1.8% 1.9% 1.8% 2.1% 2.0% 
  
Sweden 2.6% 2.2% 1.8% 1.4% 1.2% 1.1% 1.0% 
Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2018, http://sipri.org/databases/milex [accessed 
21/05/2018]. 
Decreasing defence budgets will be referred to throughout the thesis as one 
of the elements initiating concentration and transnationalisation of European air 
forces. Reduction in military expenditure had a direct influence on their size, 
both in terms of personnel and equipment. But it also seriously affected the 
capabilities possessed by those air forces. Without sufficient funding they could 
afford neither the newest technological developments nor acquire or upgrade 
equipment in a capacity sufficient to conduct independent operations. That 
would suggest that decreasing defence budgets were one of the factors leading 
to increased participation of European air forces, and the RAF, Polish and 
Swedish Air Force in particular, in multinational operations and other forms of 
multinational initiatives. 
 
1.2 Methodology 
 
In order to investigate the subject of the involvement of European air 
forces in multinational operations, the thesis adopted a qualitative approach 
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which was identified as more suitable than a quantitative one. As Bruce L. Berg 
argues, ‘qualitative research, (…), refers to the meanings, concepts, definitions, 
characteristics, metaphors, symbols, and descriptions of things’ as contrasted to 
a quantitative one referring to ‘counts and measures of things.’56 Qualitative 
methods are also argued to be especially suitable for studies seeking to look in a 
greater detail at a smaller number of cases which, at the expense of somewhat 
limiting the ability to generalise the findings, provides a much more detailed 
insight and a deeper understanding of the subject under investigation than a 
quantitative approach.57 For this thesis, the author was predominantly interested 
in investigating the processes being part of the post-Cold War transformation of 
European air power, the context of these changes and the effect they had on the 
capabilities of the British, Polish and Swedish Air Forces. To achieve this it was 
important to look at the different perspectives shared among the three studied 
Air Forces rather than solely consider the numbers of their personnel, aircraft or 
defence spending. Since processes and contexts are, among others, elements 
typical for a qualitative study such approach was chosen as the most suitable 
design for this project.58 
Therefore, the thesis utilised qualitative evaluation and analysis of official 
documents, such as air doctrines, national strategic documents, NATO 
publications. It also used existing secondary literature and web-based materials, 
for example news media and think-tanks providing an independent analysis of 
issues related to security and defence such as the RAND Corporation and the 
Royal United Services Institute – RUSI. Early versions of British and Swedish 
air doctrines were obtained in cooperation with the Library at the RAF College 
Cranwell and the National Archives in London, the Anna Lindh Library at the 
Swedish Defence University in Stockholm. Relevant Polish air doctrines were 
obtained from the Doctrine and Training Centre of the Polish Armed Forces in 
Bydgoszcz. The abovementioned primary and secondary literature was all 
subject to thematic analysis.  
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Thematic analysis is defined as ‘a method for identifying, analysing, 
organising, describing, and reporting themes found within a data set.’59 As such, 
Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke identified it as the most basic research 
method providing researchers with foundational skills for conducting widely 
understood qualitative analysis.60 In her pursuit to address the main research 
question, the author identified three main and interconnected themes around 
which the thesis was structured. These are namely concentration, 
transnationalisation and challenges of multinational cooperation. Since the thesis 
is investigating the context and changes taking place among European air forces 
in the post-Cold War period and is primarily interested in the effects they had on 
the shape of European air power, it was intentional and reasonable to choose 
these three issues as the leading themes. All the gathered primary and secondary 
material was therefore looked at with the abovementioned themes in mind.  
The validity of used materials was ensured by using, where possible, 
primary sources, for example copies of the original official documents, such as 
air doctrines, national strategies, defence policies or press releases and 
statements given by official organisations, such as governments, or international 
institutions. Nevertheless, one must be aware of certain limitations to that 
project. In a few cases, access to the publications listed above was limited since 
these were classified documents and could not be shared with the Author who 
had to rely on secondary literature. 
In order to triangulate findings and to fill any gaps that remained following 
the analysis of available documentary materials, semi-structured interviews were 
conducted in the UK, Poland and Sweden. A semi-structured interview is a 
compromise between structured (or standardised) and unstructured (or 
unstandardised) interview. It contains a list of set, core questions providing the 
framework but it also allows both, the interviewee and the interviewer, to 
develop and digress on any issues or themes which arise during the interview 
and which could bring some new perspective or improve the understanding of 
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the studied subject.61 The form of semi-structured interviews was chosen as the 
most suitable for the project. It allowed to maintain the abovementioned thematic 
structure and, at the same time, allowed interviewees to include their own 
perspectives and first-hand experience on discussed issues providing invaluable 
insight into the state of post-Cold War European air forces. The interviews also 
provided the author with necessary clarifications and information on issues and 
processes not directly addressed in the unclassified primary documents or widely 
available secondary literature.62 In order to maintain the chosen research design, 
the interviews as well as the analysis of the collected  data were also subject to 
thematic analysis structured around the themes identified above – concentration 
and transnationalisation of the British, Polish and Swedish Air Forces as well as 
the challenges they encountered when involved in multinational cooperation.  
The fieldwork was organised mostly in June 2016 – in Sweden and Poland, 
and September 2016 – in the UK. A total of 25 interviews were conducted, that 
is including face to face conversations, telephone interviews and email 
conversations. Out of these, 24 were used in the thesis. The interviewees 
included individuals employed at various levels at the RAF, the RAF College 
Cranwell, the British Ministry of Defence, University of Birmingham, Swedish 
Defence University (SWENDU, Försvarshögskolan), Swedish Defence 
Research Agency (FOI, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut), the Swedish Air 
Force (Flygvapnet), the Swedish Concepts and Doctrine Centre at DCDC, the 
Polish Air Force (Siły Powietrzne RP), the Polish Armed Forces Operational 
Command (Dowództwo Operacyjne Rodzajów Sił Zbrojnych), the Doctrine and 
Training Centre of the Polish Armed Forces, the War Studies University in 
Warsaw (Akademia Sztuki Wojennej) and the Polish Air Force Academy in 
Dęblin (Wyższa Szkoła Oficerska Sił Powietrznych). The interviewees included 
firstly British, Polish and Swedish officers serving in the Air Forces (also the 
retired staff) and, secondly, academics working on that subject area. However, 
in some cases the participants were performing both roles at the same time, being 
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both lecturers or professors and officers. Person with the lowest rank interviewed 
was captain and the highest, major general. The interviewees were initially 
identified, in the UK and Poland, through the author’s network of contacts and, 
in Sweden, by a web-search. Subsequently, as the research progressed other 
interviewees were reached by referral (also called the snow-balling technique). 
This approach resulted in varying numbers of interviewees – six in the UK, nine 
in Poland and nine in Sweden. This imbalance was partially mitigated by the 
generally easier availability of primary sources in the UK. For example, the RAF 
air doctrines are publicly available unlike in the case of Poland where most of 
the information on the doctrinal issues had to be gathered in the interviews. 
Similarly, there is much more secondary literature mentioning the RAF and their 
involvement in various multinational operations whereas the subject of smaller 
air forces such as the Polish or Swedish, is not that widely covered and hence 
interviews served as an opportunity to fill that gap. 
The fieldwork also involved further collection of secondary literature as 
well as archival research conducted at the Central Military Library, the War 
Studies University Library and the Institute of National Remembrance in 
Warsaw, Anna Lindh Library at SWENDU in Stockholm as well as the Polish 
Air Force Archives in Nowy Dwór Mazowiecki. 
The fieldwork raised several accessibility issues. In order to conduct 
interviews with officers in the Polish Air Force, an official permission had to be 
obtained from the Polish MoD. The procedure involved providing the superiors 
of the potential interviewees with a set of documents including covering letter, a 
letter from the University confirming the Author’s student’s status, research 
proposal and a list of suggested topics for discussion. After gaining their 
approval for conducting the interviews, the aforementioned documentation was 
sent to the MoD for the final consent which was ultimately granted for the period 
20th June–1st July 2016 with the requirement that all of the interviewees have to 
remain anonymous.  
Similar procedure was applicable for accessing the Polish Air Force 
Archives and the Institute of National Remembrance. A formal application had 
to be filled in advance stating the reason for the visit and listing the materials the 
Author wished to see. The application form had to be accompanied by a letter of 
reference from the Author’s supervisors. Official letters stating the research 
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objectives also had to be sent to the aforementioned Doctrine and Training 
Centre of the Polish Armed Forces and the Polish Armed Forces Operational 
Command in order to obtain a copy of the Polish air doctrine as well as 
information on the Polish Air Force’s involvement in the Baltic Air Policing and 
ISAF mission. 
The project underwent a stringent ethical review at the University 
of Nottingham. At the beginning of every interview, the participants were 
informed of their right to withdrawal from the research as well as not to answer 
certain questions if they are not allowed to share specific information. They 
could also stay anonymous if they wished so. In case of the active Air Force’s 
staff in Poland, anonymity was a condition for the consent to conduct research 
given by the MoD. In some cases, individuals asked for anonymity when 
providing information on behalf of the institution they are affiliated with or on 
behalf of their superiors. The collected data has been safely stored according to 
the Data Protection Act. 
The research, although providing important insight into European air 
forces and their involvement in multinational operations, also has some 
limitations. One must note that even though the thesis identified presence of 
similar trends taking place among the RAF, Polish and Swedish Air Force (as 
well as sporadically referring to examples of other European militaries) these 
may not apply to every European air force. Further research, involving larger 
number of case studies, would be necessary to validate the results as true for 
European air power. 
 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
 
 The thesis, as already mentioned, is structured around three main themes, 
namely concentration and transnationalisation of European air forces as core 
elements of their post-Cold War transformation leading to increased 
multinational cooperation as well as potential challenges arising during that 
cooperation. In order to address these issues, the thesis is divided into four main 
chapters and a conclusion. 
Chapter 2. addresses the first sub-question: why has the end of the Cold War 
led to an increasing number of multinational operations? It reviews the relevant 
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academic literature and official documents, on the subject of contemporary air 
power and multinational operations. Since there is no obvious theoretical 
framework which could be used for studying that subject, the chapter’s main 
objective is to identify a number of relevant concepts and theoretical approaches 
that allow for systematic investigation in the empirical chapters. It is organised 
in two parts. The first part identifies the major trends in the transformation of 
European air forces during the post-Cold War period, namely aforementioned 
concentration, transnationalisation and an increase in multinational military 
operations linking them to the changes taking place in the European security 
environment after 1990. The second part of the chapter deals with the potential 
challenges which may be usually experienced by air forces involved in various 
forms of multinational cooperation. These difficulties often result from 
differences between the involved air forces, and these are often rooted in their 
cultural background. In order to illuminate and assess these differences, the 
chapter introduces Geert Hofstede’s model of cultural dimensions. The three 
themes: concentration, transnationalisation and cultural influences are used in 
the empirical Chapters 3., 4. and 5. as a conceptual framework to analyse the 
involvement of the RAF, Polish and Swedish Air Force in multinational 
operations. 
Chapter 3. introduces the concepts of concentration and transnationalisation 
applying them to the specific cases of the RAF, Polish and Swedish Air Force. 
It addresses the second sub-question: why have the UK, Swedish and Polish air 
forces specifically been used predominantly in multinational operations since the 
end of the Cold War? In the first part, the chapter focuses on the post-Cold War 
situation of the named air forces and the changes they had to undergo. Reduction 
of personnel, reduction and modernisation of equipment as well as adaptation to 
standardised regulations and procedures are identified as traits of the two 
aforementioned concepts. The latter element is given more attention in the 
second part of the chapter focusing on the post-Cold War British, Polish and 
Swedish air doctrines. The chapter investigates then to what extent these 
doctrines reflect the allied context present in strategic thinking among European 
countries after the end of the Cold War. 
Chapter 4. provides further insight on the concept of transnationalisation of 
the European air forces focusing on next two sub-questions. These are: how have 
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European countries sought to create the conditions required for the effective 
cooperation of their air forces in multinational operations and what role have 
collaborative initiatives played in the creation of these conditions? The chapter 
argues that that process is reflected by their increased participation in various 
multinational initiatives aimed at capacity and capability building and, therefore, 
leading to increased interoperability and interdependence. The chapter explores 
examples of such initiatives pursued by NATO, EU and other organisations. 
These ventures are grouped into three interconnected categories, namely cost 
and burden sharing, capability building and training. The chapter concludes with 
a discussion on the continuing importance of building and maintaining national 
capabilities. 
Chapter 5. investigates the potential challenges that British, Polish and 
Swedish Air Forces are facing when involved in different forms of multinational 
cooperation. That is done by addressing final two sub-questions posed in the 
thesis – what are the ongoing problems encountered by European air forces when 
they participate in multinational operations and how can these problems be 
overcome? Discussing these challenges, the chapter refers to the complexity of 
multinational operations being often a result of bringing together units from 
different cultural backgrounds. It refers at this point to the aforementioned model 
by Hofstede and uses it as a framework to illustrate these differences between 
various air forces, especially British, Polish and Swedish. Referring to the actual 
experiences of the named Air Forces, as well as secondary literature on the 
subject, the chapter identifies four potential conflict areas in multinational air 
operations, such as interpersonal relations, language, national caveats, rules of 
engagement, homogenous procedures and interoperable equipment. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the possible ways of overcoming, or at least 
minimising these challenges. 
Finally, Chapter 6. draws together the topics discussed in preceding three 
empirical chapters and uses these findings to answer the thesis’ main research 
question. It concludes that despite the challenges discussed in the thesis, 
multinational operations will remain the major form of war fighting engaging 
European air forces. Therefore, the potential problems they may encounter in the 
course of multinational cooperation need to be continually assessed and 
overcome. Furthermore, considering the currently growing threat from Russia, 
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the chapter analyses the role that multinational and regional cooperation may 
play for the national defence and security, especially in case of the UK, Sweden 
and Poland. 
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Chapter 2: Studying air power in multinational 
operations 
 
Multinational or, ‘combined operations’ have become the dominant form of 
military operations. This is due to the changing character of military threats, as 
well as shrinking defence budgets. European air forces do not possess enough 
capability, or capacity, to conduct independent operations on a large scale. 
Furthermore, involvement in a multinational operation adds legitimacy to a 
nation’s actions and therefore the importance of that form of military 
engagement is growing. Although increasingly common, multinational 
operations are complex and may present certain challenges which, if not 
addressed, will disrupt cooperation. 
The following chapter addresses the first sub-question for the thesis: why 
has the end of the Cold War led to an increasing number of multinational 
operations? It reviews the existing academic literature, as well as official 
documents, dealing with the subject of contemporary air power and 
multinational operations. Since there is no obvious theoretical framework 
available to study that subject, the chapter focuses on concepts and issues drawn 
from the abovementioned sources which are relevant for the study of European 
air forces, as well as the UK, Polish and Swedish cases in particular. Doing so, 
it seeks to provide a framework for the systematic analysis of the potential and 
limits of the engagement of European air forces in multinational operations in 
the thesis’ empirical chapters. 
To start with, the chapter identifies some major trends in the transformation 
of European air forces during the post-Cold War period. These trends are 
concentration, transnationalisation and an increase in multinational military 
operations. The chapter starts off with discussing the latter, defining 
multinational military operations and identifying potential reasons for their 
increased popularity. The chapter identifies two other trends, namely 
concentration and transnationalisation of European armed forces, as major 
factors in the increasing popularity of multinational operations. All three 
processes are linked to changes in the security environment after the end of the 
Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. These processes have led to 
increased interoperability and interconnectedness that would imply smoother 
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and easier cooperation. However, as this thesis also shows, introducing 
standardised procedures and regulations and participating in various forms of 
multinational cooperation, from alliances, through collaborative programmes 
and training to expeditionary operations does not guarantee easy cooperation. 
This can still be disrupted by issues related to national politics, compatibility of 
existing equipment, regulations and knowledge, and above all, cultural 
background of the involved nations. These issues are discussed in the third part 
of the chapter. The final section identifies potential challenges usually 
encountered in a multinational military operation. The chapter concludes with 
outlining a sociological approach to analysing these challenges, introducing the 
model of cultural dimensions proposed by Geert Hofstede.63 This framework 
will be used in the empirical chapters for identifying and explaining differences 
between the British, Polish and Swedish Air Forces. 
 
2.1 European air power and multinational operations 
 
According to the definition formulated by NATO, multinational 
operations are ‘conducted by forces of two or more nations acting together’.64 
As such they should be distinguished from ‘joint operations’. The latter does not 
necessarily have to involve different nations, but has to engage elements of at 
least two services and, optionally, non-military institutions or organisations.65 A 
combination of these two is a multinational (combined) joint operation defined 
by NATO as ‘an operation carried out by forces of two or more nations, in which 
elements of at least two services participate.’66 The majority of contemporary 
multinational military operations are, in fact, also joint. According to the 
NATO’s Joint Air Power Strategy, the warfighting domains such as land, sea and 
air, are linked and these connections and interdependencies between them are 
                                                             
63 Geert Hofstede, Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviours, Institutions and 
Organisations across Nations. Second Edition. London: Sage, 2001. 
64 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions AAP-06 (English and French), NATO 
Standardization Agency, 2017, p. 76. 
65 Jacek Pawłowski et al., Słownik terminów z zakresu bezpieczeństwa narodowego. Second 
edition. Warszawa: Akademia Obrony Narodowej, 2002, p. 85. 
66 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, p. 76. 
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increasing due to the changing security environment and evolving – 
transnational and multidimensional character of future threats.67  
Two primary forms that a multinational venture, whether joint or not, can 
take, are coalitions and alliances. Following Stuart Peach’s research on coalition 
air operations, coalitions can be characterised as less formal, often temporary 
and ad hoc created groupings, while alliances are formal, often institutionalised, 
long-lasting and often bound by treaties.68 Joseph Soeters and Philippe Manigart 
distinguish two basic types of multinationality – horizontal and vertical as well 
as simple and advanced cooperation.69 The first form, horizontal 
multinationality, occurs when individual units from different countries are 
operating together within one group.70 While the battle group is multinational, 
the individual forces involved remain within their national formations. As a 
consequence, there is very little, if any, direct interaction between individual 
soldiers and such contacts are maintained only between the headquarters staff. 
The other type, vertical multinationality, involves more complex cooperation, 
not only between the commanders but between the entire military personnel, so 
truly multinational units are created.71 Finally, the two above can be pursued at 
simple or advanced level what is related to the degree of specialisation of the 
involved units and hence result in teams of even greater complexity. In coalitions 
formed at simple level the national contingents are not allocated with any 
specific tasks whereas, at advanced level, the national units specialise, to some 
extent, in performing certain tasks or missions.72 
This thesis will investigate the role of European air power in multinational 
joint operations, including some tasks performed by the air forces in support of 
other military services. It will evaluate the major benefits and challenges of such 
operations and identify the solutions that have been sought to overcome potential 
problems in cooperation. 
 
                                                             
67 NATO’s Joint Air Power Strategy, NATO, 26 June 2018, p. 2. 
68 Stuart Peach, “Coalition Air Operations.” In Perspectives on Air Power: Air Power in Its 
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69 Joseph Soeters and Philippe Manigart, eds. Military Cooperation in Multinational Peace 
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70 Ibid., p. 3. 
71 Ibid., p. 3. 
72 Ibid., p. 3. 
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2.1.1 The growing significance of multinational operations for European 
air forces in the post-Cold War period 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, multinational operations have gained 
importance and have become the dominant form of military intervention. It is 
possible to identify three different reasons for initiating and developing 
multinational operations, and especially air force cooperation, in Europe. These 
are: an opportunity to make up for capability gaps and limitations, especially 
compared to the US; a chance to ease the financial burden by sharing the cost of 
advanced equipment; and a way of improving the cooperative skills of personnel. 
These three reasons are discussed in more detail in the following sections. 
 
Limited capability and capacity of European air forces and reliance on US 
support. 
Limitations in the capabilities and capacities of European air forces in 
the Cold War period have led to an increase in the number of multinational 
operations, because these have been a way to overcome the limitations of 
individual states. Hew Strachan pointed out that after many European countries 
had abandoned conscription since the end of the Cold War, their militaries no 
longer have the manpower to fight large-scale and high-intensity conflicts.73 
Hans-Christian Hagman points to a significant difference of conducting military 
operations either by the US or European states, saying that if the American 
approach – meaning high-intensity warfare, minimal risks and high operational 
tempo, is desirable then EU countries even collectively cannot conduct and 
sustain many possible conflicts or crises.74 However, if speed is not crucial, there 
is enough time to achieve political consensus and deploy military forces, and 
there is acceptance for the possibility of collateral damage and casualties a 
military operation conducted autonomously by the EU may be feasible.75 With 
regards specifically to air operations, research conducted for this thesis found 
that a similar view exists about the potential and limits of European air 
operations. A number of respondents expressed the belief that the success of a 
                                                             
73 Strachan, The Direction of War., p. 122. 
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Capabilities. Routledge, 2002, p. 61. 
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European-led air operation would depend on the type and scale of the operation. 
In the words of an Air commodore in the RAF, who wishes to remain 
anonymous, in the case of a low or even medium scale conflict taking place in a 
permissive environment, European air forces would probably be able to build a 
strong coalition, but it would become much more difficult in case of a high-
intensity conflict.76 This is because currently none of the European air forces 
possesses enough capacity to conduct the full spectrum of air power roles, 
namely control of the air, attack, air mobility and intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance.77  
The conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo and, more recently, in Libya revealed 
shortcomings in Europe’s capabilities and their high dependency on American 
resources.78 What European air power lacked in these operations were precision 
munitions, air transport (AT), intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
(ISR) and air-to-air refuelling (AAR), which all were to a large extent supplied 
by the US. According to Elisabeth Quintana, Henrik Heidenkamp and Michael 
Codner, during operation Unified Protector in Libya, the US contributed 80 
percent of the ISR and AAR missions and supplied 50 percent of the AAR 
aircraft.79 Since Europe lacks a sustainable capacity in AT, ISR and AAR they 
will certainly need the support of the US or at least of one of the more powerful 
European air forces, like the RAF or French Air Force, in order to conduct a 
large-scale, high-intensity air operation.80 Some interviewees, however, claimed 
that even the more capable European air forces would not be able to provide 
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substantial support to an independent European air operation, as they have 
serious capacity limitations of their own.81 Collectively European air forces 
would probably be able to provide for the full spectrum of air power capabilities 
but they do not possess enough resources for a sustained operation.82 For 
example, operation Unified Protector revealed after two weeks that European air 
forces do not possess enough air tankers, ISR assets or precision guided 
munitions – all of which were needed to minimise the collateral damage.83 This 
reiterates the fact that Europe remains heavily reliant on the USAF and that any 
large-scale and sustained European air operation would not be possible without 
their input. 
The section above indicates there is not so much a capability, but a 
capacity gap between the US and European air forces. This gap exists especially 
in the area of AT, AAR and ISR, making it impossible to conduct any major 
military operation without the American support. To quote Christian F. Anrig: 
‘for most Europeans, multinational essentially means “American-led.”’84 The 
three figures below illustrate this phenomenon. Figure 1. is a comparison of the 
aircraft inventory among individual NATO and EU countries.85 It is apparent 
that the US possesses dominant air power when compared with individual fleets 
of other NATO members. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
81 Lieutenant Colonel Anders Nygren, a scholar at the Swedish Defence University, interview 
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Figure 1 NATO and EU Air Forces' Aircraft Inventory Strength by 
Country in 2017 
 
Source: "Europe" The Military Balance, 118.1 (2018), 82–164; "North America" The Military 
Balance, 118.1 (2018), 43–57. 
 
Figure 2. illustrates the difference in inventories of NATO members 
showing the capacity of the USAF versus the collective capacity of the 
remaining 28 members. Finally, figure 3. illustrates the size of the USAF 
inventory versus the collective capacity of the EU members’ air forces.  
Looking at these figures, it is clear that the US does not actually have a 
larger aircraft inventory compared to the collective capacity of the EU states or 
remaining NATO members. In NATO, the USAF has 3,738 (41 per cent) aircraft 
while the remaining members together possess 5,490 (59 per cent) aircraft. The 
USAF aircraft inventory is also smaller than the collective capacity of the EU 
countries’ air forces which equals 4,918 aircraft. However, it is not all about pure 
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numbers. The quality and varieties of aircraft available are more important than 
quantity and, as noted above, in spite of the large number of aircraft available to 
European air forces in combination, serious shortcomings exist in crucial areas, 
such as AT, AAR and ISR. Moreover, the total of all European air forces does 
not automatically combine to one powerful air force. Differences in doctrine, 
equipment, training and procedures will inevitably limit their combined 
effectiveness, or even usefulness, as a collective force. Therefore, European air 
forces in combination may possess significant hardware and capacity, but cannot 
cover the full spectrum of capabilities and are also not easily interoperable. 
Chapter 4. discusses European multinational initiatives aimed at dealing with the 
challenges of both the capability gap in AT, AAR and ISR and interoperability. 
It will show that these challenges can be minimised to an extent by following 
certain standards, for example imposed by NATO, and continuously improving 
interoperability. However, the scale of any operation will always be an issue. 
Improved interoperability and proficiency in procedures will not mitigate 
shortcomings in capacity.86  
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Figure 2 Comparison of aircraft inventory in NATO 
 
Source: "Europe" The Military Balance, 118.1 (2018), 82–164; "North America" The Military 
Balance, 118.1 (2018), 43–57. 
 
Figure 3 Comparison of the USAF and EU aircraft inventory 
 
Source: "Europe" The Military Balance, 118.1 (2018), 82–164; "North America" The Military 
Balance, 118.1 (2018), 43–57. 
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Although the capability gap is often quoted as the main reason for 
European air powers’ ongoing reliance on the USAF, some observers in fact 
believe that lacking willingness and effort by European states to cooperate is a 
more significant constraint. Reaching agreement on strategic objectives, how to 
achieve them, questions of command and the allocation of resources have been 
seen as particularly problematic in this respect.87 Another explanation for the 
gap between US and European air power is the fact that air power never played 
such a major role in Europe as it has done in the US, a tendency that has its 
origins in the Cold War and has evolved into a bigger problem with changes in 
the security environment since the early 1990s. As suggested by Anrig, during 
the Cold War there was no need for Western European militaries to develop 
advanced strategic airlift capabilities because they were not expected to conduct 
any expeditionary operations.88 The same was applicable for the members of the 
former Warsaw Pact who were also preparing for operating within the European 
theatre. With the end of the Cold War and the increasing number of 
expeditionary operations, those airlift limitations have become obvious. As this 
thesis will show, European air forces have developed mechanisms for 
multinational cooperation in order to build collective capabilities and, 
ultimately, to fill the capability gap and reduce their reliance on the US. 
 
Decreasing defence budgets. 
Chapter 1. already indicated that shrinking defence budgets have been 
another reason for the growing tendency to conduct military operations as 
multinational ventures. Less money available for defence has meant that 
European states have not been able to overcome the capacity gap with the US 
simply by purchasing more and new advanced equipment. This has been 
particularly significant for the air forces, as a service that is heavily dependent 
on technology. According to the definition given in the current British air 
doctrine, air power is ‘the ability to use air capabilities in and from the air, to 
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influence the behaviour of actors and the course of events.’89 Therefore, to 
operate in and from the air, one needs specific equipment to do this. Air power 
and air forces cannot exist without aircraft and the associated systems. Since 
these platforms are necessary for an air force to exist in the first place, they also 
define its capabilities as well as its limitations, since a specific type of an aircraft 
enables an air force to perform particular task.90 Air forces are generally 
technologically similar across nations, especially those allied within one 
organisation.91 For example, aircraft built (or bought) by countries allied in 
NATO, are designed according to certain standards in order to ensure their 
interoperability.92 This has further enabled and enhanced European air forces’ 
motivation for engaging in multinational operations, especially in the air power 
realm, in order to make up for gaps in capabilities.  
If air power prowess heavily depends on expensive specialist equipment, 
keeping up with the latest developments is crucial. However, after the end of the 
Cold War, as a result of decreasing military expenditure, the size of European 
military forces, including air forces, has been cut, a process that is often 
described as ‘concentration’.93 As discussed in more detail in the next section, 
concentration of the armed forces, including the air forces, is often presented as 
favourable development, because smaller, professional military forces are more 
effective than mass militaries. At the same time, the procurement of high-tech 
equipment required to make up for shortages in manpower is extremely costly. 
For example, the cost of the first four multirole fighter jets F-35B ordered by the 
UK, which arrived at the RAF Marham base in June 2018 is 92 million pounds 
each.94 That number, however, only shows the cost of the single aircraft but does 
not reflect the full scale of the investment. Keeping up with the latest 
technological developments requires the air forces not only to modernise their 
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fleets but also the infrastructure on the ground. For example, in order to prepare 
for receiving the F-35s, the British Defence Infrastructure Organisation invested 
250 million pounds in the programme of upgrading the infrastructure at RAF 
Marham base which involved resurfacing the runways, construction of three 
vertical landing pads for the F-35s, construction of new headquarters for the 617 
Squadron as well as refurbishment of the existing facilities, such as aircraft 
shelters and hangar, offices or gym and canteen.95 The given example shows the 
scale of expenditure that an air force would face in an attempt to keep up with 
the latest developments and maintain a modern and capable fleet.  
The above processes – rising technology costs and shrinking defence 
budgets result in increased concentration of the air forces - will be discussed in 
more detail in section 2.2. below. These processes may mean that it will be 
getting increasingly difficult to balance the budgets and at the same time to 
maintain air forces with a wide spectrum of military capabilities.96 Therefore 
multinational cooperation between European countries has been seen as 
important to ease some of the financial constraints and help with overcoming 
military shortcomings.97 
 
Improving interoperability and integration at personnel level. 
Finally, improving interoperability and integration at the personnel level 
has been another factor in the growing popularity of multinational cooperation 
among European air forces. Combining forces in multinational efforts is 
imperative for European states for the reasons outlined above. However, 
international cooperation is also difficult and brings many potential challenges, 
as discussed in detail in Chapter 5. Pursuing different collaborative initiatives at 
a multinational level may help with overcoming the problem of cultural diversity 
and improve interoperability and integration. Joint operations and training in 
foreign units have been identified by Elron, Shamir and Ben-Ari as one of the 
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integrating mechanisms improving cooperation between military forces.98 
Multinational projects and missions give staff the opportunity to learn to work 
together, to share values, experiences and practices and as a result integrate the 
military personnel coming from different cultural backgrounds.  
As the above section suggested, creating the collective resources for 
European states to pool and share is crucial for building or strengthening the full 
spectrum of their air power capabilities as well as maintaining military capacity. 
This would enable the involved air forces to perform their roles, however, still 
in a significantly smaller capacity (whether individual or joint) than the US.99  
 
2.2 European air power – towards concentration and 
transnationalisation 
 
The increasing tendency of European air forces to perform in the 
framework of multinational military operations since the end of the Cold War is 
linked to two further transformation trends identified by Anthony King: the 
concentration and transnationalisation of European militaries.100 The change in 
the security environment as well as gradually reduced military expenditure, led 
to moving away from the idea of mass, often conscript, armed forces in favour 
of smaller, volunteer and professional ones. King describes this process as 
‘concentration’.101 Moreover, the significant reduction in numbers of active 
military personnel as well as the available equipment, resulted in an increased 
need for developing efficient cooperation mechanisms between European 
militaries. In effect they became interdependent and interconnected in a process 
of ‘transnationalisation’. An example of this process has been the creation of 
collective military resources for European states to pool and share. Some of these 
initiatives will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. as examples of the 
process of transnationalisation of the European air forces. The next two sections 
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will introduce the concepts of concentration and transnationalisation of 
European militaries in the post-Cold War period. Using available literature 
focusing on European armed forces in general, they aim to set up a conceptual 
framework which will be used in Chapters 3. and 4. to explore the development 
of these two processes among European air forces. 
 
2.2.1 Concentration 
 
Concentration of European militaries in the post-Cold War period 
involved their reduction and re-organisation often leading to creating specialised 
and compact professional military forces.102 The process is discussed in the 
wider literature under various names. For example, Philippe Manigart 
investigates restructuring of the armed forces after 1990 which involved their 
downsizing and professionalisation.103 This is similar to the concept of the 
conversion of the armed forces taking place in the post-Cold War period. As 
argued by Ljubica Jelušič, the term itself is used with reference to re-allocating 
the production and use of resources from military to civilian uses, involving such 
phenomena as demobilisation, disarmament or defence restructuring.104 All of 
these are elements in the concentration of post-Cold War militaries as understood 
by King.  
The process of changes taking place within the military sector did not 
happen in vacuum, but went hand in hand with the transformation of the civilian 
sector. For example, King pointed out that the trend of concentration of military 
forces observed after 1990 is a continuation of the process which started in the 
1970s and was running parallel to the transformation of the industry visible in 
moving away from the mass workforce to increasing professionalisation.105 
Manigart mentioned here technological evolution such as, for example, 
automation which, just as in the industrial sector and apart from the reduced 
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expenditure, resulted in reduction of the size of the armed forces.106 However, 
technological developments or budgetary cuts were not the only reasons for 
initiating the process of concentration of European militaries. Another reason 
was the changing security environment. With the end of East-West tensions and 
the diminishing threat of a large-scale state-on-state aggression, in many 
European states the military was no longer perceived as a priority and started to 
be reduced and restructured.107 
Considering the shrinking budgets and downsizing of European armed 
forces one might conclude that these militaries came out of this situation weaker 
than they used to be – with less money and less personnel. However, as King 
suggested, in many ways the opposite is true, because the armed forces today are 
‘qualitatively different’ from the Cold War.108 Because of their specialisation 
they often benefitted from increased investment in priority areas, resulting in 
advanced capabilities and increased effectiveness. However, such improvements 
were limited to capabilities that were prioritised at the time and without a doubt 
came at the expense of maintaining military forces with the full spectrum of 
capabilities (and capabilities for fighting high-intensity warfare in particular).109 
Abolishing conscription and creating specialised military units organised into 
joint rapid reaction forces in place of massive, national service armies led to the 
concentration of the European armed forces and, as will be discussed in Chapter 
3. European air forces were no exception and also underwent a process of 
concentration. 
Rejecting mass militaries and introducing professionalisation led to 
cultural changes within the armed forces and their approach to the service. By 
abandoning the idea of compulsory military service, European armed forces had 
to become competitive on the job market in order to attract potential recruits by, 
for example, investing in their continuous training or offering clear career 
perspectives.110 As a result, the militaries, and air forces as will be discussed in 
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Chapter 3., became smaller, but also more cost-effective as, with fewer but 
professional and voluntary personnel willing to raise their qualifications, they 
are more focused on developing a wide range of capabilities within specialised 
units.111 Explaining that phenomenon, Jelušič suggested reductions of specific 
types of equipment and weapons, especially outdated ones, may allow for 
increased development and investing in advanced solutions.112 That combined 
with structural changes would result in increased capability as well as 
specialisation and professionalisation within a particular area.  
The process of specialisation and professionalisation of the post-Cold 
War European armed forces is also linked to the changing character of 
contemporary conflict and increasing number of operations other than war, such 
as, for example, peacekeeping, peace support or humanitarian interventions 
requiring deeper cooperation between military and civilian sectors than the 
traditionally perceived military functions.113 In effect, the armed forces, 
including air forces, are being reduced in size but also restructured in the process 
of adaptation to the requirements of the changing political situation and security 
environment. In sum, the concentration of European armed forces should not be 
viewed exclusively as a decline, but rather as an evolution – a change in quality. 
The concept of concentration will be used for a systematic study of the changes 
taking place in the post-Cold War RAF, Polish and Swedish Air Forces in 
Chapter 3.  
 
2.2.2 Transnationalisation 
 
Another characteristic of the post-Cold War transformation of European 
militaries identified by King is transnationalisation. This is understood as the 
process of European armed forces becoming more and more interdependent and 
interoperable.114 As such, transnationalisation is not new: states have been 
cooperating before the 1990s, whether it was done within NATO structures, 
Warsaw Pact, or ad hoc coalitions. However, after the Cold War, this 
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collaboration has become much deeper and happens also at lower levels of the 
military structure and is therefore of significance for this thesis. 
Just as the process of concentration happened along the industrial 
recession in Europe, transnationalisation of the armed forces went hand in hand 
with changes taking place in the business sector. The emergence of the European 
market resulted in increasing numbers of international mergers between 
companies specialising in insurance, accounting, banking, travel as well as 
industrial organisations.115 The process of transnationalisation also affected 
European police forces. For example, Joseph Soeters, Geert Hofstede and 
Mireille van Twuyver explored the developing trend of cross border cooperation 
among German, Dutch and Belgian police forces in the Euregion Maas-Rhine116 
after signing the Schengen Convention in 1990 and abolishing the internal 
borders between the signatories.117 The authors came up with several 
recommendations for improving that cooperation such as, organising 
intercultural training, performing joint tasks, job rotation or establishing liaison 
officers and institutions.118 All of these would increase both interoperability and 
interdependence between the involved forces, making them transnational. 
Similar interdependencies arose as the armed forces became increasingly 
transnational. Such a process was essential considering the increased number of 
multinational operations and the necessity to streamline cooperation as well as 
to deal with potential difficulties. This phenomenon was called by Klein and 
Kümmel the ‘internationalisation of military life’.119 Increased multinational 
military cooperation following the end of the Cold War was not only essential, 
but also inevitable. King stated two basic reasons for this – first, it gave states an 
opportunity to maintain their military capability while the process of 
concentration was simultaneously taking place and, secondly, it helped to uphold 
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the idea of existing alliances, particularly NATO, as still useful.120 Although 
beneficial for sustaining a state’s military power, increased participation in 
multinational ventures of different kinds also required that the armed forces 
demonstrated a certain level of flexibility to adapt to the environment and 
circumstances they were supposed to operate in.  
Christopher Dandeker listed several traits characteristic of flexible armed 
forces, such as having adequate equipment, organisational structure as well as 
regulations and policies making it possible to create coalitions and quickly react 
to any potential crises that may arise.121 The concept of flexible forces is related 
to both the idea of concentration and transnationalisation. It involves increased 
cooperation between different militaries working together in alliances or 
coalitions, but it also indicates the necessity of re-organisation of the existing 
structures as well as prioritisation and specialisation within certain capabilities. 
Such a situation is dictated by the fact that most of the European states would 
not be able to achieve flexibility (as described above) and demonstrate full and 
varied capability and capacity to quickly respond to any kind of a potential crisis. 
As pointed out by Dandeker, most of them would need to carefully calculate 
what they can afford to specialise in and which capabilities need to be left 
underdeveloped and, in case of such need, could be filled in with the collective 
help of allies.122 
The increased cooperation between European air forces and reliance on 
pooled and shared resources has led to more interdependence and 
interoperability. This does not mean, however, that it will ultimately lead to the 
creation of a supranational European military or air force. In fact, a certain 
paradox exists in the process of building a transnational network of European 
militaries and air forces. Increasing cooperation since the end of the Cold War 
has led to a much higher degree of interaction, not only at the level of 
multinational command, but also at tactical and operational levels – something 
unlikely to be observed pre-1990.123 This was triggered by the changes in the 
emerging post-Cold War security environment, which forced all European 
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countries to restructure and reduce their armed forces. There has been a 
widespread expectation that concentrated militaries will still be able to deal 
effectively with the newly emerging threats.124 Increased multinational 
cooperation was one way chosen by European countries to achieve this. The 
concept of post-Cold War transnationalisation of the armed forces in Europe will 
be used in Chapter 4. as a framework to investigate the process of increasing 
interoperability and interdependence in the RAF, Polish, and Swedish Air Force. 
 
2.3 The complexity of multinational operations – challenges and 
difficulties 
 
  As discussed in section 2.1., owing to the use of similar technology and 
comparable standards and procedures, air forces might be less affected than 
ground forces by the difficulties of operating in a multinational environment. 
However, as this thesis will show the potential challenge air forces might 
encounter when deployed in multinational operations are still significant.  
The uniqueness of air power derives from its attributes which allow for 
dominating the third dimension of the battlefield, such as speed, reach and height 
together with ubiquity, agility and concentration.125 These are the characteristics 
which distinguish air power from other services and enable it to conduct a wide 
range of operations at any point of the operational area. As a result, military force 
is no longer bound to geographical location but can quickly respond to a crisis 
wherever and whenever needed. There are certain limitations which can slow 
down or disrupt an air power deployment, for example impermanence, limited 
payload or vulnerability (to hostile fire or weather).126 Despite this, air power 
still offers more versatile opportunities than any other type of military force. 
What an air force is capable of depends first of all on the available equipment, 
diminishing the centrality of the human factor.127 As a result of relatively 
uniform rules, the influence of human behaviour and cultural diversity in 
multinational operations should be less pronounced for air forces than other arms 
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of military service.128 NATO’s AJP 3.3(B) Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and 
Space Operations is a good illustration of this point.129 As will be discussed in 
Chapter 3., this doctrine is referred to as a template for national doctrinal 
documents by both the RAF, Polish Air Force and, interestingly, even the 
Swedish Air Force, which is not part of the NATO alliance. Such similarities in 
doctrine, procedures and technology, enhanced by regular operations as a part of 
an alliance or coalition, indicate the increasing interdependence and 
internationalisation of European air forces. 
Although, as discussed, air forces are less susceptible to some of the 
challenges encountered in multinational operations, this does not mean that there 
is such a thing as a supranational air force culture where cultural differences are 
no longer important. For example, as Soeters and Boer suggested that the cultural 
background of personnel influences their ability to work with advanced 
technology in an interdependent system, such as aviation.130 Therefore, the issue 
of cultural diversity is still applicable when speaking of smooth cooperation 
between different air forces in a multinational operation, as this thesis will show. 
The following sections look specifically at the potential challenges that may arise 
in a multinational air operation. There are no doctrinal publications addressing 
specifically the involvement of air power in such operations, either at the 
national or NATO level. This means that according to the doctrinal guidance 
available, the principles for multinational operations generally do not change 
depending on whether these involve land forces, navy or air power. Because of 
this limitation in the available literature, section 2.3.1. therefore focuses mostly 
on official publications and secondary sources treating the subject of potential 
problems in multinational operations on a general level. It discusses the 
influence of national culture on the behaviour of military personnel using the 
model proposed by Geert Hofstede allocating different nationalities with index 
values in five cultural dimensions, namely power distance, individualism-
collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity-femininity and long-short term 
orientation.131 Doing so, the model illustrates the cultural differences among 
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nations and helps to identify the potential problems which may arise from these 
differences. The identification of challenges in multinational military operations 
combined with Hofstede’s model of cultural dimensions to military studies, will 
be used as a framework for studying the subject of multinational cooperation in 
relation to the RAF, Polish and Swedish Air Forces in Chapters 3. and 5. of the 
thesis.  
 
2.3.1 Potential challenges in multinational operations 
 
There are a number of potential challenges an air force may encounter in 
a multinational operation. These usually involve issues related to the different 
cultural backgrounds of the participating nations, including different languages 
being spoken. Culture is a complex term and, due to the scope of the thesis, 
cannot be addressed comprehensively.132 However, for the purpose of this 
research, culture is understood accordingly to Hofstede’s definition – ‘the 
collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group 
or category of people from others.’133 This understanding encapsulates two 
common definitions of culture. One which says that culture consists of ‘the 
beliefs, way of life, art, and customs shared and accepted by people in a 
particular society’, and another defining it as ‘the attitudes and beliefs about 
something that are shared by a particular group of people or in a particular 
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organisation.’134 In the context of this thesis it is vital to emphasise this last 
distinction and to note that culture distinguishes not only nations and societies, 
but also organisations and professional groups – in this particular case these are 
military organisations and members of the British, Polish and Swedish Air 
Forces.  
Considerations of national sovereignty and domestic political priorities 
and sensitivities can also present difficulties, as can conflicting national rules of 
engagement (ROE). Finally, a lack of standardisation and interoperability 
regarding equipment, procedures and training can make cooperation difficult. 
Even though the above factors are often discussed individually, they do not exist 
separately and can occur in different combinations once the operation has 
started. 
A comprehensive approach to the complexity of multinational military 
operations is presented in the US Joint Publication (JP) 3-16 Multinational 
Operations which covers a broad spectrum of issues that should be addressed in 
order to build efficient cooperation with other nations and achieve the desired 
objective.135 These considerations are divided into three main groups: general, 
operational and other, and as such they also help to identify potential challenges 
that a country may encounter when involved in a multinational operation. The 
table below summarises what, according to this US doctrine, a commander and 
military staff should consider while planning and executing a multinational 
operation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
134 See culture in a society and culture in a group, Longman. Dictionary of Contemporary 
English. 4th Edition. Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2003, p. 382. 
135 See Joint Publication (JP) 3-16 Multinational Operations, 16 July 2013. Available at: 
<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub_operations.htm> [accessed 10/02/2017], pp. 
III-1–III-54. 
56 
 
Table 2 Considerations for Planning and Executing Multinational 
Operations 
General considerations Operational considerations Other considerations 
Diplomatic and military 
considerations: 
• national objectives, 
• military capabilities, 
• integration of assets, 
• preparation, and 
• range of individual 
forces’ employment. 
Sharing and receiving 
intelligence from other 
coalition or alliance 
members and their military 
forces. 
 
 
Host-Nation Support 
including available 
infrastructure. 
Building and maintaining a 
multinational force including 
addressing any command 
issues. 
Sharing  classified 
information with other 
nations involved in an 
operation. 
Health services. 
Mission analysis and 
assignment of tasks. 
Integrating communications 
between alliance or coalition 
members: 
• frequency 
management, 
• equipment and 
procedural 
compatibility, 
• information security, 
• friend-foe 
identification, 
• data-link protocols. 
Preparation for non-
combatant evacuation 
operations. 
Language, culture and 
sovereignty issues between 
nations involved in an 
operation. 
Operational environment: 
• land 
• sea 
• air 
• space 
• cyberspace 
• information 
operations. 
Personnel support. 
Legal considerations 
involving international 
agreements, treatment of 
detainees and military 
justice. 
Special operations. Understanding of 
meteorology and 
oceanography. 
Doctrine and training. Civil affairs support, within 
NATO structures referred as 
Civil-Military Cooperation. 
Environmental 
considerations. 
Funding and resources. Joint fires which is 
integration of both, lethal 
and non-lethal capabilities of 
involved operation 
members. 
Transitions: 
• from a plan to 
execution, 
• between operation 
phases, 
• transition of authority. 
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Protection of personnel, 
information and critical 
assets. 
Integration of partner 
nations’ systems using 
electromagnetic spectrum 
for communications, 
command and control, 
electronic warfare, etc. 
Considerations for foreign 
humanitarian assistance 
operations. 
Concurrent rules of 
engagement although a 
complete agreement on that 
may not be achievable in 
every case. 
Multinational 
communications integration 
among participating nations 
and public affairs: using 
information to create 
favourable conditions, 
anticipating media coverage, 
minimising misinformation, 
etc. 
 
Combat identification and 
friendly fire prevention. 
Multinational logistics.  
 Personnel recovery.  
 Considerations specific for 
stability, counterdrug or 
chemical, biological, 
radiological and nuclear 
operations. 
 
Source: JP 3-16 Multinational Operations, July 2013, pp. III-1–III-54. 
 
JP 3-16 was written specifically for the US Armed Forces. However, the 
issues it focuses on are quite general and can be applied to any multinational 
grouping. Similar principles and considerations for multinational operations 
have been mirrored in a series of allied joint doctrine publications issued by 
NATO. These include, for example, mutual confidence, respect and knowledge 
of the partners, effective communication, civil-military cooperation, concurrent 
ROE or unity of effort.136 
A very similar list of potential challenges in multinational arrangements 
can be found in NATO’s Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC) 
publication on the concept of Regional Fighter Partnership.137 The document 
discusses the idea for a NATO-led pooling and sharing programme focusing on 
building a sustainable fighter capability among its members aimed especially at 
strengthening that capability in Central and Eastern European states. The paper, 
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alongside a list of potential benefits, also enumerates potential challenges which 
may occur among the participating air forces. These include difficulties in 
establishing mutual trust and cooperation; loss of autonomy over national assets, 
dependence on other nations and national caveats; incompatibility of individual 
nations’ standards, certifications or divergence in national interests; potential 
liability and legal issues; difficulties in the process of decision making; language 
related issues; as well as requirements for deployable personnel.138 These 
challenges do not differ from those listed in the above joint doctrinal 
publications, so there seems to be an assumption that the challenges of 
multinational operations are the same for air forces, ground forces and the navy. 
Scholarly studies of multinational operations have come to conclusions 
similar to those flagged up in official documents discussed above. For example, 
Soeters et al. identified seven conditions for smooth cooperation within a 
multinational, or cross-cultural, military organisation.139 These include such 
issues as cultural diversity, national heterogeneity and technological 
interoperability. Furthermore, equally important as national or cultural 
heterogeneity is also internal cohesion and status of units. For example, 
according to Soeters et al. specialised, high status units, such as air manoeuvre 
or airborne troops have usually a very strong sense of identity and belonging but 
also a tendency to disregard anyone coming from the outside of their own circle 
– and this, in a multinational operational environment, may prove counter-
productive.140 
Effective cooperation within a multinational environment can also be 
helped by a well-considered organisation of tasks. For example, if nations are 
willing to assimilate or to subordinate to another nation’s leadership, a 
multinational unit can be organised in a reciprocal structure where all 
participants collectively contribute to various tasks.141 In fact, working together 
towards one common goal is a powerful integrative factor, especially if that goal 
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is a supranational objective, such as, for example, peace or international 
justice.142 However, if countries are resistant to assimilation and perceive their 
own culture and identity as superior, a more effective way forward is a separation 
strategy and a parallel organisation, where nations operate within their own 
separate roles or even in separate geographical areas.143 
It is also vital that cooperation is not disturbed by a shift in bargaining 
power between involved nations, for example when a national contingent tries 
to become more independent or if the contribution by a specific country is getting 
more important for the overall outcome.144 Finally, according to Soeters et al., 
multinational cooperation will be less strained if conducted under non-life-
threatening conditions and executed by personnel well-prepared for any given 
situation.145 This confirms the idea of national caveats as a serious challenge to 
the successful conduct of multinational operations, when such caveats are 
imposed by a government to minimise the risk exposure of its own personnel. 
At the same time, Elron, Shamir and Ben-Ari pointed out that being together in 
a situation of danger can also act as an integrating and bonding factor in 
multinational military organisation.146 
The above section identified several potential difficulties which may 
occur in a multinational operation. These can be grouped in three categories: 
challenges arising from cultural background, those related to the issues of 
national sovereignty and domestic politics, and various interoperability issues. 
Chapter 5. will use this categorisation to discuss the challenges disrupting 
multinational cooperation involving European armed forces, and the RAF, 
Polish and Swedish Air Forces in particular. 
 
2.3.2 Cultural implications for effective multinational cooperation 
 
The previous section suggested that many potential challenges that an air 
force may encounter in a multinational operation stem from differences in 
cultural background. In fact, any multinational team or operation can be 
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described as cross-cultural since it involves participants adhering to different 
values or traditions, using different languages or accustomed to different work 
styles. Such differences do not only relate to very distant cultures but can also 
exist within long standing alliances, such as NATO. 
Despite the differences originating from national backgrounds, all 
personnel participating in a multinational operation also share a common 
military background or culture. Several authors have identified characteristics 
like bureaucracy, hierarchy, similar structures, discipline, ethos and a 
‘communal’ character as features specific to military organisations.147 These 
characteristics, to a greater or lesser degree, are part of the military culture of all 
states and therefore are shared by all military personnel involved in a 
multinational operation, no matter what their national background is. Military 
culture is also generally perceived as ‘masculine’ since, as pointed out by Karen 
Dunivin, it was created by men within a paradigm of ‘a combat masculine-
warrior’.148 Therefore, a shared professional culture that is universal to all armed 
forces to an extent, forms an important basis for ensuring the smooth cooperation 
of military personnel from different backgrounds in a multinational setting. 
Nevertheless, challenges posed by participants’ various national characteristics 
when they are working in multinational military operations cannot be completely 
ruled out. Chapter 5. of the thesis will study the importance of national 
characteristics for the success of multinational engagements by European air 
forces, and of the RAF, the Swedish and Polish air forces in particular. It will do 
so by drawing on an adapted version of Geert Hofstede’s concept of cultural 
dimensions, which will be explained in detail below. 
In the 1970s, Geert Hofstede, in order to analyse the cross-cultural 
differences in a multinational business organisation, conducted an extensive 
survey of IBM employees from over 50 different countries. He identified five 
cultural dimensions: power distance, individualism-collectivism, uncertainty 
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avoidance, masculinity-femininity and long-short term orientation.149 Hofstede 
allocated every country with an index value corresponding to each of these five 
areas. The study was later replicated by different researchers, including Hofstede 
himself. Significantly, it was also used in the field of military studies, which is 
why it was identified as a relevant conceptual aid for the analysis of the 
implications of cultural differences in multinational air operations in this thesis. 
For example, in 1997 Soeters followed Hofstede’s approach to investigate 
cultural differences in military academies in 13 different countries.150 In 2010, 
Janja Vuga referred to Slovenia and Italy’s index values proposed by Hofstede, 
in her study of cultural differences during these countries’ involvement in the 
UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL II) peacekeeping mission.151 Also, most 
vital for this thesis, in 1998, Wojciech Nasierowski and Bogusz Mikuła 
replicated Hofstede’s study to investigate the cultural characteristics of Polish 
managers.152 Another study was conducted by Ludek Kolman, Niels G. 
Noorderhaven, Geert Hofstede and Elisabeth Dienes, which focused on four 
Central European countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia.153 The inclusion of Poland in these samples is especially important for 
this thesis, since Polish nationals, unlike British and Swedish nationals, were not 
surveyed by Hofstede either in 1970s or 1982. Furthermore, in spite of the fact 
that initially it may seem contradictory, research conducted in a business 
environment, like Hofstede’s model, can be successfully used to investigating 
contemporary military organisations because of the changes they underwent in 
last 30 years. Following the transformation into specialised, professional, all-
volunteer forces, Western militaries today resemble much more a business 
organisation where career prospects are equally important as in any other 
profession.  
                                                             
149 The long-short term orientation dimension was added in 1980s illustrating a society’s 
adaptability and acceptance of its future changes and will not be looked at in this thesis. See 
Hofstede, Culture’s Consequences., pp. 351–370. 
150 See Soeters, “Value Orientations in Military Academies.”, 7–32. 
151 See Janja Vuga, ”Cultural Differences in Multinational Peace Operations: A Slovenian 
Perspective.” International Peacekeeping, 17.4 (2010), 554-565. Available at: 
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152 See Wojciech Nasierowski and Bogusz Mikuła, „Culture Dimensions of Polish Managers: 
Hofstede’s Indices.” Organization Studies, 19.3 (1998), 495–509. 
153 See Ludek Kolman, et al., “Cross-cultural differences in Central Europe.” Journal of 
Managerial Psychology, 18.1 (2003), 76–88, pp. 78–80. 
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Nevertheless, when applying Hofstede’s model to analyse the 
implications of cultural differences in multinational air operations one should be 
aware of some limitations. Two potential shortcomings must be considered here. 
The first limitation is the small number of studies applying Hofstede’s model to 
military organisations and, what follows, unavailability of index scores for a 
sample of countries comparable with Hofstede’s research at IBM. Moreover, if 
the model of cultural dimensions is being used in military studies, it is applied 
to the armed forces in general without distinguishing between the army, navy or 
air force where service-specific cultural characteristics may also exist. As such, 
although insightful, the conclusions reached in this thesis based on that 
framework will not be absolute and more future research in this area will be 
required. A second potential limitation of applying Hofstede’s model is the fact 
that his research is 40-50 years old and the data, as well as some concepts he is 
referring to like, for example, ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’, may seem 
outdated. However, in the absence of other, more suitable or up-to-date 
frameworks, Hofstede’s study provides a strong point of reference to show how 
influential and how important is the national culture in spite of its potential 
limitations. As Hofstede stressed, the data he gathered at IBM represents values 
which were emerging through centuries and therefore will always provide an 
insight into understanding national cultures.154 As such, his model also proves 
useful for investigating in this thesis the influence of national culture on military 
culture. 
The two tables below illustrate the scores allocated to British, Polish and 
Swedish nationals using the model created by Hofstede. Table 3. presents 
national index values representative for British, Polish and Swedish societies 
according to the studies conducted by Hofstede and Kolman et al. Table 4. refers 
to the aforementioned study conducted by Soeters on cultural differences in 
military academies and illustrates the discrepancies between the scores 
applicable to British society and those allocated to the British military. The next 
sections will briefly describe what is understood under each of the four 
dimensions and how they may be applicable to the study of European air forces’ 
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involvement in multinational operations, particularly focusing on the UK, 
Poland and Sweden. 
 
Table 3 National index values for the UK, Poland and Sweden according to 
Geert Hofstede's four cultural dimensions 
 
United Kingdom Poland Sweden 
Power distance 35 62 31 
Individualism-collectivism 89 55 71 
Uncertainty avoidance 35 85 29 
Masculinity-femininity 66 87 5 
Sources: Hofstede, Culture’s Consequences., p. 500; Kolman, et al., “Cross-cultural differences 
in Central Europe.” p. 80. 
 
Table 4 Comparison of cultural dimensions values for British society 
according to Hofstede, and officers at the Royal Military 
Academy Sandhurst according to Soeters 
 
Hofstede Soeters 
Power distance 35 131 
Individualism-collectivism 89 44 
Uncertainty avoidance 35 49 
Masculinity-femininity 66 3 
Sources: Hofstede, Culture’s Consequences., p. 500; Soeters, “Value Orientations in Military 
Academies.”, pp. 15–18. 
 
Power Distance 
The cultural dimension of power distance is defined by Hofstede as ‘the 
extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organisations 
within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally.’155 
Poland, among the three case studies, was allocated the highest national score of 
62 meaning that there is a majority acceptance for a rigid hierarchy among Polish 
nationals. Since acceptance of an authoritarian hierarchy and discipline is 
characteristic for military organisations, one can expect high, or even higher 
values for the Polish Air Force as well. The values for this dimension for the UK 
and Sweden are much lower, respectively, 35 and 31. However, the result from 
questionnaires distributed among the officers at the Royal Military Academy in 
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Sandhurst showed an index value of 131 in the power distance dimension. This 
implies that British military culture, compared to British society at large, highly 
values hierarchy, authority and discipline. The Swedish National Defence 
University (SWENDU) was included in a study conducted by Soeters and Recht 
in 1998, where the students were allocated a ‘minus’ value for the importance of 
military discipline, which aligns with Swedish society’s low score for power 
distance.156 This seems to contradict the character of military culture and high 
power distance scores usually associated with it. However, a study conducted by 
Robert L. Helmreich and Ashleigh C. Merritt showed that civilian pilots, 
including Swedish pilots, tended to display higher power distance scores than 
those allocated by Hofstede to their societies of origin.157 It is therefore not 
unlikely that a study of Swedish Air Force personnel would also reveal a power 
index score higher than that of Swedish society at large. In the absence of definite 
data on this matter, however, this conclusion is only speculative.  
 
Uncertainty Avoidance 
Uncertainty avoidance, according to Hofstede, relates to the extent to 
which a society is able to accept ambiguous situations.158 Groups or individuals 
with high uncertainty avoidance index are often willing to undertake risky 
actions if these will lessen ambiguities and allow them to re-gain control of the 
situation.159 Uncertainty avoidance, therefore, is not the same as risk avoidance. 
Among the three case studies used in this thesis, Poland, scores the highest value 
in this dimension of 85. This means that Polish society demonstrates a high need 
for set regulations, which will grant some level of control in the case of an 
ambiguous situation. The UK and Sweden’s uncertainty avoidance values are, 
respectively, 35 and 29. Similarly to the case of power distance, there is a 
dichotomy between the score allocated by Hofstede to British society and the 
                                                             
156 The article did not list index values for the Swedish military in the same way as it was done 
for the UK. See Joseph L. Soeters and Ricardo Recht, “Culture and Discipline in Military 
Academies: An International Comparison.” Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 24.2 
(1998), 169–189. 
157 Helmreich and Merritt conducted research on national, organisational and professional 
influences in (civilian) aviation and medicine which involved 22 case study countries. See Robert 
L. Helmreich and Ashleigh C. Merritt, Culture at Work in Aviation and Medicine. National, 
Organizational and Professional Influences. Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 1998, p. 93. 
158 Hofstede, Culture’s Consequences., p. 148. 
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score of 49 allocated by Soeters to the surveyed group of British officer cadets 
at Sandhurst, although the difference is not as significant in this case. This 
suggests that the British military has a slightly higher esteem for set regulations 
than society at large. The low national value allocated to Swedish society, 
especially when combined with the ‘minus’ value allocated by Soeters and Recht 
to the importance of military discipline among the students at SWENDU160, 
indicates low uncertainty avoidance and less need for set rules and regulations. 
Also, the aforementioned study by Helmreich and Merritt revealed a correlation 
between Hofstede’s score and the one allocated to civilian pilots, including 
Swedish pilots.161 The low power distance scores discussed above, stand in 
opposition to what one would expect from members of a military organisation. 
Such a situation is interesting though, especially in case of air power where, as 
Soeters and Boer said, ‘the precise following of rules is a matter of life and death’ 
and strict adherence to set procedures is a large part of the personnel’s 
training.162 It is interesting not only because such behaviour contradicts what one 
would expect from members of a military organisation. It would also present 
Swedish military culture as a very distinct one when compared with the British 
or Polish one, however further studies on that matter would be needed to confirm 
that claim. 
 
Collectivism versus Individualism 
Hofstede’s third cultural dimension – collectivism versus individualism, 
may be referred to as independence versus interdependence.163 It illustrates the 
extent to which members of a society are dependent (or not) on a group.164 On 
the one hand, the implication is that military personnel from countries with a low 
collectivism versus individualism score, which places high importance on 
building strong relations within a group and working in a team, might be more 
likely to integrate into a multinational military unit or effort.165 On the other 
                                                             
160 See Soeters and Recht, “Culture and Discipline in Military Academies.”, pp. 180–181. 
161 Helmreich and Merritt, Culture at Work in Aviation and Medicine., pp. 94–95. 
162 Soeters and Boer. “Culture and Flight Safety.”, p. 119. 
163 Helen Altman Klein, “Cultural Differences in Cognition: Barriers in Multinational 
Collaborations.” In How Professionals make Decisions ed. by Henry Montgomery, Raanan 
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164 Hofstede, Culture’s Consequences., p. 225. 
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hand, Anne Lise Bjørnstad and Pål Ulleberg argued that it may actually be easier 
for armed forces personnel from countries with a higher score for individualism 
to cooperate in multinational operations, because they attach less importance to 
group relations and therefore cultural differences will not matter as much.166 
Among the three, the UK holds the highest index score in the 
individualism versus collectivism dimension (89). The value for Sweden is not 
that much lower, at 71. Poland was allocated the lowest score among the three 
cases (55) which demonstrates a tendency to build strong relations within a 
group and high reliance on support from this group. Collectivism also means a 
greater desire to work within a team and as such would be more characteristic 
for military culture, suggesting that a similar result would be likely for the Polish 
Armed Forces, including the Air Force. The existence of a link between a low 
score in the individualism versus collectivism dimension and military culture 
was verified by Soeters. His study showed that the score for individualism was 
50 percent lower among military officers at Sandhurst than among British 
society at large. This indicates that British military culture and personnel is much 
more collectivist than society. In the case of Sweden, the aforementioned study 
by Helmreich and Merritt showed a certain convergence between Hofstede’s 
national scores and values allocated for pilots of civilian airlines, including in 
Sweden.167 This hints at the likelihood that Swedish Air Force personnel also 
represents higher levels of individualism than their Polish and British 
counterparts. 
 
Masculinity versus Femininity 
Finally, the masculinity versus femininity dimension relates to the extent 
to which a society demonstrates what Hofstede calls ‘masculine’ values.168 
                                                             
166 Anne Lise Bjørnstad and Pål Ulleberg, “Is Established Knowledge About Cross-Cultural 
Differences in Individualism-Collectivism Not Applicable to the Military? A Multi-Method 
Study of Cross-Cultural Differences in Behavior.” Military Psychology, 29.6 (2017), 477–490, 
p. 485 
167 Helmreich and Merritt, Culture at Work in Aviation and Medicine., p. 94. 
168 One should acknowledge however that the terms ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’, as 
understood by Hofstede, are firstly, contested in wider literature and, secondly, too complex to 
be addressed comprehensively within the scope of this thesis. For further discussion on gender 
roles in military studies see, for example, Deborah Jordan Brooks and Benjamin A. Valentino, 
“A War of One's Own: Understanding the Gender Gap in Support for War.” Public Opinion 
Quarterly, 75.2 (2011), 270–286; Nancy M. Wingfield and Maria Bucur, Gender and War in 
Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006; Orna Sasson-
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These values, according to Hofstede, are assertiveness, toughness or giving 
priority to career and material values for an individual.169 Groups with low 
masculinity scores are described by Hofstede to represent a ‘feminine’ approach, 
which is characterised by tenderness, building interpersonal relations and 
concern for improving the common quality of life.170 
Considering air forces, some studies suggest that ‘masculine’ values 
prevail among pilots although team working skills are equally vital since they 
help to ensure flight safety. That proves true for both commercial airlines and air 
forces since the pilot profession is a well-paid one, as well as values such as 
decisiveness, assertiveness, directness, and dependence on other team members, 
for example air traffic controllers, are characteristic for pilots across various 
countries.171 Therefore, one could conclude that military culture combines both 
of Hofstede’s ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ traits. For example, one would expect 
from officers that they are assertive, tough and decisive in what they do but also 
cooperative and good in team working. That would help to explain the 
dichotomy between national scores allocated for the UK, Poland and Sweden if 
they were applied to military organisations. 
The lowest national score within this dimension among the three case 
study states was allocated to Sweden, which achieved a 5. In comparison, both 
Poland (87) and the UK (66) achieved much higher scores indicating that these 
societies are much more focused on individual, rather than communal goals. At 
the international level, the difference between the British and Swedish case can 
be easily captured when it comes to solving international disputes. Hofstede 
                                                             
Levy, “The Military in a Globalized Environment: Perpetuating an ‘Extremely Gendered’ 
Organization.” In Handbook of Gender, Work and Organization, ed. by Emma L. Jeanes, David 
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Reports, 120.3 (June 2017), 374–382. 
169 Hofstede, Culture’s Consequences., p. 297. 
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gives an example of two conflicts – one between Sweden and Finland about the 
Åland Islands, and the other between the UK and Argentina about the Falkland 
Islands.172 Both were territorial disputes, however, they were dealt with in a very 
different manner. The Swedish-Finnish conflict ended in 1921 through 
negotiations with the participation of the League of Nations, showing the 
tendency to search for a solution involving compromise and not requiring the 
use of force. The other one resulted in British military intervention in 1982 what 
demonstrated traits characteristic for Hofstede’s ‘masculine’ culture, such as 
assertiveness or toughness. Considering that example, the significant difference 
between British society (66) and the cadets at the Sandhurst Academy (3) in the 
so called masculinity-femininity dimension is very much surprising. That is 
because, following on the example of the conflict over Falkland Islands, one 
could conclude that traits characteristic for Hofstede’s ‘masculine’ culture are 
concurrent with those characteristic for a military culture. 
The low score allocated to Sweden reflects society’s dominant concern 
about common wellbeing. Before the 1990s Sweden kept to its strategy of 
neutrality, and as the above example indicates, preferred the diplomatic way of 
resolving conflicts rather than engaging in military actions. For example, during 
the Cold War, in 1960s and 1970s, Sweden started to actively participate in 
mediations and negotiations in order to help solve international disputes.173 Such 
way of maintaining national security aligns with, suggested by Hofstede, 
concern for common wellbeing. Moving from national to multinational 
perspective, one could observe a relation between that value and the change of 
Sweden’s political course from national security to multinational involvement 
and peacekeeping during the post-Cold War period. Even though Hofstede’s 
study dates back to 1970s and 1980s and it was 1995 when Swedish Parliament 
declared in a defence bill that the main purpose of Swedish military forces was 
extended beyond territorial defence to promoting international peace and 
security through participation in peacekeeping operations.174 That shift could 
also be perceived as an illustration of the concern for common wellbeing 
characteristic for Hofstede’s ‘feminine’ approach and, in this case taking form 
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of international peace and justice. Therefore, there could be seen a continuity in 
the Swedish representation in the so called masculinity-femininity dimension 
however demonstrated in two different ways – neutrality pre-1990s and 
international peacekeeping after the end of the Cold War. 
The above sections explained Hofstede’s model of cultural dimensions 
as a useful conceptual aid for studying the significance of cultural differences 
for European, and specifically British, Swedish and Polish Air Forces’ 
contributions to multinational operations. In spite of the shortcomings of the 
available data as indicated above, the model provides insightful background and 
context for a systematic study of this important subject. Although there are some 
universal traits and values shared by the military personnel of all countries, as 
discussed above, the thesis will show in Chapters 3. and 5. with reference to 
Hofstede’s model that the military culture of a country is also shaped by society’s 
individual national characteristics. In order to avoid these differences from 
interfering with the smooth running of multinational military operations, their 
implications and how to deal with them need to be understood. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter provided the conceptual background for the analysis of the 
potential and limitations of European air power in contemporary multinational 
operations, focusing on the United Kingdom, Sweden and Poland as case studies. 
Because there is no single theoretical framework that could capture the 
complexity of the various issues addressed in this thesis, all of which are required 
for a nuanced understanding of the subject, the chapter reviewed the available 
secondary literature and official documents discussing relevant issues and 
concepts in contemporary air power, post-Cold War military transformation in 
Europe and multinational operations. As noted throughout the chapter, these 
concepts and issues will be referred to as a framework for analysis in the 
following empirical chapters.  
The chapter identified three major trends characteristic for the post-Cold 
War European armed forces which are concentration, transnationalisation and 
an increase in multinational military operations. Because of declining defence 
budgets the armed forces are getting smaller, but also more specialised. 
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Furthermore, thanks to deepening multinational cooperation, their 
interoperability is increasing and therefore common defence capability 
and capacity is being built. This collective effort and pooling and sharing 
resources allows for developing and maintaining those capabilities which, for 
some countries, would not be available because of high costs. These 
collaborative initiatives and projects require strong political will from all the 
participating countries in order to be successful. They could also incur similar 
difficulties as any other form of multinational cooperation which have to be 
anticipated and addressed however, looking at the whole picture, these still seem 
to be the best way forward for European air power. The identified concepts of 
concentration and transnationalisation will be used to investigate the post-Cold 
War transformation of the European air forces, looking especially at the RAF, 
Polish and Swedish Air Force, in empirical Chapters 3. and 4. 
In the final section, the chapter suggested that the smooth running of 
multinational operations is challenged by various potential difficulties. Air 
power, as any other military service, is susceptible to factors related to cultural 
diversity, for example language barriers or adherence to different norms and 
values; national interests and domestic politics, for example differences in ROE; 
as well as standardisation and interoperability issues. These challenges exist in 
spite of the fact that equipment, regulations and procedures are more uniform for 
air forces than for any other service. The thesis argues that anticipating and 
addressing these challenges before they occur can help to minimise the risk of 
potential failure and increase the chances to achieve the desired, common 
objective. The chapter concluded with a suggestion of Hofstede’s model of 
cultural dimensions as a useful tool for studying the reasons for and implications 
of cultural differences in multinational operations in subsequent chapters. 
In addition to identifying a conceptual framework for the rest of the thesis, 
the chapter also argued that the end of the Cold War and subsequent changes 
taking place in the security environment stimulated development of certain 
transformation processes among European militaries addressing an increase in 
the number of multinational operations. Next chapter will discuss these 
processes identified as concentration and transnationalisation of the European 
air forces. Focusing in particular on the RAF, Polish and Swedish Air Force it 
will address both their professionalisation as well as development of relevant 
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national air doctrines indicating increasing multinational interconnectedness and 
interoperability. 
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 Chapter 3: European air forces in the post-Cold War 
era – towards concentration and transnationalisation 
 
In order to discuss the involvement of European air power in 
contemporary operations, the situation that European armed forces found 
themselves after the Cold War needs to be taken into account. Before the 1990s 
the political situation in Europe was very clear – there were easily defined 
opponent blocs (NATO and Warsaw Pact) preparing for a large-scale, symmetric 
conflict. With the end of the bi-polar order came a shift in defence policies and 
transformation of European militaries. They were focusing more on asymmetric 
threats such as, for example, terrorism, ethnic conflicts or proliferation of WMD 
which often required them to prepare their forces for expeditionary warfare.175 
European countries also started a process of concentration and 
transnationalisation of their military forces. As was discussed in the previous 
chapter, these terms are understood as downsizing and professionalisation of 
European armed forces as well as their increased interconnectedness and 
interdependence.176 This chapter will explore both concepts, concentration and 
transnationalisation, with specific focus given to the UK, Poland and Sweden. 
The latter term – transnationalisation, will also be given more attention in 
Chapter 4. discussing the different forms of multinational initiatives involving 
the air forces of named countries. 
The objective of this chapter is to introduce the European perspective on 
the security and defence in the post-Cold War period. It strives to answer the 
second sub-question: why have the UK, Polish and Swedish Air Forces 
specifically been used predominantly in multinational operations since the end 
of the Cold War? In that attempt it argues that all three, British, Polish and 
Swedish Air Forces are undergoing the process of concentration and 
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transnationalisation evident in the reduction of manpower, modernisation of 
their fleets, re-organisation of their structure as well as the development of the 
air doctrines they use aimed at the idea of jointness. All of these are elements of 
military transformation resulting from the post-Cold War changes in security 
environment and indicating the increased adaptation of the named air forces to 
participation in multinational operations. Therefore, the chapter focuses in 
particular on the use of European militaries, especially air power, in an allied 
context. 
The structure of the chapter is two-fold. Firstly, it explores the 
aforementioned concept of concentration and transnationalisation of military 
forces in European countries after 1990. In doing so, it focuses on the situation 
the British, Polish and Swedish Air Forces found themselves in after the end of 
the Cold War. Secondly, the chapter investigates the presence of the process of 
concentration and transnationalisation in the post-Cold War air doctrines looking 
specifically at the development of allied context in strategic thinking in Europe 
at that time. At that point, it focuses on the British, Polish and Swedish air 
doctrine and explores how these documents reflect the allied context present in 
the strategic thinking in Europe after 1990. 
 
3.1 Post-Cold War transformation of European air forces 
 
The end of the Cold War, collapse of the Soviet Union and dissolution 
of Warsaw Pact created a new security situation in Europe. Countries previously 
grouped in two opposing blocs had to re-define their approach to security and 
defence. The UK, Poland and Sweden found themselves in very different 
circumstances at that time and adapted different ways of managing that situation. 
The UK focused on strengthening its cooperation with NATO and EU, while for 
Poland becoming a member of these organisations became the main strategic 
goal.177 The former Warsaw Pact member country decided to completely re-
orientate its political focus from Eastern to Western Europe and build its position 
as an independent nation.178 Sweden also changed the course of its politics – 
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from threat- to capability-driven defence and increased involvement in 
multinational operations rather than focusing predominantly on defending own 
territory.179 However, although, the individual situation of those countries in 
1990 was quite different, as this chapter will show, there were also certain 
similarities in the way they have approached the changing security environment. 
This sub-chapter will discuss the changes taking place in the European air forces 
in a two-fold way. Firstly, it will look at the decrease in size of the RAF, Polish 
and Swedish Air Force. Secondly, it will discuss the organisational and structural 
changes happening in these forces after 1990. 
 
3.1.1 Changes in the size of European air forces 
 
Changes in strategic thinking had a direct effect on European air forces 
and armed forces in general. After 1991 they underwent transformation and 
British, Polish and Swedish militaries were no exception. One of the two major 
outcomes of that process identified by King, was discussed in Chapter 2., 
concentration of European armed forces. Table 1. in Chapter 1. illustrated the 
decrease in defence budgets across the last 25 years in the UK, Poland and 
Sweden. As a result their armed forces were downsized too: they became more 
concentrated. According to the Strategic Defence Review, British armed forces 
were cut by one third in the period 1990–1998.180 However, according to 
Alexander and Garden, this process begun in the UK well before 1990, as the 
numbers for British military personnel started dropping from 346,000 in 1975181 
to 306,000 in 1990 and 150,250 in 2017. Polish Armed Forces were cut from 
312,800 in 1990 to 105,000 in 2017. Similar decrease was also noted in Sweden. 
The number of armed forces personnel was significantly reduced from 64,800 in 
1990 to 15,300 in 2015 with a slight increase to 29,750 two years later what 
could be associated with the security concerns in the region as well as a 
preliminary to the re-introduction of conscription in January 2018. Table 5. 
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illustrates that process including the most recent data available at the time of 
writing. 
 
Table 5 Total armed forces personnel in the UK, Poland and Sweden, 1990-
2017 
  1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2017 
  Manpower 
United 
Kingdom 
306,000 236,900 212,450 205,890 175,690 159,150 150,250 
  
Poland 312,800 278,600 217,290 141,500 100,000 99,300 105,000 
  
Sweden 64,800 64,000 52,700 27,600 13,050 15,300 29,750 
 
Sources: "The Alliances and Europe" The Military Balance, 90.1 (1990), 44-96; "NATO" The 
Military Balance, 95.1 (1995), 33-67; "Non-NATO Europe" The Military Balance, 95.1 (1995), 
68-101; "NATO and Non-NATO Europe" The Military Balance, 100.1 (2000), 35-108; "Europe" 
The Military Balance, 105.1 (2005), 45-106; "Europe: non-NATO" The Military Balance, 105.1 
(2005), 107-150; "Europe" The Military Balance, 110.1 (2010), 103-210; "Europe" The Military 
Balance, 115.1 (2015), 57-158; "Europe" The Military Balance, 118.1 (2018), 65-168. 
 
The general trend of shrinking of military forces illustrated in Table 5. is 
also clearly mirrored in the transformation of European air forces. The table 
below shows the trend in decreasing manpower in the RAF, Polish Air Force or 
the Swedish Air Force. It illustrates a dramatic cut in the case of Poland where 
number of active personnel in the Air Force dropped from 86,200 in 1990 to 
16,600 in 2015 with a slight rise to 18,700 in 2017. During that period Swedish 
Air Force noted a decrease by 5,300 officers, while in the UK the number went 
down from 89,600 in 1990 to 32,900 in 2017.  
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Table 6 Total air forces personnel in the UK, Poland and Sweden, 1990-
2017 
  1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2017 
 
Manpower 
United 
Kingdom 
89,600 70,400 54,730 48,140 39,750 34,650 32,900 
  
Poland 86,200 72,600 46,200 30,000 17,500 16,600 18,700 
  
Sweden 8,000 11,500 8,400 5,900 3,800 3,300 2,700 
 
Sources: "The Alliances and Europe" The Military Balance, 90.1 (1990), 44-96; "NATO" The 
Military Balance, 95.1 (1995), 33-67; "Non-NATO Europe" The Military Balance, 95.1 (1995), 
68-101; "NATO and Non-NATO Europe" The Military Balance, 100.1 (2000), 35-108; "Europe" 
The Military Balance, 105.1 (2005), 45-106; "Europe: non-NATO" The Military Balance, 105.1 
(2005), 107-150; "Europe" The Military Balance, 110.1 (2010), 103-210; "Europe" The Military 
Balance, 115.1 (2015), 57-158; "Europe" The Military Balance, 118.1 (2018), 65-168. 
 
In line with that drop in numbers, came professionalisation of the 
European militaries and creating voluntary forces. An interesting hypothesis was 
formulated by Haltiner saying that ‘the more a European nation is involved in 
supra- and international ties, the greater probability of an abolition of 
conscription with a simultaneous reduction of its own defensive power.’182 
Haltiner calls it an ‘alliance effect’ – the more a country participates in NATO, 
EU, PfP the more it relies on their collective defence capabilities and therefore 
reduces their military expenditure, as discussed in Chapter 1., as well as their 
armed forces numbers, as shown in the above tables. 
Haltiner also gives another reason for creating all-voluntary forces that 
is especially applicable for air power arguing that increased professionalisation 
of armed forces and higher technical complexity of the military equipment 
accompanies a move away from conscription.183 Air forces, as completely reliant 
on equipment and introducing more advanced solutions and systems, require 
voluntary personnel, serving on a long-term basis and ready to take up a 
permanent training to increase their qualifications. Conscripts with only basic 
training cannot fulfil these requirements. The decreasing numbers shown in 
Table 6. confirm the process of concentration taking place in the RAF, Polish 
and Swedish Air Force. 
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Following the widespread trend of concentration happening after 1990, 
all three, the UK, Poland and Sweden decided on professional, all-voluntary 
Armed Forces although the UK abolished conscription well before the end of the 
Cold War, in 1963.184 Poland followed in 2009 and Sweden in 2010.185 There 
are two reasons why Poland did not abolish conscription until 2009. Firstly, 
during the Cold War, most European militaries, including those of the Warsaw 
Pact, prepared for large-scale theatre warfare in Europe. The massive manpower 
required for such an undertaking could only be achieved and afforded with a 
conscription-based military.186 Secondly, following the end of the Cold War, 
many Central and East European countries, including Poland, perceived Russia 
as a potential threat to their newly gained independence from the Warsaw Pact. 
They continued to rely on mass conscription militaries before alleviating their 
feeling of insecurity vis-à-vis Russia by becoming members of NATO.187 Close 
proximity to Russia, in fact, has been continuously perceived as a major point in 
Polish security and defence strategy until today.188 For example, in a declaration 
made in 2001 the then defence minister, Jerzy Szmajdziński, stressed the 
importance of professionalisation of the Polish military but, at the same time, 
still emphasised the crucial role of conscription in recruiting the military 
personnel pointing, again, to the country’s geopolitical location as one of the 
reasons.189 Such approach stood in contradiction to creating voluntary military 
forces confirming the aforementioned general trend observed among former 
Warsaw Pact members. But also after the abolishing of conscription, Russia’s 
presence in the region was recognised as a vital reason for increased participation 
of the Central and Eastern European countries in frameworks of collective 
defence such as NATO or EU.190 Examples of such initiatives will be discussed 
in Chapter 4.  
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Sweden abolished conscription in 2010.191 However, interestingly, they 
decided to re-activate it from 1st of January 2018 since the voluntary recruitment 
system did not provide enough military personnel.192 That decision also had a 
strong and increasingly growing public support, from 40 per cent in 2013 to 62 
in 2016.193 According to Philippe Manigart, the problem of all-volunteer forces 
not providing enough personnel proved to be very common among the Western 
militaries introducing the voluntary recruitment.194 The other reason for re-
activating conscription in Sweden was the increased Russian military activity in 
the Baltic region.195 That together with growing tensions in Eastern Europe, with 
annexation in Crimea being only one example, resulted in a widespread feeling 
that Russia had again emerged as a serious threat to the neighbouring states. In 
effect, the somewhat diminished in last 25 years perception of traditional threats, 
i.e. conventional state-on-state conflict, again gained importance. 
The above section provided a brief overview over the downsizing of the 
RAF, Polish and Swedish Air Forces. That process was a direct result from the 
changes taking place in these states’ Armed Forces. These were not only reduced 
in size but also transformed from conscript to voluntary forces resulting in their 
professionalisation. The next section will look into how the process of 
concentration affected the organisation and internal structure of the RAF as well 
as Polish and Swedish Air Forces. 
 
3.1.2 Changes in air forces’ structure and organisation 
 
Cutting numbers was not the sole outcome of the changes taking place in 
European air forces. Toward the end of the 1990s, efforts were made to maximise 
the flexibility and capabilities of the now much smaller militaries in order to 
allow them to swiftly and effectively respond to various challenges presented by 
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the complex contemporary security environment.196 These changes affected the 
armed forces as a whole and therefore obviously had direct impact on 
transformation of the individual services including the air forces. The 
concentrated, professional armed forces underwent re-organisation in all of the 
three cases – British, Polish and Swedish. The clear tri-service divide has been 
gradually replaced with the concept of jointness and all three countries 
introduced joint commands for their armed forces. Also, joint doctrine and 
concept centres were established as institutions responsible for providing 
guidance on how the armed forces should operate in contemporary security 
environment by, for example, preparing standardised doctrines, analysis lessons 
learnt from past operations and developing new concepts for improving military 
capability, integrating new technologies and organising necessary personnel 
training. Stemming from the changes taking place in armed forces, elements 
characteristic for military concentration and transnationalisation are also found 
in the process of internal re-organisation of the European air forces, 
modernisation of their equipment and standardisation of regulations and 
procedures. 
The first element of the military concentration discussed in this section 
is the introduction of the idea of jointness and moving away from the tri-service 
divide. In the UK, following the defence review Options for Change from 1990, 
the Joint Rapid Deployment Force – JRDF, was established in 1996.197 The same 
year the operational Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) were officially 
opened. SDR from 1998 reinforced the idea of jointness pointing out that the 
nature of potential new challenges and future operations will require the use of 
deployable joint military forces rather than individual services.198 The Review 
converted JRDF into JRRF – Joint Rapid Reaction Force as well as created Joint 
Helicopter Command and stressed the importance of conducting joint training 
for the personnel.199 Also a Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre 
(DCDC) was established in Shrivenham as a result of the SDR taking on the role 
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of providing all three services with a joint doctrine and concepts for their 
employment in different kinds of operations.200  
In Sweden there was Försvarsmaktens Enhet för Konceptutveckling – 
FMKE (the Swedish Armed Forces Centre for Conceptual Thinking and 
Experimentation) based in Enköping; however this one was closed down 
because of its low efficiency.201 The gap was filled in 2013, when the Swedish 
Concepts and Doctrine Centre was formed within British DCDC.202 The Centre 
is an interesting example of multinational cooperation as well as 
transnationalisation. It employs four Swedish officers who primarily report to 
their British superiors at the DCDC and work (alongside the British personnel) 
within the area of doctrine, concepts as well as future and strategic analysis but 
can also receive tasks from the Policy and Plans Department at the Swedish 
Armed Forces HQ.203 Similarly as the Swedish officers, the DCDC as an 
institution can also receive direct tasks at the strategic level from the Swedish 
Armed Forces HQ and therefore whatever work is conducted in DCDC (unless 
classified) it is shared with Sweden. Johnny Resman, in an email conversation 
to the Author, noted: ‘we are both the UK and Swedish DCDC – a unique 
relationship.’204 However despite the joint nature between the Swedish Centre 
and DCDC, the former is not responsible for preparing Swedish doctrines. That 
task remains within the remit of the Swedish Armed Forces HQ, however, the 
Swedish officer working in the DCDC’s doctrine writing team supports that 
process to certain extent.205  
In the case of Poland, a similar institution to the DCDC, FMKE or the 
Swedish Concepts and Doctrine Centre, was created. Centrum Doktryn i 
Szkolenia Sił Zbrojnych (Doctrine and Training Centre for Polish Armed Forces 
– DTC PAF) was officially opened in Bydgoszcz in 2011 and is responsible for 
managing such processes as: operational standardisation of doctrines and 
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doctrinal documents, lessons learnt as well as concept development and 
experimentation.206  
Poland and Sweden also established joint commands for their military 
forces. In Poland it was regarded as the final stage of the long-term military 
transformation initiated shortly after the end of the Cold War. On the 1st of 
January 2014 two new joint commands: Armed Forces General Command 
(Dowództwo Generalne Rodzajów Sił Zbrojnych) and Armed Forces 
Operational Command (Dowództwo Operacyjne Rodzajów Sił Zbrojnych) 
replaced the old, individual structures being in place for Polish Land Forces, 
Navy, Air Forces and Special Forces. There is also an operational Joint Forces 
Command within the structure of Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters 
(Högkvarteret). As one could expect, it is organised according to NATO 
standards what increases interoperability when Sweden is involved in any 
operations led by the Alliance.207 All these structural changes, creating joint 
commands and establishing joint doctrine centres, can be regarded as elements 
of the military concentration since they are improving the effectiveness and 
flexibility of the reduced military forces. They also implied significant changes 
within the air forces. 
The aforementioned British defence review Options for Change included 
very clear recommendations for the transformation of the RAF, for example, it 
suggested a decrease in manpower from 89,000 to 75,000.208 However, it also 
made recommendations for organisational changes stemming from the reduction 
in numbers. For example, in response to the prospective withdrawal of the Soviet 
air forces from the Central and Eastern Europe, the RAF forces stationed in 
Germany were to be reduced by two Phantom air defence squadrons, four 
Tornado Interdiction Strike squadrons and two air bases – RAF Bruggen and 
RAF Laarbruch.209 That, in turn, led to a complete disbandment of the RAF 
Germany command and their withdrawal in 1996.210 Also the defence review 
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called for changes within the RAF in the UK, such as reducing Tornado 
squadrons from three to two, reducing the numbers of Nimrod Maritime Patrol 
Aircraft by 15 per cent, withdrawing the remaining two Phantom air defence 
squadrons as well as replacing Buccaneers in two existing maritime attack 
squadrons with the Tornados re-deployed from Germany.211  
Despite all these changes the character of future uses of the RAF 
remained unclear. The Defence Committee’s Report on the RAF Options for 
Change expressed anxiety about making these changes without knowing what 
NATO may need them for and what will be the broader context of their use.212 
Later on the focus shifted to maintaining highly-deployable expeditionary 
forces. Although the SDR from 1998, recognised the major role that air power 
plays in operations regardless of their character, the priority was given to such 
capabilities as air superiority and air defence in expeditionary warfare, over 
national air defence.213 Finding out the context in which the RAF was supposed 
to operate was only one challenge. Another challenge was the available 
equipment, which was not suited to the new security environment. During the 
Cold War, the RAF got over-adapted to NATO Cold War requirements to such 
an extent that a lot of equipment worked very well in Germany but not in the 
desert during the Gulf War.214 
Changes taking place within the Polish Air Force were a direct result of 
the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the country’s aspirations to join NATO. 
After 1999, when the country became a NATO member, crucial for the Polish 
Air Force was to adapt to the Alliance’s standards as well as the regulations of 
the International Civil Aviation Organisation – ICAO.215 Similarly as the whole 
Armed Forces, the Polish Air Force underwent organisational changes. These 
started as early as 1990, when the Air Force (Wojska Lotnicze) and the Country 
Air Defence Force (Wojska Obrony Powietrznej Kraju) were joined into one 
formation – the Air Force and the Counter-Air Defence Forces (Wojska Lotnicze 
i Obrony Powietrznej). The latter was then finally transformed into the Polish 
Air Force (Siły Powietrzne) in 2004. Similarly, the structure within the Air Force 
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started to change in 1999 with disassembling two regiments and formation of 
two squadrons.216 The early 1990s also presented challenges on the personnel 
level. Before that time the majority of the high rank command positions were 
taken by Soviet officers so Polish personnel were often unprepared to take their 
place after the withdrawal of USSR forces.217 
The Service’s downsizing that took place after the end of the Cold War 
was reflected not only in decreasing numbers of the personnel but also the 
numbers of aircraft. In 1990 the Polish Air Force consisted of approximately 800 
aircraft which were reduced to 300 in 1998 with a target of 100 in 2002.218 As a 
former Soviet bloc country, Poland had in its inventory mostly aircraft built 
either in the Soviet Union or under their licence so, for example, the fighter fleet 
consisted of MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-29 and Su-22 where only the latter two 
types had any modern combat capability.219 As a result of modernisation 
conducted in the Polish Armed Forces, the former two types (MiG-21 and MiG-
23) were withdrawn from service by 2004 and the fleet was boosted with 
additional 22 MiG-29 bought from Germany in 2003 and 48 F-16 Block 52+ 
delivered in years 2006–2008.220 With the acquisition of a new type of a fighter 
aircraft came a change in the mindset of the personnel. According to an account 
given by Polish F-16 pilots the training they underwent to learn how to operate 
the new aircraft was comparable to starting their career from scratch.221 It 
entailed not only improving the knowledge of English, learning Western tactics 
and procedures or NATO terminology but also, and above all, learning how to 
think in a completely new way about their role as pilots. American-led training 
was found to be very different from the one in the former Soviet bloc which the 
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Polish crews were used to and required a change of mindset of a whole 
generation of already trained and experienced pilots.222 
But not only the fighter fleet was modernised at that time. New 
equipment was acquired for every capability within the Polish Air Force. For 
example, Poland bought transport aircraft like CASA C-295M – 17 of these were 
delivered in years 2003–2013. The country also made plans for establishing a 
UAS (Unmanned Aircraft System) fleet.223 The 12th Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
Base was officially opened on 1st January 2016 and currently operates mini-
UASs BSP Orbiter. In the future it will be equipped with short-range, medium-
range and MALE (Medium Altitude Long Endurance) aircraft.224 Needless to 
say that modernisation on this scale is extremely costly, especially because most 
of the Polish inventory by the 1990s, compared to that of the UK or Sweden, 
was almost entirely outdated. 
Following reductions in personnel, the structure of the Swedish Air Force 
underwent changes as well. For example, out of twelve Wings (and also main 
air bases) into which the Swedish Air Force was organised in 1990,225 only four 
remained in 2017 – F7 Skaraborgs (Såtenäs), F17 Blekinge (Ronneby), F21 
Norrbottens (Luleå) and a Helicopter Wing.226 The discussion on which bases 
should be closed was not focused on their strategic importance for national 
defence, but rather driven by the issue, as a scholar at the Swedish Defence 
University put it, about ‘how many jobs will be lost if that particular air base 
closes’.227 This tendency was confirmed by a study conducted by Boëne et al. 
The authors found that in the 1990s in Sweden the expenses for military defence 
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were regarded of lesser importance when compared to those made towards 
improving the education and national health care system, creating job 
opportunities or looking after the environment.228 
Similarly to Poland, there were also modernisation plans for the Swedish 
Air Force which involved replacing Viggen aircraft with JAS-39 Gripen, 
introducing more advanced types of munitions as well as upgrading command, 
control, communications and intelligence system.229 This process also led to 
gradual increase of interoperability with NATO countries and their 
transnationalisation. Sweden realised that efficient cooperation with those 
countries in various operations or exercises required adjusting their systems, 
equipment and the way they work. It was a very challenging goal to achieve.  
First point was to switch from speaking Swedish to English and that task 
(as any other) was taken very seriously. For example, in 1999 all personnel in 
air bases in Ronneby and Kallinge started taking English courses and that did 
not involve the aircrews only but literally everybody down to the cleaning 
staff.230 These adaptations went so far that even a Swedish word for air power – 
‘luftmakt’, which did not exist until this point, was created at that time.231 
Learning English was not the only challenge that Swedish Air Force had to face. 
Another was to switch from the metric to the imperial system. This not only 
involved upgrading or re-scaling the equipment, but similarly as in case of 
Poland, the process required creating a whole new mindset so the personnel did 
not need to constantly make calculations in order to operate in the air.232 These 
adjustments were not always straightforward. For example, a lot of criticism was 
raised by switching to NATO LINK16 from the Swedish communication system 
– Erieye which was in fact more advanced.233 It took about 10 to 15 years for the 
Swedish Air Force to become interoperable with NATO standards.234 
Adjustments took place also at the political level. For example, another 
thing that Swedish Air Force had to learn was air-to-air refuelling. The reason 
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why the Viggen or the early version of Gripen fighters did not have such 
capability, and consequently why the crews did not possess such skill, was a 
political one. As Wilson, a Swedish Air Force officer, noted: 
It was not allowed by the Swedish Government because if we had air-to-
air refuelling one could easily imagine that we have an offensive 
capability to fly to Moscow. And that fact could trigger Moscow to attack 
Sweden.235 
Similarly, the fact that Sweden decided to introduce Gripen into the fleet and not 
some other fighter like for example, F-16 (which was also considered) was also 
a political decision. Just as in case of Poland where choosing F-16 over Jas-39 
Gripen or Dassault Mirage 2000-5 Mk II demonstrated the country’s close 
relations with the US.236 For Sweden, reliance on national production was not 
only a matter of technological development but also national prestige.237 It 
allowed for undisrupted continuation of providing the Air Force with highly 
sophisticated aircraft made by the home industry. What is more such decision 
also helped to uphold Sweden’s self-sufficiency and credibility as a neutral 
country at the same time as strengthening interoperability with NATO as a non-
member.238 
 In order to meet the requirements of post-Cold War security environment 
the RAF, Polish and Swedish Air Forces underwent the process of concentration 
and transnationalisation. This involved downsizing the existing force and 
reorganising its structure and resulted in creating professional and specialised air 
forces. The transformation was a result of concentration of the armed forces in 
general and also mirrored changes taking place in strategic thinking at that time. 
For example, one could notice the shift from focusing predominantly on national 
defence to increased involvement in expeditionary warfare in creating smaller, 
more deployable units as well as modernisation and standardisation of the 
existing fleets. The latter process was, however, initiated not only at the level of 
equipment but also took place at the level of writing air doctrines and developing 
concepts on how to use air power, as discussed in more detail below. 
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Recognising the increased number of multinational operations, these documents 
were also standardised in order to increase the interoperability among involved 
air forces. The issue of allied context in strategic thinking reflected in these 
documents will be discussed in the next section of this chapter providing more 
proof that European air forces have been undergoing the process of concentration 
and introducing the idea of their transnationalisation. 
 
3.2 Towards concentration and transnationalisation – development 
of the British, Polish and Swedish air doctrines 
 
The post-Cold War transformation took form of not only modernising and 
reorganising the air forces but was also reflected in air doctrines. This part of the 
chapter investigates the development of air doctrines in the three countries and, 
their adherence to NATO documents. Firstly, referring to the idea of 
concentration, it discusses the development of post-Cold War British, Polish and 
Swedish doctrines focusing on the introduction of the concept of ‘jointness’. 
Secondly, using the framework provided by Hofstede, the following section 
looks at how the cultural background could influence character of these 
documents. Finally, it discusses how, if at all, the British, Polish and Swedish air 
doctrines address the subject of multinational cooperation identifying that as an 
evidence of the process of transnationalisation.  
 
3.2.1 Military concentration in development of post-Cold War British, 
Polish and Swedish air doctrines 
 
British air power doctrine for the post-Cold War period dates back to 
1991, when the first edition of AP 3000 – Royal Air Force Air Power Doctrine 
was issued. It followed a period of over 20 years when NATO doctrine had 
completely supplanted national documents. As suggested by an interviewee who 
wishes to stay anonymous, resignation from a national air doctrine in favour of 
a NATO one could have its origins in the expectation that during the Cold War, 
it was very unlikely for the UK to get involved in a military conflict other than 
in response to Article V.239 However, with the Cold War coming to an end and 
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growing possibility of military involvement on a global scale and not necessary 
under auspices of NATO there was a recognised need for a national document.240 
A document that would provide airmen with an understanding of air capabilities 
in the context of modern warfare and the contemporary security environment, 
but also (or before all) of the fundamental principles and philosophy 
underpinning air power thinking.241 As a result AP 3000 was published in 1991 
on a trial basis.242 Its next version was issued in 1993, in light of the 
disintegration of the USSR and to reflect lessons learnt from the RAF 
involvement in the First Gulf War. Then, the doctrine was revised several times, 
in 1999 – AP 3000 British Air Power Doctrine, 2009 – AP 3000 British Air and 
Space Power Doctrine, and 2013 – Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-30 – UK 
Air and Space Doctrine with its latest edition published in December 2017.  
The evolution and development of Polish air power doctrine bears marks 
of the legacy of several decades of Poland’s membership in Warsaw Pact. As 
was already mentioned in Chapter 1., all Polish documents relating to security 
and defence strategy which were in use before 1990 were in fact executive 
documents for the Pact’s doctrinal publications.243 Similarly, air force-specific 
publications were adapted from Soviet regulations.244 The first truly national 
document of such kind issued after the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact was 
Regulamin działań taktycznych Sił Powietrznych (Regulations for Tactical Air 
Forces Operations), published in 1996. This was a purely tactical publication 
describing detailed rules for performing air force’s tasks and it took eight years 
to revise it, as the next doctrinal publication for Polish Air Forces – Regulamin 
działań Sił Powietrznych (Regulations for Air Force Engagement) DD/3.3 was 
published in 2004. The doctrine was revised in 2014 and published as Połączone 
operacje powietrzne DD-3.3(B) (Joint Air Operations DD-3.3(B)).245  
Similarly to the case of the UK and Poland, the development of Swedish 
air power doctrine for the post-Cold War period also reflects the process of 
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concentration taking place among European air forces. Before 1990 there was 
no need for a formal air doctrine other than a tactical document as during the 
Cold War the security situation was very clear and so were the tasks of Swedish 
Armed Forces.246 After the political situation changed and the military went 
through the process of transformation there were first, unsuccessful, attempts to 
write a draft of first post-Cold War Swedish air doctrine.247 The first draft official 
publication – Doktrin för luftoperationer (Doctrine for Air Operations) was 
issued in 2004 and revised a year later, in 2005. The new document, also titled 
Doktrin för luftoperationer (Doctrine for Air Operations), was replaced again in 
2014 with the current publication, Operativ Doktrin 2014 (OPD) (Operational 
Doctrine 2014) published by Swedish Försvarsmakten (Armed Forces). 
All of the current British, Polish and Swedish air doctrines reflect the 
process of concentration observed in European air forces after the end of the 
Cold War, since all of them are joint publications. In case of the UK, it was the 
first edition of JDP 0-30 from 2013 that was the first air power related doctrine 
issued by the aforementioned DCDC. Its publication marked the shift from 
single service to a joint publication which can be perceived as another move 
towards the cross-domain integration of warfare and implementation of the idea 
of jointness in the British Air Forces. The second edition of JDP 0-30, UK Air 
and Space Power from 2017, acknowledged the complexity and uncertainty of 
the environment where air power is supposed to operate pointing to 
interconnectedness of both, domestic and international threats, presence of 
various, state and non-state actors, decreasing distinction between war and peace 
and emergence of cyber threats.248  
Year 2014 with publication of DD-3.3(B) marked a similar shift from 
single-service to joint authored doctrine in Poland. The process of military 
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transformation, and concentration, when applied to the area of publishing and 
revising air doctrines was in the case of Poland rather slow. For example, joining 
NATO in 1999, which had been defined as a strategic goal for the country, did 
not have an immediate influence on formulating new air power doctrine. As 
Kulisz pointed out, Poland entered the Alliance’s structures with strategic 
documents from early 1990s still being in force.249 One possible reason for this 
is the language barrier. Because of the country’s former membership in the 
Warsaw Pact, the foreign language dominating among Polish officers was 
Russian while knowledge of any Western languages was unpopular.250 For 
example, according to the order of the Commander for the Anti-Aircraft Forces 
dated 1977, officers who did not speak Russian on a satisfactory level or who 
were showing a ‘disrespectful attitude’ towards learning that language, were 
refused certain privileges or even removed from their posts.251 It required time 
to adjust, especially for the older generation of the military personnel. Another 
reason was that, although there was a special committee responsible for adapting 
the NATO regulations into national documents, there were no specifically 
designated units responsible for writing those national doctrines.252 Finally, 
delays were linked to the overall situation in the country and in the Polish Armed 
Forces. Transformation of the Polish military initiated in early 1990s involved a 
quite chaotic process of reducing personnel, organisational and structural 
changes, withdrawing outdated equipment and as such did not create a 
favourable environment for systematic thinking about security and defence 
strategy or writing doctrines.253 
Similarly, the Swedish OPD 2014 is, like most recent Polish and British 
publications, a joint doctrine. However, unlike its British and Polish equivalents, 
it is rather general in its character and contains only one, very brief sub-chapter 
dedicated to Flygvapenforband (Air Force Units).254 It presents Swedish Air 
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Force capabilities in a broad context ranging from guerrilla warfare, insurgencies 
and terrorism to conventional conflict stressing that the latter one still remains 
its main focus.255 There are some similarities between Sweden and Poland 
inasmuch as in both countries the process of writing an air-specific doctrine took 
quite a long time. In both cases a certain unpreparedness of the air force 
personnel to tackle such task was to account to this. In Poland the military 
transformation involved reorientation from Soviet standards and influences to 
building a dialog with NATO, also in area of strategic thinking and operational 
planning, as opposed to the rigid dependence on the Warsaw Pact. In Sweden 
the early projects of air doctrine were never finalised, because few officers were 
familiar with the field of air power theory and doctrine at the time.256 The 
Swedish air doctrines from 2004 and 2005 may be perceived as evidence of the 
process of concentration taking place in Swedish Air Force since, as was already 
suggested, they were revised with the concept of jointness in mind. Therefore, 
similarly to JDP 0-30 and DD-3.3(B), the current OPD 2014 is a joint doctrine 
reflecting the idea of concentration. 
Development of the post-Cold War air doctrines in all three case studies, 
the UK, Poland and Sweden, is convergent with other elements of military 
transformation their Air Forces have been undergoing. The successful attempts 
to issue a joint doctrine reflect the trend of concentration present among 
European armed forces. However, although following the same process, the 
three documents differ from each other in terms of contents, structure and overall 
character. That, as the next section will show, is an evidence of, partially the 
capabilities of particular air force, but also the cultural background. 
 
3.2.2 Similar process, different outcomes – cultural influences on the 
character of British, Polish and Swedish air doctrine 
 
Previous section demonstrated that all three, British, Polish and Swedish 
air doctrines reflect the process of concentration taking place in European air 
forces in the post-Cold War period. However, due to various reasons – political 
                                                             
255 Ibid., p. 47. 
256 Anrig, The Quest for Relevant Air Power., p. 307. 
92 
 
situation, military capabilities or cultural implications, these documents differ in 
character and form. 
The character of the British air doctrine, when compared with similar 
documents issued by Polish and Swedish Air Forces, and presents much more of 
a strategic approach than an operational one.257 This confirms that British 
military culture is indeed different from the values represented by society as a 
whole. Referring back to Chapter 2., Hofstede’s model of cultural dimensions 
found a disparity between values allocated to the British society and British 
military. The relatively low national score in uncertainty avoidance represented 
by British nationals can explain the fact that the UK, unlike many countries, does 
not have a written constitution to codify values, laws and freedoms as well as 
the system of governance. Therefore having an air doctrine issued at strategic 
level explaining the very concept of using air power, its role and historical 
references highlights the difference between the society and military and higher 
values in power distance and uncertainty avoidance allocated to the British 
military personnel indicating the need for such documents.258 For example, 
according to Harwood, having a strategic air doctrine in place improves the 
personnel’s understanding of the reason and purpose of certain actions being 
done in a certain way.259 Therefore, having established a strategic document 
which is not reserved for the highest ranks only but available for everyone in the 
Air Force to study certainly provides common ground and strengthens the sense 
of unity among the officers. 
Poland has no general air power doctrine issued at strategic level which, 
like the British JDP 0-30 would contain general views on the use of air power as 
well as set national objectives. Current Polish doctrinal publication DD-3.3(B) 
is in fact a second-rate document in the national structure directly subordinate to 
Doktryna prowadzenia operacji połączonych (Doctrine for Conducting Joint 
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Operations) D-3(B) and issued as an operational manual.260 An obvious 
indication of that character is the form the Polish air doctrine takes. As its 
predecessor, the DD-3.3(B) is a very detailed publication which specifies use of 
air power on both the national and alliance level. Contents and structure of 
NATO’s AJP 3.3(A) – Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations 
almost literally translate into Polish document and as such do not contain any 
references to, for example, past experiences or lessons learnt as it is done in the 
British JDP 0-30.261 A likely reason for the ‘manual-like’ character of the Polish 
air doctrine containing very tactical, detailed instructions and leaving no space 
for including any air force philosophy, references to wider concepts, ideas or 
past experiences, could be related to the cultural background.262 Referring back 
to Hofstede’s model of cultural dimensions, one could suggest that non-
existence of a Polish air power doctrine written at a strategic level indicates high 
acceptance and expectations of a rigid hierarchical structure characteristic for 
both Polish society and Polish Air Force.263 It appears that this kind of doctrine 
is widely accepted or even expected by the Polish Air Force staff. For example, 
a colonel at one of the Polish Air Force bases stressed that at the operational and 
tactical level where all the missions, orders and commands are being performed, 
such ‘dry’, technical documents work best. That is because, firstly, they give 
clear instructions to the officers what needs to be done and how and, secondly, 
they do not allow for any hesitation when executing given orders.264 Such 
approach can also be easily related to Poland’s high score for uncertainty 
avoidance. According to Hofstede, the higher this value, the more members of 
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such groups need a clear set of rules.265 Having necessary regulations in place 
guiding what to do and how to behave helps such societies to reduce the levels 
of uncertainty in any type of situation. Nevertheless, the specific character of 
Polish air doctrine still reflects the changes taking place in European air forces 
after 1990, namely concentration discussed in previous section – by being issued 
as a joint publication, as well as transnationalisation discussed in next section – 
by standardising national document with NATO one. 
Similarly as in case of the UK and Poland, also for Sweden one could 
use the Hofstede’s model to try explaining the character of the existing doctrine. 
The very general and brief way in which the OPD 2014 addresses the subject of 
air power and the fact that there is no air-specific Swedish doctrine issued at 
operational level is convergent with the low values representative for Swedes in 
such cultural dimensions as power distance and uncertainty avoidance as well as 
the high score in individualism. Obviously, there are classified, tactical 
documents issued specifically for Swedish Air Force. However, the lack of 
similar strategic and operational air doctrines confirms very low demand for such 
originating from Sweden’s cultural background. OPD 2014 is very much 
different in its structure. The previous publications, especially the one from 
2004, were more similar to British air doctrines since they contained numerous 
references to past experiences and air power theory of interwar, post-war and 
modern period developed in Italy, France, Germany and the US.266 These 
references were to large extent condensed or completely cut out in the process 
of the revisions aimed at making the document aligned with the joint military 
doctrine, which was being prepared at the time.267 The current publication from 
2014 followed the issuing of a new Militärstrategisk Doktrin (Military-Strategic 
Doctrine) in 2011. As a result, Sweden, just like Poland, currently does not have 
a publication dedicated specifically for air power that would be similar in its 
shape to the RAF doctrine.  
Development of national air doctrines in the UK, Poland and Sweden, 
although following similar process, was to a large extent influenced by the 
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cultural background of these states. As a result, these publications differ in 
character, structure and content reflecting the capabilities, needs and preferences 
of individual air forces. However they also demonstrate a similarity, in referring 
to different extents to NATO publications – whether pointing to individual 
documents or literally adopting their structure and content as in the case of 
Poland. That, in turn, leads to standardisation of the national procedures and 
regulations being an element of another trend characteristic for European 
militaries after 1990, namely transnationalisation. The presence of allied context 
in the British, Polish and Swedish air doctrines will be addressed in next section. 
 
3.2.3 European air power in allied context – doctrinal perspective 
 
The current doctrines of all three countries, the UK, Poland and Sweden, 
show that they are prepared to get involved in multinational operations. They are 
all members of the United Nations and European Union, guaranteeing 
involvement in international arena. Furthermore, the UK and Poland, are also 
allied in NATO and therefore obliged to collective defence.268 Sweden, actively 
participated in a number of NATO-led operations during the post-Cold War 
period, for example Implementation Force – IFOR (1995-1996) and Stabilisation 
Force – SFOR (1996-2004) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo Force – KFOR 
(since 1999), International Security Assistance Force – ISAF (2001-2014) in 
Afghanistan or Unified Protector (2011) in Libya. Considering the issue from 
the point of air power doctrine, the three countries – the UK, Poland and Sweden, 
address it in a slightly different capacity.  
The broadest and most complex approach to the involvement in 
multinational operations is presented in the second edition of British JDP 0-30. 
This document names supporting national security objectives by protecting the 
UK and its dependent territories, projecting the UK’s influence and promoting 
its security and prosperity as the main purpose of British air power.269 These 
roles involve the use of air power either from the country’s territory or as a part 
of expeditionary missions within or beyond UK’s involvement in NATO. A 
similar sentiment can be found in the Swedish OPD 2014 where air power is 
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expected, together with the Army and the Navy, to protect the integrity of 
Sweden’s territory, its population, infrastructure and state’s functions.270 There 
is no such reference in Polish air doctrine which would explicitly place the air 
power capabilities in a context of national objectives. The reason for such 
approach most probably originates from the character of the document being a 
purely operational manual.  
The British doctrine also draws attention to limitations of some other 
countries’ air forces which may not be able to perform certain activities 
independently and therefore stresses the importance of inter-state collaboration. 
However, the 2017 edition of JDP 0-30 did this in more general terms, listing 
potential benefits a nation could gain, such as increasing capability and capacity 
of one’s air force or increasing international recognition and influence of their 
actions.271 In contrast, the 2013 version pointed more explicitly to the general 
decrease in Western defence budgets and growing dependence on multinational 
partnerships. It presented multinational collaboration as an insurance against any 
shortfalls in the physical component of British fighting power (such as 
equipment, manpower, training, capability development) as well as an enhancer 
of the capabilities of UK’s less equipped, less advanced partners.272 It recognised 
NATO specifically as the ‘cornerstone of UK defence on a global scale’ and 
‘principal framework for UK operations’.273 Another aspect mentioned by the 
2017 edition of JDP 0-30 in the context of multinational operations was 
integration and interoperability for increasing the effectiveness of different 
alliances or coalitions. At the same time, the doctrine also recognised that with 
multinational cooperation come certain challenges, for example, establishing 
common objectives and priorities among all participating nations.274 The 
potential difficulties encountered by the RAF, as well as Polish and Swedish Air 
Forces, are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5. 
In comparison, Polish and Swedish air doctrines only touch on the issue 
of the air force’s engagement in multinational operations. Polish air power 
doctrines do not elaborate much on the context of air power involvement in such 
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operations. However, the fact that the document itself contains analogous 
content to NATO doctrine indicates that NATO is the primary framework for 
engagement of the Polish Air Force in international efforts. The importance of 
the Alliance is also stressed in its definition of joint operations. They are 
described as military or non-military operations planned and conducted to 
achieve set strategic goals with the use of two or more kinds of military forces 
and within the framework of the country’s defence, collective defence of one of 
NATO members (or whole Alliance) as well as crisis response.275 The 
importance of developing multinational political and military cooperation within 
the structures of NATO and EU as well as bi-lateral cooperation with the US is 
more explicitly stressed in Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (National Security Strategy of the Republic of 
Poland)) from 2014, which is Poland’s main strategic document.276 According 
to this publication, such cooperation is an important stabilising factor for the 
country’s security as well as security within the region. 
Swedish OPD 2014 briefly, however much more explicitly, 
acknowledges the readiness of relevant air forces to get involved in international 
arena. It states that although the main principle of Swedish Air Forces is to 
operate within Sweden and its neighbourhood, they should also be able to 
cooperate with other states’ air components, take part in international operations 
and get involved in exercises at international level within organisations such as 
NATO, EU or UN.277 There is a clear linkage between Swedish doctrine and 
NATO publications. Despite the fact that Sweden is not allied to NATO, the air 
power chapter in OPD 2014 draws on AJP-3.3(A) as well as to the Alliance’s 
glossary, AAP-06. For example, the terminology used is synonymous with the 
one used also by NATO – Swedish doctrine refers to three levels of air space 
control: favourable air situation, air superiority and air supremacy.278 Once 
again, it only confirms the scale of the country’s efforts towards increasing 
interoperability between Swedish Air Force and NATO initiated in 1990s.  
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The alignment of national doctrines with the NATO documents is not 
exclusive for the Swedish Air Force. It was already mentioned Poland also 
meticulously followed the form, structure and glossary used for the doctrines 
written for the Alliance. Increasing interoperability is one reason for this. 
Another likely reason is the fact that such publications were relatively new for 
the Swedish Air Force and therefore individuals responsible for writing them 
were looking for an example they could use.279 A similar statement could be 
applied to the Polish Air Force as well considering the country’s political 
reorientation from East to the West. Since both countries were focusing on 
cooperation with Western militaries and the US in particular, NATO 
publications were a perfect model. Interestingly, the UK might have also been 
looking up towards the allies’ doctrines while writing their own. As suggested 
by Harwood, the way of thinking about air power within the RAF is very much 
aligned with the approach represented by the US since they set the course and 
lead when it comes to developing the aviation technology which, in fact, shapes 
the world’s air forces.280 Therefore, US air doctrines are often looked at when 
British versions are written. Of course, they are being adapted and modified to 
the RAF’s philosophy, requirements and capabilities but, nevertheless, they are 
often the starting point in the writing process.281 
Finally, in Polish and Swedish publications, there is not much reference 
made to the need of international collaboration due to limited capabilities of 
European air power. In fact Polish doctrine DD-3.3(B) does not mention this 
aspect or in fact any constraints at all. In fact if something does not lie in within 
the capabilities of Polish Air Force it is simply not mentioned. For example, 
although Poland’s DD-3.3(B) echoes NATO’s AJP-3.3(A) in almost every 
detail, it does not refer to military space operations, because Polish Air Force 
does not possess this capability. There are no references to constraints or lacking 
capabilities in Swedish OPD 2014, either. Having said this, the previous editions 
of Swedish air doctrine acknowledged the limitations of Swedish Air Force. The 
air publications from 2004 and 2005, very explicitly evaluated Sweden’s 
capability of conducting strategic attacks. For example, they acknowledged that 
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the Swedish Air Force on its own can conduct a single venture with a strategic 
effect but it is not capable of an independent, major strategic air operation.282 
This is in fact a very interesting approach to be adapted in a publicly accessible 
document. Polish or British doctrines and doctrinal publications rather focus on 
their national forces’ capabilities and stress their strengths. Early Swedish 
doctrines in a very open manner discussed what their forces were and were not 
capable of.283 
The way in which British, Polish and Swedish air doctrines address the 
issue of multinational operations bears evidence of both concentration and 
transnationalisation. The former is especially visible in Polish and Swedish 
publications, which either omit capabilities the Air Force does not possess or 
explicitly admit their shortcomings. These limitations are linked to the process 
of downsizing the Armed Forces and decreasing defence budgets – elements of 
the concentration of the European military after 1990. Transnationalisation, then, 
is evident in the many references made throughout the British, Polish and 
Swedish air doctrines to NATO documents or use of standardised terminology 
as well as the fact that these allied publications were often used as a starting point 
to writing national doctrines. All of that is leading to increased interoperability 
between the named Air Forces. 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
 
Facing the new, post-Cold War security environment the UK, Poland and 
Sweden found themselves in a very different situation. The UK was looking into 
strengthening their cooperation with NATO and the EU, Poland was re-directing 
its political course and making efforts to integrate with Western Europe and 
Sweden changed its politics from national to multinational focus. Nevertheless, 
there were certain similarities in their actions. For example, the Air Forces of all 
three underwent a process of transformation which involved reduction in size 
(among other factors, following abolition of the conscription), re-organisation 
and modernisation. All these processes are elements of King’s idea of 
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concentration leaving the involved militaries not necessarily less capable but 
actually more professional and more effective forces.284 
Another common trend observed among European air forces is developing 
a strong allied discourse in national strategic thinking after 1990 reflecting their 
increased transnationalisation. For the UK, Poland and Sweden, NATO and EU 
are guarantors of security in the region, as well as security of the individual 
countries. The importance of effective cooperation with NATO is being stressed, 
for example by the countries efforts to improve interoperability between their air 
forces and NATO and upgrading national solutions to the Alliance’s standards. 
That process is also evident in the development of the British, Polish and 
Swedish air doctrines. There are some differences specific to the country 
nevertheless these publications very easily can be linked with NATO ones. 
The fact that the process of post-Cold War transformation of the RAF, 
Polish and Swedish Air Force involves traits characteristic for both, 
concentration and transnationalisation proves that these two processes are 
mutually dependent. For example, Dandeker when referring to his idea of 
‘flexible forces’, or as understood by King – concentrated but more 
professionalised, identifies two implications such situation brings. One being the 
states willingness to build a full spectrum of military capabilities in order to 
respond to any kind of threat that may potentially emerge, and the other being 
their incapability to do so because of the shrinking defence budgets.285 As a 
result their defence capabilities are being significantly reduced. However, at the 
same time, Haltiner points out that the increased development of various 
institutionalised security initiatives pursued at international level such as, for 
example NATO, the European Defence Initiative or the PfP, could be one of the 
reasons accelerating the reduction of European military forces in 1990s.286 In 
other words, downsizing armed forces leads to their increased participation in 
multinational alliances or coalitions in order to build collective defence 
capabilities and vice versa – involvement in such initiatives reduces the need for 
maintaining mass armed forces at the national level.  
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Considering the above, the chapter argues that the processes of 
concentration and transnationalisation of the RAF, Polish and Swedish Air 
Forces are both the reason as well as a way to adapt to their increased 
participation in multinational operations since the end of the Cold War. The 
concentrated air forces, although professional, do not possess enough capability 
and capacity to conduct large-scale, independent operations. Hence the need to 
improve interoperability with other nations and build strong collective defence 
structure. The next chapter will take further insight into the latter issue 
investigating the concept of transnationalisation in more detail. It will 
particularly focus on the British, Polish and Swedish Air Forces and explore their 
involvement in various forms of multinational cooperation as a crucial tool to 
create a capable air power in the region. 
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Chapter 4: Transnationalisation of European air 
power – different forms of multinational cooperation 
 
 
 The previous chapter used Anthony King’s concept of concentration to 
illustrate some major developments European military forces, and air forces in 
particular, underwent after the Cold War. It also referred to his other concept, 
transnationalisation, when discussing the growing presence of allied discourse 
in strategic thinking in the UK, Poland and Sweden. This chapter will explore 
the concept of transnationalisation in more detail. It will aim to answer two sub-
questions to the thesis – how have European countries sought to create the 
conditions required for the effective cooperation of their air forces in 
multinational operations; and, what role have collaborative initiatives played in 
creation of these conditions?  
As was already explained in Chapter 2., post-Cold War 
transnationalisation of European armed forces is understood as cooperation 
leading to their increasing interdependence and interconnectedness. After 1990 
that cooperation between European militaries became increasingly 
institutionalised, which was reflected, for example, in the establishment of 
regional commands during NATO interventions such as SFOR, KFOR or later 
ISAF.287 Transnationalisation, however, takes place also outside of theatres of 
operation in the form of various collaborative initiatives aiming at building 
collective capabilities within the frameworks of NATO or EU as well as in the 
form of other multilateral groupings. As possible reasons for this process, 
Chapter 2. listed, firstly, limitations, in this case of European air power 
especially in the area of AT, AAR or ISR; secondly, shrinking defence budgets 
and rising costs for maintaining fully capable, national militaries. It also 
highlighted the issue of cultural diversity in multinational cooperation and the 
potential challenges this may bring. These challenges resulting from cultural 
diversity will be looked at in detail in Chapter 5., which also analyses how 
multinational cooperation can improve the effectiveness of the involvement of 
British, Polish and Swedish Air Forces in various operations at international 
level. 
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The chapter begins by discussing the idea of pooling and sharing 
resources among European militaries. Then it will introduce initiatives pursued 
within NATO, EU as well as outside of these structures where British, Polish or 
Swedish Air Forces are involved. The last two main sections of the chapter are 
structured around two main points: cost or burden sharing and building 
capabilities, however one should bear in mind that such division is made only 
for organisational purposes. In fact, all of the discussed initiatives fall in both 
categories.  
Overall, the chapter shows that the multinational initiatives European air 
forces participate in are an opportunity to build and strengthen their capabilities 
in terms of both, access to necessary equipment as well as experience and 
training. Furthermore, increasing involvement of European air forces in such 
forms of multinational cooperation reflects the process of their 
transnationalisation and results in improved interoperability and building 
collective capabilities. 
 
4.1 Multinational cooperation – parallel concepts of pooling and 
sharing capabilities in NATO and EU 
 
The initiatives of multinational collaboration among European air forces 
have been developed predominantly within the structures of NATO and the EU, 
which are the two main institutions facilitating cooperation in the field of 
security and defence in Europe.288 However, as the chapter will show, various 
arrangements are also pursued independently of these organisations, in 
multilateral formats. Within NATO framework there is the Smart Defence 
initiative. Triggered by the conduct of operation Unified Protector in Libya, the 
very idea was introduced at NATO Chicago summit in 2012. The operation in 
Libya was the most recent military involvement of European air forces to reveal 
their limitations and over-reliance on US resources, especially in terms of ISR, 
AT and AAR.289 There is no doctrinal document for Smart Defence, but it can 
be described as each countries’ commitment to contribute to common military 
                                                             
288 There is an extensive literature on NATO – EU cooperation however, due to the fact it is not 
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289 See Chapter 2. 
104 
 
capacity. The idea is built on three pillars, namely prioritisation, specialisation 
and cooperation.290 Prioritisation is understood as identifying the key capabilities 
that NATO should possess. Specialisation means that every state is supposed to 
develop and invest in an area it has the best experience at. Finally, the 
participating nations are supposed to cooperate with each other, sharing their 
strengths in order to make up for others’ shortcomings and limitations and, as a 
result, build shared capabilities and military capacity. That should also lead in 
effect to meeting the target set of prioritised capabilities for the whole Alliance.  
Parallel to Smart Defence in NATO, the European Defence Agency 
(EDA) started, in 2010, its own initiative – Pooling & Sharing (P&S). The idea 
is very similar to NATO’s concept of Smart Defence. P&S focuses on addressing 
shortcomings in European defence capabilities and improving them through 
collective effort.291 It involves a wide variety of projects, such as, for example, 
Helicopter Training Programme, Maritime Surveillance, European Satellite 
Communications Procurement Cell, Multinational Modular Medical Units 
(Medical Field Hospitals), AAR or Pilot Training.292 As concepts creating 
opportunities for closer cooperation between NATO or EU nations, both Smart 
Defence and P&S, can be regarded as examples of the process of 
transnationalisation. Promoting collective effort in order to address certain 
limitations in European militaries, or as discussed in this thesis – air forces, leads 
towards their increased interdependence and interconnectedness.  
The very idea underlying the concepts of Smart Defence or EDA’s P&S 
is not a new one. Some of the programmes, which could be recognised today as 
a form of Smart Defence, have been initiated before the concept was even 
introduced. For example, one of the oldest, NATO Airborne Early Warning 
(NAEW) system, started already in 1982.293 There were also other initiatives 
similar to Smart Defence and P&S in the past, for example the Defence 
Capabilities Initiative (DCI) introduced after NATO Washington Summit in 
                                                             
290 See Tadeusz Zieliński, “Overview of Allied Defence Capabilities in the Area of Aviation 
within the Context of the Smart Defence Initiative.” NDU Scientific Quarterly, 90.1 (2013), 93-
106, p. 96. 
291 European Defence Agency, “Factsheet: EDA's Pooling & Sharing.” (updated 06/02/2013) 
Available at: <https://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/publications/publication-
details/pub/factsheet-eda's-pooling-sharing> [accessed 03/03/2017]. 
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1999.294 DCI was initiated in 1998 for the very same reason as the initiatives 
superseding it. It was aimed at bridging the technological gap between NATO 
members, namely the US and the rest, which had resulted from decreasing 
defence budgets and shrinking military forces as well as the change of the 
strategic position of both, the US and Europe.295 However, because of its focus 
on the concept of  the Revolution in Military Affairs and advanced technology, 
the initiative was by many perceived as created predominantly for the more 
powerful countries such as the UK, France or Germany which could afford these 
solutions.296 For financial reasons, smaller nations did not see many options to 
get involved. 
Although presenting viable benefits, like making up for capability and 
capacity shortcomings, sharing experiences as well as cost and burden sharing, 
developing parallel initiatives by both NATO and EU may be perceived as 
unnecessary duplication of resources and effort or evidence of a competition 
between the two organisations. However, some scholars have noted that the EU 
is developing different initiatives not only in response to the obvious capability 
and capacity gaps, but also in an attempt to become independent from NATO’s 
resources.297 Besides, as suggested by Andrew Cottey, after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the shift from bi- to multi-polar security environment, NATO 
lost its character as the main security guarantor for the Western European 
states.298 Instead it became one of many international organisations, such as EU, 
UN, which may be used to deal with arising security challenges.299 Therefore, it 
should not be surprising that all of these institutions may develop their own 
structures to address various military needs. 
                                                             
294 Paul Johnson, Tim LaBenz, and Durrell Driver, “Smart Defence: Brave New Approach or 
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297 See, for example, Andrew Cottey, Security in the New Europe. Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, 
pp. 95–96; Claudia Major and Christian Mölling, EU Battlegroups: What Contribution to 
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Another point about developing parallel initiatives in NATO and EU is 
the character of operations they get involved in. As some scholars noted, the 
fundamental difference between military interventions conducted by both 
organisations is that the EU is focusing primarily on small-scale crisis 
management and peacekeeping or post-conflict stabilisation operations taking 
place predominantly in regions in direct neighbourhood to the EU.300 In contrast, 
building and maintaining collective defence capabilities as well as getting 
involved in large military interventions on global scale remains the focal point 
of NATO.301 It was only in the early 2000s when the shift towards high-intensity 
military operations started in the EU together with the development of initiatives 
aimed at military capabilities. However, as Tom Dyson argued, these should not 
be perceived as a challenge or rivalry towards NATO.302 As was pointed out in 
Chapter 2., the limitations of European collective military capabilities remain a 
substantial obstacle in conducting large-scale operations independently from 
NATO or the US. Therefore the initiatives pursued in the EU should be seen as 
quite different from or complementary to those organised by NATO. 
 
4.2 Multinational cooperation – cost- and burden-sharing initiatives 
in European air forces 
 
Initiatives of multinational cooperation are an important tool in reducing 
the financial burden related to maintaining a comprehensive and fully 
operational air force, especially for smaller states. They also present an 
opportunity for gaining access to resources that would not be available otherwise 
and to fill at least some of the existent capability gaps. This section explores 
Baltic Air Policing (BAP) as well as Cross Border Training (CBT) and the Arctic 
Challenge Exercise (ACE) pursued within the framework of NORDEFCO303 as 
examples for initiatives aimed at cost and burden sharing. 
                                                             
300 See, for example, Cottey, Security in the New Europe., p. 142; Bonnén, Towards a Common 
European Security., p. 16 and Tom Dyson, Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in Post-
Cold War Europe. Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 66. 
301 See ibid. 
302 Dyson, Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform., pp. 64–66. 
303 NORDEFCO (Nordic Defence Cooperation) is one of the most important initiatives pursued 
in the Scandinavian region. It was established on 04/11/2009 from merging NORDCAPS 
(Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Peace Support), NORDAC (Nordic Armaments 
Cooperation) and NORDSUP (Nordic Defence Support). The initiative gathers Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden and its main objective is to strengthen their national 
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Baltic Air Policing 
The Baltic Air Policing mission is a flagship project for the Smart 
Defence initiative. The mission started in 2004 after the Baltic States – Latvia, 
Lithuania and Estonia, joined NATO.304 It provides an example of strong 
solidarity within NATO as its members contribute with their resources and 
defence capabilities to support nations which lack them. In case of BAP these 
are Baltic States, but there are also other air policing missions over Albania, 
Luxembourg, Iceland, Slovenia and, more recently, Bulgaria and Romania.305 
Those missions allow for maintaining the integrity of NATO’s airspace. 
Furthermore, they obviously lessen the financial burden on those states which 
do not possess a (sufficient) air force. That is crucial for small countries, such as 
the Baltic States. For example, there are six transport aircraft and helicopters in 
total in the inventory of the Estonian Air Force.306 Latvia has four transport 
aircraft and six helicopters, while the Lithuanian Air Force possesses one 
training aircraft, five transport ones and six helicopters.307 Such small numbers, 
even when combined, represent very little defence capability. However, as 
members of NATO these states are entitled to certain benefits and one of these 
is collective defence. In this case it takes form of being the subject of NATO’s 
air policing missions. As a result the Baltic States do not have to spend on 
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building new defence capabilities that they cannot afford but, instead, they are 
using what already exists within the Alliance. They still need to cover part of the 
mission costs, but they also get measurable benefits. For example, the air bases 
in Šiauliai and Ämari were modernised via NATO Security Investment 
Programme (NSIP).308 Moreover, via collective defence, the integrity of the 
involved countries’ own airspace is being ensured and their national security 
increases. 
BAP mission is being performed on a rotational basis and (at the time of 
writing) there had been altogether 46 rotations. Both the Royal Air Force and 
Polish Air Force are participating in the BAP mission. The RAF has been 
involved in four rotations – in 2004, 2014, 2015 and 2016. The Polish Air Force 
has been involved in Lithuania since 2005. During that time they participated in 
the mission in seven rotations – in 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2015 and 2017. 
The latest rotation finished at the end of August 2017 and for two reasons was 
special for Poland – firstly, the country was acting as a lead nation, and secondly, 
the deployment involved for the first time Polish F-16s instead of MiG-29s.309 
The main role of RAF’s Typhoons, when deployed to BAP, is primarily quick 
reaction force responsible for patrolling the Baltic States’ air space against any 
sort of aggression from Russia.310 However, there are also other duties performed 
by the deployed air force, such as helping other aircraft in emergency situation 
(for example, loss of radio communication), dealing with a RENEGADE 
category aircraft311 or conducting training missions with Lithuanian pilots as 
well as other participating nations.312 
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Cross Border Training and Arctic Challenge Exercise 
Sweden is not involved in BAP, but the country very actively participates 
in regional forms of multinational cooperation involving its closest neighbours. 
These also take form of cost- and burden-sharing initiatives and play an 
important role for the Nordic states and militaries. For example, the number of 
personnel in Swedish Air Force was significantly reduced from 8,000 in 1990 to 
2,700 in 2017.313 Also the structure of the Service changed when eight out of 
twelve main air bases were closed. This heavily influenced capability and 
capacity of the Swedish Air Force and hence, cost- and burden-sharing initiatives 
presented new possibilities for the Service. One of the examples here is the Cross 
Border Training which, similarly to BAP, allows for collective effort and 
achieving a goal which would not be reached otherwise, or at least would incur 
much higher costs. For example, as Wilson explained: 
(…) if you need two teams with, let’s say, eight aircraft each to 
conduct an exercise or training, then you need to launch 16 
Gripens. It’s really expensive and we seldom have 16 operational 
Gripens that we could actually spare. But, if you launch, six 
Gripens from Sweden, six F-16s from Norway and six F-18Cs from 
Finland then you got 18 aircraft and voila – you are able to conduct 
quite big and complicated exercises in a way that we could never 
afford or handle, either in Norway, Sweden or Finland.314 
Lindvall also referred to the above point as well as pointing out the streamlined 
process in organising the weekly exercises – thanks to the relevant agreements 
establishing a single, common exercise area, such training can be easily 
conducted according to the needs and without asking every time for a special 
decision or permission from Stockholm (Oslo or Helsinki).315 
Cross Border Training is a short notice agreement where fighter aircraft 
from Finland, Norway and Sweden can use each other’s air space to train 
together. On a weekly basis they conduct air combat training missions flown 
from their home bases in Bodø (Norway), Luleå (Sweden) and Rovaniemi 
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(Finland).316 On the basis of CBT in 2013 there was launched Arctic Challenge 
Exercise – a bi-annual large exercise involving countries from outside 
NORDEFCO.317 It rotates between the three CBT air bases in Bodø, Luleå and 
Rovaniemi. The 2017 edition of ACE was one of Europe’s largest air exercises 
gathering over one hundred aircraft, from multirole fighters, transport aircraft, 
tankers, airborne warning and control system aircraft to transport and search and 
rescue helicopters.318 The exercise brought together air forces from Finland, 
Norway, Sweden, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland and the United States.319 Due to its scale and with the 
support of the US, ACE is going to be developed into a Northern Flag 
Exercise.320 Also, the relations established within CBT serve as a starting point 
for enhancing the bi-lateral cooperation between Sweden and Finland. In the 
Action Plan for Deepened Defence Cooperation between Sweden and Finland 
signed by both countries in 2014, they agreed on developing the collaboration 
between their Air Forces in such areas as joint exercises, education, ISR and 
Command and Control capabilities, mutual use of the infrastructure, etc.321 
All of the above are examples of burden-sharing initiatives, focusing 
especially on their advantages in terms of sharing costs. First of all, BAP, CBT 
and ACE allow participating states to use each other’s’ resources to make up for 
their own limitations. Secondly, by giving the states and air forces access to 
capabilities they lack, the mentioned initiatives ease the defence costs they 
would need to bear in order to fill the gaps on their own. Building collective 
military capability and reliance on the allies in order to maintain one’s national 
defence increases interconnectedness and interdependence between involved air 
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forces. By developing relations at international level they become transnational 
in the sense understood by King. The next sub-chapter will focus on other 
aspects of the collective efforts in making up for the shortcoming of European 
air power. Doing so it will show how multinational cooperative initiatives 
contribute to capacity-building. 
 
4.3 Multinational cooperation – capability building initiatives in 
European air forces 
 
An important reason for developing cooperation between European 
militaries, or transnationalisation, has been the need to fill certain capability 
gaps. These gaps were created by several factors but, above all, by shrinking 
defence budgets. For example, after the collapse of the USSR and withdrawal of 
the Soviet forces, the Polish Air Force was left with a limited capability.322 The 
process of rebuilding it and re-gaining operational capability took time: for 
example, the first deployment of Polish F-16s happened in 2016 – ten years after 
they were bought by Polish Air Force. Four of the fighters joined Operation 
Inherent Resolve in Kuwait, where for two years they performed reconnaissance 
missions.323  
The capability gaps within European air forces are also linked to the 
technological gap between American and European militaries. In relation to 
command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance capabilities (C4ISR) of several European countries, Adams and 
Ben-Ari, have argued that the falling behind in technological development is a 
result of declining defence budgets.324 Anrig has suggested, a likely reason for 
this technological gap is the fact that, especially since the end of the Cold War, 
air power was usually given much more attention, and consequently money, in 
the US than in Europe.325 The reasons, include financial constraints, national 
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policies, political will and others, but European air power certainly has 
shortcomings and these can be made up for through multinational cooperation. 
As indicated in Chapter 2., the operations in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s, or 
more recently, in Libya revealed significant capability or capacity gaps 
compared to the US in the area of precision munitions and their delivery systems, 
strategic airlift, AAR and ISR. The following section will show how the British, 
Polish and Swedish Air Forces have sought to overcome these gaps through 
engagement in multinational initiatives. 
 
4.3.1 Air transport 
 
According to data compiled in The Military Balance for 2018, the RAF 
possesses a total of 58 different transport aircraft with an additional twelve 
Airbus A400M Atlases on order.326 In contrast, the Polish Air Force has 45 active 
transport aircraft of various types, while in Sweden that number drops to eight 
only.327 All of these numbers are negligible when compared with the USAF’s 
airlift capacity of 728 aircraft in total.328 Within the constraints of defence 
budgets significantly smaller than that of the US, European air forces therefore 
had no choice but to work together on strengthening their collective AT 
capability, further strengthening the process of transnationalisation. 
This section starts with exploring the SAC and SALIS programmes, 
which should be regarded as model examples of successful pooling and sharing 
of resources enabling European nations to access capabilities they could not 
afford otherwise. As such, these programmes are examples of the 
transnationalisation process taking place within the European air forces, and 
armed forces in general. Furthermore, they prove the value of multinational 
initiatives as cost-sharing opportunities.  
There is also another value that initiatives such as SAC and SALIS, or 
the EDA’s training programmes EATT and EAATTC discussed at the end of the 
section, present for participating states. As was already pointed out in the 
introduction to this chapter, these initiatives provide the crews with an 
experience they would not have a chance to acquire on their own, or at least it 
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would take much more time and resources. For example, during the 2017 edition 
of EATT, the participating crews were training in missions as diverse as air 
transport, airlift, air logistic support, airborne operations, airdrops, aeromedical 
operations, non-combatant evacuation as well as support of special operations 
forces.329 This shows the scope of these training events as well as their invaluable 
role in strengthening these air forces, which would not be able to train such 
missions on the basis of their own, national capabilities alone. 
 
Strategic Airlift Interim Solution and Strategic Airlift Capability 
Similar to BAP, Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS) and Strategic 
Airlift Capability (SAC) initiatives are examples of well-established and well-
functioning cooperation between NATO members. Having started respectively 
in 2005 and 2008, these two programmes were introduced in response to the 
existing gap in strategic airlift capability.330 Poland and Sweden participate in 
both, SAC and SALIS projects (Sweden as a PfP nation) while the UK is 
involved in the latter only.331 The ventures complement each other, but are 
organised and operate separately.  
SALIS, as the name suggests, was initially established as an interim 
solution for three years, until the Airbus A400M Atlas fleets were introduced. 
However, the contract has been gradually extended with the possibility to stretch 
it until 2019.332 The initiative is coordinated by the SALIS Coordination Cell 
working together with the Movement Coordination Centre Europe (MCCE)333. 
It is not, however, an integral part of MCCE.334 Fourteen participating states 
contract six Antonov An-124-100 aircraft from Russian Volga-Dnepr Airlines 
and Ukrainian Antonov Airlines. Two of these are available immediately at 
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Leipzig-Halle Airport (Germany) and the other four are available respectively 
on six and nine days’ notice.335  
SALIS is a good example of the process of transnationalisation taking 
place among European air forces. Firstly, it proves the need for developing 
cooperation between states in order to build collective resources, in this case 
airlift, as a way of making up for capability and capacity shortcomings at 
national level. Secondly, it shows the increasing interdependence between 
involved air forces which is inseparable element of the aforementioned process 
of military transnationalisation. That also brings the risk of losing access to once 
available resources in case one of the members decides to withdraw their 
participation. That would suggest, as already mentioned in Chapter 2., that 
developing national capabilities is equally important. The example of SALIS 
illustrates that interdependence very well. The Antonov fleet chartered by the 
initiative’s members was initially owned by one company – Ruslan International 
Ltd formed by the above mentioned Volga-Dnepr and Antonov Airlines. 
However, the two companies ended their cooperation at the end of 2016 
following the deterioration of relations between Russia and Ukraine after the 
annexation of Crimea.336 With this situation in mind and the continued need for 
strategic transport capabilities, a debate ensued on how to provide for the future 
of SALIS. In the end, two separate contracts were signed with Antonov and 
Volga-Dnepr to provide respectively 40 per cent and 60 per cent of flying 
hours.337 In April 2018, however, Russian Volga-Dnepr announced their 
decision to withdraw from the initiative with the end of their contract in 
December 2018, leaving the participating states with less than half of the now 
available airlift.338 This decision, as much as the earlier one to end the Russian-
Ukrainian joint venture and to draw up separate contracts, was very much 
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influenced by the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and increasing tension between 
Russia and NATO.339  
Under SAC, a multinational military structure was established – Heavy 
Airlift Wing (HAW) based at the Pápa Air Base (Hungary) which operates the 
three Boeing C-17 Globemaster aircraft acquired by SAC members.340 The 
participating nations delegate the crews, share the maintenance and operational 
costs for the aircraft as well as the needed infrastructure and, according to their 
input into the venture, are entitled to use these for a certain number of flying 
hours.341 Interestingly, Sweden’s share, as a non-NATO nation, is the second-
largest after the US’s 32 per cent, which also means the country is the second-
largest contributor to the initiative.342 Therefore, while the annual total for SAC 
is 3,165 flying hours, Sweden and Poland have shares of, respectively, 17.4 per 
cent and 4.7 per cent of that number that equals 550.7 and 148.8 hours per 
year.343  
Both SALIS and SAC were established in order to fill the strategic airlift 
capability gap in Europe. The SALIS initiative was created to transport heavy 
cargo and, as such, was used by NATO Support Agency during the ISAF mission 
performing weekly flights between Europe and Afghanistan as well as played 
important role during the withdrawal from that part of the world.344 For example, 
Poland used SALIS for transporting their helicopters and armored vehicles to 
and from Afghanistan.345 The initiative (as well as SAC) has been also widely 
used by NATO countries to deliver humanitarian aid. For example following the 
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earthquake in Pakistan in 2005 and the typhoon in the Philippines in 2013, 
SALIS delivered aid to the affected areas. Following the earthquake in Haiti in 
2010 and flood in Pakistan the same year, SAC was used.346 SAC’s C-17s fleet 
can also be used by participating states to support their defence or logistical 
needs. For example, Poland used these aircraft to transport the bodies of the 
victims of the Tupolev crash in Smolensk in April 2010.347 Furthermore, SAC 
can be used to help the member states with their commitments towards NATO, 
EU or UN operations where these cannot be met using their national capacity. 
As such, the initiative was used in ISAF and Resolute Support Mission in 
Afghanistan, as well as NATO operations in Libya in 2011, EU Training Mission 
in Mali (since 2013) or the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation 
Mission (MINUSCA) in the Republic of Central Africa (since 2015).348 In fact, 
HAW’s first mission in support of ISAF was a Swedish initiative – the country 
used SAC to deliver cargo from Karlsborg Air Base (Sweden) to Mazar-e-Sharif 
in Afghanistan in September 2009.349 Also the first HAW mission supporting 
ISAF without American involvement had a crew of seven airmen, including 
three Swedes and one Pole (the others were two Norwegians and one 
Bulgarian).350 
The example of SAC and SALIS demonstrates that the effectiveness of 
shared capabilities built in this way depend on various factors. The success of 
the SALIS programme, was imperilled by its reliance on third parties (Ukrainian 
and Russian defence industry in this case). International events outside of the 
control of NATO suddenly left the programme with less than half of the required 
airlift capabilities. Therefore a better solution seems to be SAC, since the 
participating nations own the fleet used in that initiative excluding involvement 
of any third parties. Therefore the cooperation pursued within SAC is less likely 
to be disrupted unless one of the members decides to withdraw causing rise of 
costs for the remaining nations. However, even then, the capacity they are left 
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with is not diminished like it happened in case of SALIS. In conclusion, most 
importantly, the effectiveness of multinational initiatives depends on its 
individual members’ willingness to contribute sources, manpower and materiel 
to the collective effort. 
 
European Air Transport Fleet Concept 
Parallel to SAC and SALIS in NATO, EDA also developed their own 
collaborative initiative focused on providing air transport capability and capacity 
to participating nations. This is the European Air Transport Fleet Concept 
(EATF) established in 2009 and gathering twenty one EU countries.351 In the 
long run EATF should allow for building an interoperable, robust network of 
European AT able to cost-effectively use its assets regardless of their origin or 
national affiliation.352 Implementation and development of the project have been 
divided into three phases. During the first phase from 2012–2014, the 
foundations for multinational cooperation were established. For example, 
diplomatic clearances were provided, procedures agreed and several training and 
exercises programmes initiated.353 During the second phase from 2015–2017, 
the European Tactical Airlift Centre (ETAC) was opened at the air base in 
Zaragoza (Spain) as a permanent training centre for participating states.354 The 
third and last EATF phase will last until 2021. It focuses on deepening the 
cooperation between EU nations and their AT fleets while implementing 
innovative solutions and developing new capabilities.355 Reliance on nationally 
owned assets illustrates one significant difference between the NATO and 
EDA’s airlift initiatives. For SAC and SALIS the participating countries 
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acquire/charter and maintain a shared fleet of air transport aircraft while in EATF 
they use their own aircraft. As pointed out by Robert C. Owen when discussing 
the examples of HAW and European Air Transport Command (EATC)356, this 
may pose challenges regarding the availability of the shared fleet for all the 
participating nations. In the former case they may have limited access to the 
collective resources despite of their assigned number of flying hours as they may 
be used by someone else.357 EATC leaves the participants more flexibility in 
terms of making their aircraft available for the partner nations, as with putting 
forward their own national fleets they also retain the right to prioritise their 
needs.358 The same could be said about EATF since the initiative focuses on 
improving interoperability between participating air forces and the airlift aircraft 
they possess while they retain the full ownership of these assets. Such an 
arrangement also eliminates the risk of replicating a situation similar to that 
affecting the SALIS initiative, which will be left with only 40 percent of their 
previously available air lift fleet in 2019 as a result of unforeseen circumstances 
beyond their control.  
EATF is being exercised through the European Air Transport Training 
(EATT) and the European Advanced Airlift Tactics Training Course 
(EAATTC).359 The former is an annual event that started in 2012 and focuses on 
enhancing interoperability between participants and their airlift assets (mostly 
Lockheed C-130 Hercules, Transall C-160 and CASA C-295).360 In the 2018 
edition, EATT involved air personnel from Belgium, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland and the UK who performed a 
total of 100 sorties.361 Also it was the first EATT exercise, now renamed as 
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European Tactical Airlift Programme – Training (ETAP-T), organised by the 
ETAC that opened last year in Zaragoza. As such it proved to be a great success 
of the newly created Centre and confirmed its relevance and usefulness. 
The European Advanced Airlift Tactics Training Course (EAATTC) was 
established in 2014 as a European alternative to the American Advanced Airlift 
Tactics Training Centre (AATTC). The event takes place several times a year 
and focuses on providing the air transport crews with academic knowledge and 
flying training in tactics and procedures in order to improve the interoperability 
between different nations and their airlift assets.362 The EAATTC also places the 
participating crews in a deployment scenario where they train in realistic and 
tactically challenging environments.363  
Both, Poland and Sweden took part in the EATT exercise several times 
since it was established – Poland in the 2016, 2017 and 2018 editions, and 
Sweden in 2013 and 2015 (also acting as an observer country in 2014).364 
Moreover, Poland participated, as the only of the three case study countries, in 
the EAATTC training in 2016 and 2017.365 It is vital to mention here, that 
although these programmes have been established as part of the EATF and 
currently are two of the four main deliverables for ETAC, participation is not 
limited to EATF/ETAC members only. The UK, as an EDA state, took part in 
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EATT six times at the time of writing – in 2013 and 2014 as an observer nation, 
and in 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 fully participated in the training.366 
The multinational initiatives discussed above are not the sole opportunity 
for European air forces to gain such valuable experience within the framework 
of multinational cooperation. The most important occasion to learn is actual 
experience of and participation in air operations. For example, the UK, Poland 
and Sweden all were to different extents involved in Operation Enduring 
Freedom and the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. All three participated with their 
helicopter forces performing various tasks, such as Close Air Support (CAS), 
Quick Reaction Force, escorting convoys, fire support, shows of force or 
reconnaissance but also tactical transport of the ground forces and lighter cargo 
as well as medical (MEDEVAC) and casualty evacuation (CASEVAC). That 
extensive employment of helicopters in this mission significantly enhanced the 
tactical capabilities of involved air forces (and land forces in case of Poland as 
the Polish Mi-17s belong to the Polish Ground Forces not the Air Force). For 
example, in the case of the RAF, it led to developing those niche activities such 
as helicopter flying to a very high level, as noted by AVM Edward Stringer.367 
A number of Polish respondents confirmed the operation as a unique opportunity 
for pilots to gain experience of flying in the mountains, in a specific climate with 
high temperature amplitudes, while performing the mission after dark with night 
vision goggles.368 Others referred to developing procedures for land-air 
cooperation, such as for example call for fire support, and including this 
experience in the training.369 Also, in the case of Sweden, this operational 
experience was pointed out as having an important effect on the country’s 
involvement in ISAF resulting in performing better in any other coalitions built 
in the future.370 
The above section demonstrated the importance of collaborative 
initiatives in the area of AT. Both, SAC and SALIS pursued within the NATO 
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framework, as well as EATF initiated by EDA, present salient examples of cost-
effective opportunities for European air power to strengthen their airlift 
capabilities. They also provide access to transport aircraft for those air forces 
which would not have it otherwise, or for which it would incur too high costs to 
acquire an AT fleet of their own. Finally, the discussed programmes present 
opportunity for the air crews to work together and gain invaluable experience. 
That, in result, also supports the argument in Chapter 2., suggesting that the more 
different air forces cooperate with each other, the smoother their cooperation 
will be, thus leading to the increasing transnationalisation of European air forces 
in the post-Cold War period. 
 
4.3.2 Air-to-air refuelling 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2., experiences from the Kosovo and Libya 
operations also pointed to the shortfall in European AAR capability and capacity. 
AAR was identified as a shortcoming in NATO military capability – especially 
among its European members.371 The EU declared it as a ‘critical capability 
shortfall’.372 The reason for such a statement becomes very much obvious when 
one looks at the numbers – in 2014 NATO tanker inventory was 709 aircraft.373 
Without the US that number dropped to 71, and without the US, Canada and 
Turkey it dropped even further to 58 which included platforms from France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK.374 Only seven EU NATO 
members had at that time deployable AAR capability.375  
Among the three case study countries only the UK has a viable tanker 
fleet. The latest data from The Military Balance 2018 shows 14 AAR aircraft in 
the RAF.376 Swedish air tankers inventory can hardly be compared here. 
According to Nygren, Swedish Air Force in 2016 possessed only one tanker 
aircraft, which was used only for training purposes.377 Poland, in turn, never had 
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its own AAR capability. However, in 2014, the country, together with Norway 
and the Netherlands, decided to acquire a fleet of Airbus A330 Multi Role 
Tanker Transport (MRTT).378 
This section discusses initiatives launched to fill the AAR gap, such as 
EDA’s AAR project, a joint NATO and EU AAR exercise, and the ATARES 
programme. The fact that NATO and the EU are both paying so much attention 
and work together to obtain mutual AAR clearances is encouraging. Having 
these in place will increase the operational flexibility of the tanker assets 
possessed by European nations. That, in turn, is likely to lead to better efficiency 
of using the available AAR fleet and will increase their interconnectedness. That 
interconnectedness is also being developed outside of NATO and EU structures. 
It is, for example, a direct result of the cooperation pursued within the ATARES 
initiative, which will be discussed as another example of an effective cost-
sharing programme and building capabilities for air forces that could not afford 
them on national level. Moreover ATARES, as a pooled multinational initiative, 
also reduces the bureaucracy between the participating countries.379 This is 
another way to make multinational cooperation easier and smoother but also to 
increase interconnectedness between the involved air forces, which is one 
element of the process of military transnationalisation in post-1990 Europe. 
 
European Defence Agency’s AAR Project 
Since the AAR provides an air force with greater range, endurance as 
well as flexibility, which is essential for expeditionary operations, filling, or at 
least reducing, that gap is vital for European states. There are several initiatives 
pursued within both NATO and the EU to address this issue. For example, the 
aforementioned initiative involving Poland, Norway and the Netherlands is a 
part of a project initiated by EDA in response to the limited AAR capability in 
Europe. The EDA’s AAR project was started in 2012 and is realised in three 
work strands aiming at (1) optimising the use of existing tanker assets and 
acquiring new aircraft such as (2) Airbus A400M Atlas as well as (3) Airbus 
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A330 MRTT leading to the creation of an MRTT fleet by 2020.380 In 2016 a 
Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg, joined a year later by Germany and Norway, to buy seven aircraft 
of that type and have them delivered between 2010 and 2022.381 Despite the 
initial signing of the Letter of Intent to acquire the pooled fleet of MRTT aircraft, 
Poland has not been part of that Memorandum. 
 
NATO and EU AAR Clearance Request/Approval Training and Table Top 
Exercise 
The acquisition of the pooled multinational fleet of AAR aircraft 
necessitates all participating states to have any required clearances in place for 
the fleet to become fully operational. In 2014, 40 per cent of such clearances in 
Europe were still missing. This reduced the flexibility and immediate 
deployability of available AAR assets.382 The problem was addressed by both 
the EU and NATO. For example, in 2013 a first collective AAR clearance trial 
was organised in Italy involving the host nation’s tanker – Boeing KC-767, two 
French Mirage 2000 and Rafale fighters and three Swedish Gripens. Eleven 
EDA states had signalled interest in the initiative initially.383 In 2014, NATO 
identified Five Pillars of an AAR Clearance as areas which should be reviewed 
by the tanker and receiver nations in order to ensure that bi-lateral clearances are 
obtained.384 Following that, the JAPCC initiated in January 2017 the first edition 
of the NATO and EU AAR Clearance Request/Approval Training and Table Top 
Exercise. This was conducted with the involvement of both, NATO International 
Staff and the EDA, as well as the MCCE, the Dutch Flight Test Centre and the 
European Air Transport Command, which hosted the training. The participants 
identified several key points to focus on during cooperation within the AAR 
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domain and requested that the event should be held annually.385 As such, this 
initiative looks very promising for establishing mutual AAR clearances among 
NATO and EU nations in the future. It also serves as another example of the 
increasing transnationalisation of European air power. 
 
Air Transport, Air-to-Air Refuelling and other Exchange of Services 
An interesting example of a collaborative initiative based on pooling and 
sharing AT and AAR resources, although this time pursued outside of the NATO 
and EU framework, is the Air Transport, Air-to-Air Refuelling and other 
Exchange of Services (ATARES) arrangement. It emerged following the 
establishment of the MCCE in 2007 and the merger of the European Airlift 
Centre and the Sealift Coordination Centre. MCCE is based at the Eindhoven 
Air Base in the Netherlands and currently gathers 28 nations among which are 
all three case study countries – Poland since 2008, Sweden and the UK, as 
founding nations, since 2007.386 The Centre is responsible for coordinating 
existing air, sea and land transport assets as well as opportunities of their usage 
and participating nations’ needs, in order to ensure that these services are 
exploited in the most effective way.387 One of the tools enabling to perform these 
roles is the ATARES initiative, which is another opportunity for the European 
air forces to use pooled and shared resources in order to fulfil their individual 
needs in AAR and AT. The arrangement allows for mutual exchange of services 
with a ‘currency’ of Equivalent Flying Hour (EFH) which is one flying hour of 
a Lockheed C-130 Hercules or Transall C-160 aircraft.388 Any other types of a 
transport aircraft which participating states may possess can also be used. They 
are assigned their own equivalent factor calculated using the cost of one EFH. 
Therefore every member of the initiative has to compensate for used services 
(for example air tankers) with an agreed number of EFH, which have to be ‘paid’ 
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back to ATARES nations in general and not necessarily to the particular country 
which resources were used in the first place.389 Similar to the SAC initiative, the 
MCCE supports any operational and training needs of participating nations. For 
example, as was pointed out by a Polish Air Force officer, Poland uses ATARES 
during the pilots’ training so they get the possibility to learn and maintain AAR, 
an area of training that the country cannot cover with its national capabilities. In 
return, Poland offers transport to pay for this training.390 Poland also used 
ATARES when flying AT for the coalition during the ISAF mission in 
Afghanistan, exchanging those flying hours for AAR.391 Sweden provided their 
tanker aircraft as part of the Centre’s support to the ACE 2017 exercise.392 The 
UK, finally, is among eight nations manning at the time of writing (2018) the 
AT Cell at the MCCE, coordinating the spare airlift capacity and the AT requests 
coming from the participating states.393 The country also agreed for the 
ATARES members to use the RAF’s spare capacity of the Airbus A330 MRTT 
Voyager fleet.394 As such ATARES is an excellent example of the principles of 
specialisation and cooperation in Smart Defence, where participating nations 
share their respective strengths in order to make up for specific weaknesses of 
others, as a result building joint capabilities and military capacity. 
Gaining operational experience is also of crucial significance for the 
development of shared European AAR capabilities. For example, as pointed out 
by Deputy Commander of Armed Forces Operational Command, Tadeusz 
Mikutel, Polish officers gained invaluable ISR and AAR experience during their 
reconnaissance mission in the Operation Inherent Resolve in Kuwait in 2016–
2018.395 According to the General, the mission’s specifics involved 8–10 hour-
long sorties performed several times a week and requiring AAR – something that 
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the pilots could not train for back at home to such an extent since such flights 
are performed not that often and are much shorter.396 Therefore, it is clear that 
operational experience, especially gained from high-intensity missions, not only 
raises the qualifications of the involved personnel but also improves future 
training as those pilots who will be sharing that first-hand knowledge with their 
colleagues. 
In sum, AAR capability, just like AT, is crucial for an air force to be fully 
operational, especially in a time when expeditionary operations are the dominant 
form of warfare, but it is also a major shortcoming among European nations. As 
this section showed, several multinational initiatives aimed at filling that gap 
have been pursued within the framework of NATO, the EU and MCCE. The 
initiatives discussed above are focusing on two main points – pooled and shared 
AAR/AT fleet as well as obtaining mutual AAR clearances for NATO and EU 
countries. The cooperation within AAR as much as that pursued for airlift, 
confirms the idea of transnationalisation and European air forces becoming more 
interconnected and interdependent. 
 
4.3.3 Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
 
Another area of capability limitations present among European air forces 
is ISR which is a crucial enabler in any kind of modern military operation. As 
Peter Lee pointed out, ISR retains its primary importance among other air power 
roles since the foundations of the RAF,397 what also would be applicable for any 
other air force. Without effective ISR they are unable to perform their tasks. 
Therefore, it is understandable that, similarly as in case of AT and AAR, 
attempts have been made to make up for these limitations with the use of 
multinational initiatives, giving the participating states access to capabilities that 
otherwise could not be afforded as well as complementing the already existing 
ones. As the section below will show, cooperation in the area of ISR also has led 
to increased interoperability and interdependence between participating air 
forces, serving as further evidence of their progressing transnationalisation. 
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NAEW and AGS are explored below as pertinent examples of European 
cooperation in the area of ISR.  
 
NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control System 
As was already mentioned, NATO’s Smart Defence is not a new idea as 
such and the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control (NAEW&C) system 
is one of the concept’s oldest predecessors. The initiative was started in 1978 
and currently involves two components – the multinational NATO fleet of 16 
Boeing E-3A Airborne Warning and Command System (AWACS) aircraft based 
in Geilenkirchen (Germany), and the UK component of 7 Boeing E-3D Sentry 
aircraft based at Waddington (UK).398 Besides the main air base in 
Geilenkirchen, the multinational component operates also from forward 
operating bases in Italy, Greece and Turkey, as well as a location in Norway.399 
The long endurance of the NAEW&C programme proves the utility of 
such initiatives. The programme is aimed at enhancing the alliance’s ISR 
capabilities, which is an important area where European air power experiences 
limitations. According to the latest data provided by The Military Balance, in 
2018 the UK possessed altogether 18 different aircraft to cover airborne early 
warning, electronic intelligence and ISR capability.400 The Swedish Air Force 
had only five.401 Poland does not possess any ISR capability at all. Therefore, in 
the field of intelligence and airborne early warning European air power can be 
strengthened with shared capability and pooled resources. A good example of 
that is the AGS programme discussed later in this section. This initiative 
provides a great opportunity especially for Poland to fill the gap in capability of 
conducting air recognition from unmanned platforms until its first UAS base, 
opened at the beginning of 2016, becomes fully operational.402 
Although NAEW&C is an established initiative with a long history of 
success, Sweden, as a non-allied state, is not part of this particular programme. 
The country operates its own version of airborne early warning (AEW) system 
– three Saab 340 Erieye aircraft as well as two Gulfstream IV SIGINT aircraft 
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of American production.403 Similarly, the UK also operates its very own E-3D 
Sentry aircraft at the Waddington base, but that fleet also forms the NAEW’s 
second component. It involves 18 RAF officers and seven aircraft in the 8th 
Squadron – six of which are being used airborne and one as a training unit on 
the ground.404 These provide the UK with national AEW capability which can 
be used, when required, towards independent operations or in support of a 
coalition.405 At the national level, the E-3D Sentry is part of the UK Intelligence, 
Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) system,406 but 
the British AWACS fleet also significantly contributes to the NAEW&C force. 
The Waddington component became fully operational in July 1992 and provided 
25 per cent of the initiative’s annual performance in the operations against ISIL 
in Iraq and Syria, having contributed in the past to missions taking place in 
Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan or Iraq.407 
Poland has participated in the NAEW system since 2006 and, with other 
sixteen NATO members,408 is a user of the shared E-3A fleet at Geilenkirchen 
air base.409 Poland also contributes military personnel for that AWACS 
component. In 2016, Polish Air Force officers filled over 20 positions in the air 
base.410 The NAEW&C system provides information and data which Poland can 
use in case of a contingency or conflict. The Polish Air Force also participates 
in multinational exercises focusing on airborne early warning.411 In addition to 
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these obvious benefits, the initiative also provides opportunity for training and 
exercises that are not necessarily focusing solely on ISR. One of the most recent 
events of that type, where Polish officers were among the AWACS crew, was 
the NATO Tiger Meet 2018.412 However these are not the only ways in which 
the opportunities offered by membership in NAEW&C can be exploited. For 
example, AWACS aircraft were also present over Polish territory during such 
mass-scale events as the visit of Pope Benedict XVI (2006), the European 
Football Championship (2012), NATO Summit in Warsaw (2016) or the World 
Youth Day in Cracow (2016).413 AWACS aircraft also supported the Polish Air 
Force in six BAP missions adding collectively pooled and shared resources to 
another joint effort.414 As such, the NAEW&C programme has been beneficial 
especially for countries such as Poland, which would not be able to maintain and 
make use of advanced ISR capabilities otherwise. 
 
Alliance Ground Surveillance 
Poland is also involved in the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) 
programme, which is another example of building a collective air capability in 
Europe in the field of ISR. In this case the country cooperates with fourteen other 
NATO members.415 These states are acquiring together a system consisting of 
five remotely piloted Global Hawk aircraft and ground-based command and 
control stations, which altogether will allow for providing persistent surveillance 
from high-altitudes.416 The first NATO Global Hawk is expected to arrive in the 
AGS main operating base in Sigonella (Italy) by the end of 2019.417 The system 
and its fleet, once operational, will be available for all 29 NATO members. 
The abovementioned AGS programme was started in 2004 and Poland 
participated in that initiative until 1st April 2009, when it withdrew due to 
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financial constraints.418 As mentioned by a Polish Air Force Colonel who wishes 
to remain anonymous, another possibly political reason for this withdrawal 
might have been the fact that the Polish Government was pushing for the main 
AGS air base to be located in Powidz in Poland, but had been unsuccessful.419 
In view of the long-term benefits of being a member in this initiative, especially 
given the limitations of the country’s national capabilities in the area of ISR, 
Poland re-joined the initiative five years later in 2014 and, once again, is a full 
member to the programme.420 The UK and Sweden have never participated in 
the AGS. However, the former intended to sign a Memorandum of 
Understanding before the programme becomes fully operational with a view to 
contributing to the initiative with the RAF’s own capabilities.421 
Certainly, both systems, NAEW and AGS, are of great importance to 
European air forces and especially to those that are unable to build significant 
national capabilities in the area of ISR. The former, considering its long 
endurance, can be called the most successful cooperative initiative within NATO 
and in Europe. It provides the Alliance with a rapid airborne surveillance, 
command and control capability for any operation.422 AGS, once fully 
operational, will complement it with providing near real time situational 
awareness. Both initiatives provide the participating nations with a capability 
that, again, some of them would not be able to afford, develop and maintain on 
their own. Therefore it is in their best interests to work together to get it up and 
running within the given timeframe in case of AGS, and to promote and develop 
further cooperation in case of NAEW. However, Poland’s approach to the AGS 
example also indicated that countries may attempt to use their participation in 
multilateral efforts for the achievement of national political gain. That shows 
that increasing interdependence among European air forces may become at some 
point problematic. Nevertheless, as the UK’s close involvement as one of 
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Europe’s strongest air powers in most of the above initiatives, as well as Poland’s 
eventual decision to re-join the AGS show, transnationalisation, in spite of the 
problems it may bring, is seen as the best way forward for European air power 
in the current security environment. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
Shrinking defence budgets, increasing costs of military technological 
improvement and developments as well as limitations of European armed forces 
have contributed to the increasing transnationalisation of European militaries. 
Air power is not an exception here and, as this chapter demonstrated, European 
air forces have become increasingly interdependent and interconnected during 
the post-Cold War period.  
Chapter 3. introduced the concept of transnationalisation of the RAF, 
Polish and Swedish Air Forces pointing to such phenomena as adapting certain 
NATO standards, reliance on the Alliance’s documents when writing national 
doctrines, or changes in strategic thinking giving importance to the 
institutionalisation of international security through reliance on such 
organisations as NATO, EU or UN. This chapter provided further evidence of 
the increasing transnationalisation of European air forces by exploring a number 
of important examples of relevant multinational cooperative initiatives. The 
chapter showed that these initiatives, depending on specific needs and 
objectives, are being pursued within the frameworks of NATO or the EU, but 
also outside of these on an ad-hoc multilateral basis, for example established by 
organisations like the MCCE or as a joint efforts of interested countries (for 
example CBT). The majority of the discussed programmes focus on the areas 
identified in Chapter 2. as those are where European air power collectively faces 
the most serious limitations, namely air transport, air-to-air refuelling and 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. The initiatives take different 
forms, from burden-sharing missions, through exchange of services, pooling and 
sharing of resources to collective training and exercises. All of them are 
providing evidence of the transnationalisation of European air forces, including 
of the RAF, Polish Air Force and Swedish Air Force, resulting in their increasing 
interconnectedness and interdependence. 
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Both, interconnectedness and interdependence are inseparable elements 
of the multinational initiatives discussed in this chapter. The participating air 
forces often agree to share costs and resources, which significantly lessens the 
financial burden they would have to bear otherwise and gives them access to 
certain equipment. In some cases, like for example the AGS in Poland, this 
allows for access to capabilities that the country could not afford on its own. 
Furthermore, closer multinational cooperation within established programmes 
and missions results in gaining invaluable experience. By coming together to 
train they can also conduct much larger exercises at smaller cost. As a result, 
personnel comes back not only better trained, with greater tactical and 
operational knowledge but has also gained valuable experience in working with 
colleagues from different national and cultural backgrounds. The cost-
effectiveness and the opportunity to gain that experience are the two points that 
were most often mentioned in the interviews conducted for this thesis on the 
topic of potential benefits of participating in multinational initiatives. Lindvall 
also stressed the wide variety of roles and tasks that an air force can train for 
when working together with other nations – these involve not only those 
available back home, but a much wider variety of possible activities.423 
Therefore participating in the initiatives of multinational cooperation and such 
training programmes allows especially smaller air forces to get experience in 
areas otherwise unavailable and, as a result, increase the air force’s operational 
readiness. Involvement on a multinational level is also important for professional 
development among the air force officers. There is a strong motivation for air 
force personnel to get involved in the multinational initiatives. Stringer pointed 
out the direct link between participating in NATO exercises and career progress 
in the RAF.424 Career progress certainly enhances the personnel’s willingness to 
take part in such initiatives what, in turn, results in the development of their own 
skills and experience and of the effectiveness of their national air force as a 
whole. Participation in initiatives like those discussed in this chapter does not 
come free, but it is still more cost-effective than building specific capability from 
scratch within national capacity. The gains from discussed initiatives are 
proportional to a state’s contribution and for the same reason, these programmes 
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will never (and should never) substitute national military capability and capacity 
but rather complement them.425 Therefore it remains vital for a country to 
maintain its own military capabilities and use the multinational initiatives as an 
opportunity to boost them. 
Having discussed the increasing transnationalisation of European air 
forces the question arises whether this process ultimately will lead to the creation 
of a supranational ‘European Air Force’. For example, Gardner suggested that 
deepened cooperation between European nations could, in the long term, affect 
the development of such a service.426 However, a certain paradox exists in the 
process of building a transnational network of European militaries and air forces. 
Increasing cooperation since the end of the Cold War has led to a much higher 
degree of interaction, not only at the level of multinational command, but also at 
tactical and operational levels – something unlikely to be observed pre-1990.427 
Examples of the initiatives discussed in this chapter and also the procedural and 
doctrinal interdependence discussed in Chapter 3., provide evidence for this, 
since they are taking place mostly on a tactical and operational level. Having 
said this, these initiatives are intended to address certain capability and capacity 
gaps and are not aimed at full integration, which would be a strategic goal if the 
involved states had an aspiration to create a supranational, European Air Force. 
It is also national units that participate in multinational ventures. In all 
cases, state sovereignty and national affiliation of forces retains primacy over 
the existing multinational networks.428 This is true even if, like in the case of the 
UK, Poland and Sweden, participation in organisations perceived as guarantors 
of international security, like NATO or EU, is a strategic objective. For example, 
post-Cold War military reforms in Europe were driven by changes in defence 
strategies or budgetary cuts at national levels and primarily represented the 
interests of individual states rather than international organisations.429 Similarly, 
the importance of national objectives may be noticed in levels of control that 
states maintain over their deployed forces. For example, it is in the interest of a 
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state to keep the potential risks their military forces may face to a minimum in 
order to limit the casualties and losses. As discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter, there are usually caveats enforced, which will often restrict the extent 
of their involvement in a multinational operation allowing the participating states 
retain control over their own military forces. Although there are specific 
instances where states have partially given up some of that control and 
subordinated their assets to a multinational command, as is the case, for example, 
with the European Air Transport Command noted in footnote 356, these are not 
common practice and have never involved the UK, Poland or Sweden. 
Finally, in the process of transnationalisation, it is again the national level 
where states consider and decide on which military capabilities they should 
invest and specialise in, and which capabilities they prefer to maintain as a 
collective initiative. Many European NATO members’ air forces specialise in a 
specific capability, which they contribute towards the collective strength of the 
alliance. Deciding which capabilities to pool and share is difficult for the simple 
reason that such a decision cannot be easily reversed. On the one hand, as the 
procurement of advanced air power technology is expensive, the prioritisation 
of certain capabilities and aircraft appears to be a sensible choice. On the other 
hand, rebuilding a certain capability, once lost, involves not only acquiring new 
platforms but also training the personnel and creating the infrastructure. As a 
Polish Air Force Colonel pointed out, it is therefore a lengthy process which may 
take decades.430 As a result, many of the European air forces seek a balanced 
approach and, for example, invest in multirole aircraft that allow them to 
maintain varied capabilities at the expense of capacity.431 Such a stance brings a 
serious risk to the effectiveness of a ‘balanced’ air force. For example, the RAF 
wants to be able to perform all of the air power roles, but it lacks the mass – the 
capacity to deliver a complete air force capable of conducting a large-scale 
operation independently.432 Dandeker argues that due to financial constraints it 
may be very difficult for European states to maintain a sustainable force for the 
full spectrum of military capabilities, meaning that even those ‘balanced’ air 
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forces may be of little use on their own.433 Therefore investing in national 
capabilities retains importance but, unless a state is prepared to bear the 
increasingly high costs of modernisation and technological developments on its 
own, involvement in burden-sharing multinational initiatives may be a better 
option. 
In sum, post-Cold War military transnationalisation is not in itself a goal, 
but rather an inevitable side-effect of the need to build new capabilities and 
strengthening already existing ones through smart defence, pooling and sharing. 
The more the air forces are involved in such initiatives the more capable they are 
of being a worthy partner and contributor to multinational operations. Increased 
cooperation and transnationalisation inevitably leads to certain challenges that 
must be addressed, such as for example maintaining high interoperability in 
terms of procedures, technology and training with other alliance or coalition 
members. These potential challenges (and the way they are being dealt with) will 
be looked at in more detail in next chapter. 
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Chapter 5: The challenges for European air forces of 
multinational cooperation 
 
 This chapter investigates the difficulties that British, Polish and Swedish 
Air Forces are facing when involved in different forms of multinational 
cooperation. It answers the final two sub-questions posed in the thesis: what are 
the ongoing problems encountered by European air forces when they engage in 
multinational operations, and how can these problems be overcome? Therefore, 
the chapter’s main objective is two-fold. First, it demonstrates that the discussed 
challenges to multinational cooperation are to large extent dependent on cultural 
background of the air forces involved. Second, it shows that their negative 
effects may be minimised during the aforementioned process of 
transnationalisation, namely through active involvement in the different forms 
of multinational collaboration, for example, the initiatives discussed in Chapter 
4. 
The initiatives looked at in the previous chapter are part of the process of 
post-Cold War transnationalisation and take different forms, from burden 
sharing programmes to multinational training and exercises. The chapter 
identified several benefits coming from such cooperation among European air 
forces, for example access to nationally unavailable capabilities, strengthening 
the existing capabilities and gaining invaluable training and experience. From 
the point of view of these benefits, such initiatives of multinational cooperation 
look very appealing. However, the chapter also concluded that such cooperation 
may create potential challenges hindering the effectiveness of multinational 
initiatives and operations that also need to be taken into account. These 
challenges and how to overcome them are the subject of the following chapter. 
 Multinational operations are complex. As this chapter will reveal, that 
complexity stems from the fact that they are bringing together units from various 
nations – coming from different cultural backgrounds, speaking different 
languages, representing different national objectives, operating according to 
different procedures and using different equipment. Even if the nations involved 
are part of a multilateral organisation, for example NATO, that does not remove 
the potential challenges multinational collaboration may bring. Nevertheless, 
multinational operations, as pointed out by King, are the most frequent form of 
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military operations today.434 As discussed in Chapter 2., the reasons for this are 
that as a result of shrinking defence budgets, downsizing of the armed forces and 
emerging new unconventional threats, individual states can no longer afford to 
deal with all potential security challenges on their own. Moreover, multinational 
coalitions have become a tool for attributing political legitimacy to a state’s 
actions.435 Therefore, the military personnel of participating nations should be 
aware of the challenges they may be facing and should take precautions to avoid 
or minimise their negative effects to increase the effectiveness of the 
multinational contingent. Some ways to achieve this may be, for example 
establishing common objectives and rules of engagement, adherence to 
standardised regulations and procedures, organising joint trainings or raising 
cultural awareness within national units. 
 Referring back to Hofstede’s model of cultural dimensions, the chapter 
will focus on actual experiences of the British, Polish and Swedish Air Forces, 
also referring to the experiences of other countries’ military forces where 
relevant, from their participation in multinational operations. Four main areas 
where potential challenges are most likely to arise will be identified. These are 
communication and interpersonal relations, language, national caveats and 
homogenous rules of engagement as well as interoperability in terms of 
procedures and technology. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of how 
these challenges may be overcome.  
 
5.1 Cultural diversity in European air forces 
 
Aviation creates very specific environments for both military and civilian 
pilots. The profession brings a lot of risk and, at the same time, is constrained by 
a high level of interdependence. Interdependence is relevant on both the national 
and international level, above all with regards to the use of English as a common 
language, adherence to standardised procedures, use of international air-traffic 
control system and the existence of International Civil Air Organisation 
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enforcing adherence to unified regulations on its members.436 This hints at the 
existence of a one supranational aviation or air force culture invulnerable to the 
influence of national background of the air personnel. This section, however, 
argues that despite certain common elements, different air forces still reflect the 
traits characteristic for their national culture. 
Considering the very specific environment that air personnel work in, on 
one hand, it could be argued that cultural diversity has very little, or even no 
influence on the quality of cooperation pursued among different air forces. 
Helmreich and Merritt, for example, observed that in civilian aviation the 
professional culture often supersedes national culture, meaning that pilots’ 
professional activities are determined more by the values and norms of a shared 
aviation culture, than those seen as typical for society at large in their country of 
origin.437 Speaking of such a common professional culture among pilots, Karl E. 
Weick and Karlene H. Roberts referred to the idea of ‘collective mind’ in 
aviation pointing out that there is no space for individualism among the air crew, 
because well-developed interpersonal skills are essential when it comes to tasks 
performance and dealing with emergencies.438 On the other hand, Soeters and 
Boer found that there is a correlation between the power distance index of 
particular countries identified by Hofstede and flight safety.439 In other words, if 
air crew come from a culture with a typically higher power distance index, 
aviation accidents are more likely to happen.440 The authors referred to various 
examples of civil aviation accidents linked to power-related issues. One that was 
not discussed by them, but which is relevant for one of the case studies used for 
the thesis, is the crash of the Polish Presidential Tupolev in Smolensk in April 
2010 mentioned in Chapter 4. According to the final report of the Committee for 
Investigation of National Aviation Accidents, the crew of that flight remained 
passive in executing commands of the captain and neither reacted to critically 
changing parameters, nor objected to the presence in the cockpit during landing 
of the Protocol Director and the Air Forces Commander-in-Chief who, as 
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passengers, should not have been there.441 The presence of superiors, even if they 
did not try to interfere, was likely to have put indirect pressure on the captain to 
land the aircraft at any cost and despite unfavourable weather conditions.442 The 
situation might have been exacerbated by the fact that the same pilot two years 
earlier, this time as co-pilot, had witnessed an incident when the captain was 
called ‘coward’ and threatened with prosecution443 after he refused to suddenly 
change the flight route on demand of the Polish President.444 This situation took 
place in 2008 during the Russian war with Georgia. When the Polish President 
flew to Georgia for diplomatic support, the pilot was pressured to abort the initial 
plans of landing in Ganja in Azerbaijan and fly directly to Tbilisi instead. In spite 
of the fact that the President tried to use his authority as the Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces to interfere with the flight route, the pilot followed 
the procedures, continued the flight to Azerbaijan and did not risk flying over a 
war zone without the necessary permissions and guaranteed security.445 These 
two examples demonstrate the correlation between Polish national culture and 
military culture. In the first case, the crew demonstrated undue respect and 
acceptance for authority and hierarchy towards the captain. That correlates with 
high power distance characteristic for Polish nationals as a whole. In the second 
case the pilot stood up to pressure from his superior and demonstrated adherence 
to the existing regulations and a high uncertainty avoidance index, both of which 
are characteristic for aviation culture. Of course, the ratio of accidents cannot be 
related simply with the pilots’ cultural origins, but also depends on the resources 
and infrastructure available to them.446 Nevertheless, both examples show how 
cultural aspects can play an important role in the military culture of states 
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In sum, there is something in the idea of the existence of a common 
aviation or air force culture shared by all air crews despite their nationality. This 
is the result of certain commonalities that all air personnel share, such as use of 
English language, adherence to common international procedures or 
international aviation rules. These are elements constituting certain standards 
and norms that air crew of all countries need to adhere to in order to be able to 
efficiently and safely perform their duties in international air space. As such, 
elements of a shared air force culture that transcends national boundaries might 
make the participation of air force personnel in multinational operations easier.  
However, the above section also indicates that the influence of national 
culture on a state’s military and air force culture still exists. Even when using 
the same language and adhering to the same procedures and regulations, the 
ways in which air crews think and perform are likely to be susceptible to the 
influence of their national background and culture to an extent. Within the 
framework of multinational operations, where air force personnel from different 
cultural backgrounds cooperate, this can lead to challenges that could potentially 
interfere with the effectiveness and smooth running of the mission. An 
awareness of these potential challenges and ways to deal with them is therefore 
essential.  
 
5.2 Challenges encountered in multinational air operations – the 
case of British, Polish and Swedish Air Forces 
 
Air power creates a specific environment with internationalised rules, 
procedures, technological interoperability and English serving as a common 
language. It is likely that these commonalities are even stronger if air force 
personnel from different countries work together within the framework of an 
established structure such as NATO, other alliances or coalitions, since these 
impose certain standards on the participating states, thus ensuring ease in 
cooperation 
However, as the previous section implied, national culture and background 
are important even in organisations, such as air forces, that share many 
commonalities around the world. This means that even within the framework of 
a multinational organisation such as NATO potential difficulties in cooperation 
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between air force staff coming from different cultural backgrounds are likely. 
The following section will assess four possible challenges air forces might 
encounter in multinational operations, using the British, Polish and Swedish 
cases as examples. These challenges are communication issues resulting from 
cultural differences; language related issues; problems resulting from national 
caveats enforcing restrictions on a state’s involvement in an operation and 
adapting different rules of engagement as well as interoperability issues. 
 
5.2.1 Cultural diversity – communication and interpersonal relations 
 
The cultural background of air force personnel participating in 
multinational operations and their differences in the four dimensions identified 
by Hofstede, especially power distance, can disrupt the communication and 
interpersonal relations within a multinational team. Helmreich and Merritt cited 
an example of such a problem arising in a cockpit where the captain and the 
second officer represented a different level of power distance what yielded 
misunderstandings on even a such basic level as how to address each other – by 
first name or by his title, i.e. ‘captain’ or ‘officer’.447 A study on command and 
leadership challenges in multinational operations found that, compared to other 
contingents, British military personnel were given the right to make decisions on 
a much lower level of military hierarchy – for example, by officers in the rank 
of captain or major.448 In contrast, other participating nations allowed the same 
decisions to be made only by a lieutenant colonel, who would often seek 
additional confirmation from the higher ranks. Similar findings were published 
by Moelker and van Ruiten in their study of bi-lateral cooperation between 
German and Dutch officers at the NATO corps headquarters in Münster,449 
which gave an interesting insight into potential challenges resulting from 
different cultural backgrounds. For example, their respondents explicitly 
admitted that different military cultures – more authoritarian among the Germans 
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and more relaxed among the Dutch, increased the feeling of ‘otherness’ in both 
groups.450 This also led to misunderstandings, such as perceiving the less strict 
side as rude or disobedient. The above examples demonstrate the differences 
between an individualistic, egalitarian military culture and a collectivistic, 
authoritarian one. Communication problems and misunderstandings even on a 
very basic level can cause delays in the decision making process if the 
authorisation from superiors is needed.  
Moreover, depending on a nations’ power distance and uncertainty 
avoidance index, different approaches to leadership may disrupt smooth 
command of a multinational operation. As Febbraro suggested, multinational 
military missions often have a decentralised command and decision making 
structure allowing them to be run effectively and eliminating the need to wait for 
a decision from the higher ranks in the case of an unexpected situation or 
emergency.451 Such an approach may put those nations high on power distance 
and uncertainty avoidance, such as, for example, Poland, in an uncomfortable 
position – unwilling to assume leading positions and making decisions in fast 
changing circumstances, or even unwilling to be under other nations’ command 
and therefore disrupting the smooth organisation and running of a multinational 
coalition.452 Lin-Greenberg pointed out that it may be potentially difficult for an 
air commander to work with personnel from different countries that underwent 
different training and adhere to different tactics or strategies.453 For the same 
reason stated above, the participating states may be resistant to delegate their air 
forces under foreign command, fearing that differences in training, practice, 
culture or language will increase the risk their personnel is exposed to.454 
Therefore, not only cultural diversity, but also national interests can pose 
potential difficulties for conducting multinational air operations. 
Interestingly, challenges resulting from cultural diversity may be 
applicable not only to individual nations being involved in a coalition, but are 
also present within their air forces. For example, Wilson referred to the specific 
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approach that British helicopter and airlift pilots have for participating in 
operations.455 Both rarely see the bigger picture or consider themselves part of 
the larger operation never reading the Air Tasking Orders (ATOs) even if they 
are included in it. They would rather operate within the small designated box 
flying from point A to B without asking what is the purpose of that and what 
effect it would have.456 In comparison, in opinion of Wilson, a fighter pilot 
would never go on a mission without familiarising himself with the ATO and 
considering the strategic effect of his actions.457 Even though that example refers 
to a problem arising within an air force, such difference in behaviour among the 
air personnel may also lead to potential challenges in a multinational operation. 
In such a case, it could be related to the idea of elite and specialised units 
mentioned in Chapter 2. and identified by Soeters et al. as one of the challenges 
in multinational cooperation’s.458 Therefore the way in which airmen work 
together in multinational operations depends not only on their national 
background, but also on what they do – whether they operate fighters, 
helicopters, tankers, transport aircraft, UASs. These differences may further 
disrupt communication among the air force personnel and therefore one should 
be aware of such disparities in the approach they may have for performing their 
roles in the operation. 
 
5.2.2 Language 
 
Communication problems in multinational air operations are linked not 
only to cultural differences but also to different languages being spoken. The 
importance of being able to understand and to be understood by all members of 
the coalition was already signalled in Chapter 2. With English being the lingua 
franca in aviation, both civilian and military, the personnel of all European air 
forces is able to easily communicate. Therefore, being able to speak a common 
language is already part of air power culture and being able to communicate in 
English is absolutely crucial for all the personnel involved in order to ensure 
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smooth running of the mission. For example, in case of Poland, the pilots and 
other personnel talk in Polish up to the point of boarding the aircraft, but with 
the very moment when the cockpit is closed the only language spoken is 
English.459 Apparently, it has become second nature for Polish Air Force pilots 
and aircrew, which is likely to apply also to other nations especially if they are 
regularly involved in multinational operations, to automatically switch between 
the two languages in this way. 
Reaching such level of proficiency to be able to naturally switch from 
one language to another is a lengthy process and requires fundamental 
preparation of the military personnel. The challenge will also not be equal for 
everyone. For example, one could imagine that the process will present more 
difficulties for Polish air personnel, who before 1990s were encouraged to speak 
Russian, than for any other Western air force, i.e. Swedish where English-
teaching had been part of military education for a long time.460 Lack of such 
preparation results in a seriously disrupted communication within a coalition and 
may be one of the major flaws in getting the military personnel ready for a 
deployment. Gaining sufficient language knowledge may prove to be especially 
difficult when an air force cooperates with a standing multinational structure, 
such as NATO, which is using its own, specific terminology, phraseology, 
abbreviations. For example, Bulgaria, experienced such problems during its 
various military involvements with NATO. In a study conducted by Yantsislav 
Yanakiev, 64 per cent of the respondents, Bulgarian Army and Air Force officers 
serving in various peace support operations, admitted the language training they 
received before they were sent to the mission was insufficient in terms of military 
terminology and acronyms.461 Considering the Bulgarian example, it is likely 
that the Swedish Air Force, especially as belonging to a non-NATO state, would 
experience similar difficulties when involved in a multinational operation 
adhering to the Alliance’s standards. In the Swedish case, however, this 
difficulty was anticipated and dealt with ahead of time. As was already 
mentioned in Chapter 3., the post-Cold War transformation of the Swedish Air 
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Force involved extensive efforts to increase their interoperability with NATO. 
For example, these efforts involved incorporating in the post-Cold War Swedish 
air doctrines references to NATO publications as well as introducing 
terminology used by the Alliance. That process was, however, much more 
comprehensive than standardising, to certain extent, national publications with 
those issued by NATO. In order to increase interoperability on multinational 
level, English was adapted as the operational language in the Swedish Air Force. 
What is more, that task was meticulously approached since learning English was 
a requirement not only for military personnel but also for the civilians working 
at air bases including the cleaning staff.462 The language preparation, as shown 
in the next paragraph, also involved special courses for the pilots to familiarise 
them especially with NATO phraseology and glossary used during missions.  
Nevertheless, even with the best training unexpected problems may 
occur, because it is impossible to cover all eventualities in training. An 
interesting example of an unexpected problem occurring was given in an 
interview by Wilson who recalled a situation when the Swedish Air Force was 
going through a transformation switching from Swedish to English and adapting 
to imperial units system.463 Before an exercise in the North of the country the 
Swedish pilots had to go on a course and take a test on phraseology and acronyms 
used in NATO to make sure they will be able to communicate with each other. 
During the exercise a command ‘pancake’ was given meaning everybody should 
go back to the base and land, however that particular word was not on the list 
studied by the Swedes. Therefore after 10–15 minutes, Lt Col Wilson found 
himself alone on the radio frequency and had to ask the air traffic control what 
is going on and what he should do since he did not know this particular 
command.464 Therefore thorough and ongoing language preparation is crucial 
before the deployment of the military forces to a multinational operation in order 
to avoid such problems as much as possible.  
The language barrier may exist not only due to lack of preparation and 
insufficient knowledge of English, but also because of different accents, 
pronunciation or simply confidence and proficiency in speaking a foreign 
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language. Mastering the grammar and learning vocabulary does not necessarily 
guarantee achieving the goal of smooth communication flow among the 
members of a multinational team. It is equally important to be able to convene 
the information so that it is understood and interpreted in the same way by every 
member of the coalition.465 Here, again, the ‘recipient’ is key – his/her language 
proficiency, but also values, traditions and cultural background. The cultural 
origin of the person giving the information is also important – how did he/she 
formulate the sentence?466 Non-native speakers can lack confidence in 
communicating in a foreign language and therefore might not formulate 
statements in a clear way or will not be willing to participate in discussions in 
multinational groups.467 The language barrier is also relevant for English native-
speakers. They may also not to be able to communicate freely since other 
participants of the coalition may not fully understand their accent, grammar, 
specific vocabulary, sense of humour, et cetera.468 This problem was highlighted 
by an Air commodore in the RAF recalling that when, during the British 
involvement in ISAF, he was flying a CAS mission for the French Special Forces 
and, even though English was commonly spoken, the communication was still 
hindered because of different accents which were even more difficult to 
understand because of the oxygen masks the fighter pilots wear.469 It is important 
for the air personnel to be aware of these challenges. As pointed out by Anioł, a 
Polish officer acting as a Tactical Director at the NAEW&C Geilenkirchen base, 
the AWACS crew members are used to dealing with such situations and 
therefore these differences do not generally affect the overall performance of the 
multinational team.470 
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Another factor exacerbating the language barrier in multinational air 
operations is preference given to one’s native language especially in 
conversations within national units. It should not be surprising that, even with 
sufficient knowledge of English, members of multinational coalitions often 
resort to speaking their native language in informal conversations. However, it 
can lead to problems at formal levels when information given at joint meetings 
to be passed on to individual units is communicated in native languages owing 
to insufficient knowledge of English. Members of a multinational coalition can 
also tend to resort to speaking their native language during emergencies, when 
military personnel have to act under pressure.471 All of this can have major 
drawbacks – firstly, frequent use of native languages may increase divisions 
between the participating nations disintegrating the team and secondly, lead to 
disruptions in the flow of information and smooth cooperation. This means that 
in spite of the fact that most countries’ air force personnel are able to use English 
as a shared, professional lingua franca, varying levels of language proficiency 
still present a challenge to multinational air operations that requires ongoing 
attention. 
 
5.2.3 National caveats and homogenous rules of engagement 
 
In addition to language barrier and cultural background causing 
disruptions in communication, national caveats and adherence to diverse rules 
of engagement (ROE) also can lead to potential challenges and 
misunderstandings in multinational operations. According to the definition 
provided by the NATO Glossary, caveats should be understood as ‘any 
limitation, restriction or constraint imposed by a nation on its military forces or 
civilian elements under NATO command and control or otherwise available to 
NATO, that does not permit NATO commanders to deploy and employ these 
assets fully in line with the approved operation plan.’472 Implementing national 
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caveats is a norm in multinational operations and became increasingly common 
in the post-Cold War years when that form of military intervention became 
dominant.473 That correlation is based on the issue of national sovereignty over 
one’s military forces deployed to operate as a part of a coalition. As was 
discussed in the previous chapter, it is rather unlikely that states, although willing 
to participate in multinational operations, would delegate control over their 
deployments to a multinational command. Maintaining national control is one of 
the basic reasons of imposing caveats over ones military units. However, some 
scholars also point to further motivations behind such decision, which are, for 
example, minimising costs and risks that their military forces may face.474 
Furthermore, caveats may also be a reflection of domestic politics. As such, 
caveats may be used as a way of finding compromise between political parties 
which represent opposing views on the military involvement as well as ensuring 
that any action performed by the deployed armed forces will not contradict the 
national interests of the deploying country.475 Speaking of the latter one, some 
scholars also point to the fact that, with the presence of omnipresent media and 
undisturbed information flow, states participating in a multinational operation 
may impose restrictions on their deployed forces in order to protect their (or the 
political leaders’) good image in the eye of public opinion – especially if the 
operation is unpopular among the society.476 Finally, Saideman and Auerswald 
suggest national caveats may originate from the cultural background – the extent 
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of a state’s involvement in a multinational operation therefore may vary 
depending on their priorities or perception of an ‘appropriate’ behaviour.477 
However, one should also be aware that national caveats may not always work 
as a way to keep one’s nation’s image ‘crystal clear’. As pointed out by Gray 
and a scholar who wishes to stay anonymous, air forces in a multinational 
operation do not operate in vacuum and therefore, even if they refrain from using 
direct force, they may facilitate it by their other actions, such as providing AAR 
or performing ISR and sharing the data with the coalition.478 
The challenge of writing and implementing ROE for multinational air 
operations has also been identified as a potential problem. According to NATO 
definition ROE are ‘directives issued by competent military authority which 
specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces will initiate and/or 
continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.’479 Therefore, ROE 
have a double purpose. Firstly, they provide the deployed units with clear 
guidelines on how to use force in specified circumstances and, what is also 
intrinsically linked with that, they set legal boundaries within which the 
performed activity is considered as appropriate.480 Secondly, even though issued 
primarily for the use of the commander, ROE also serve as a tool for the 
governing authorities to ensure that military force is employed according to set 
political goals.481 
As explained in the section above, both national caveats and ROE 
imposed on a nation’s air force reflect the state’s national interests and policy 
priorities and are therefore rooted in cultural background. For example, national 
caveats may be a perfect illustration of what Hofstede referred to as ‘masculine’ 
or ‘feminine’ characteristics in a nation’s behaviour as discussed in Chapter 2. 
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Swedish involvement in operation Unified Protector in Libya in 2011, where the 
Swedish Air Force was tasked with reconnaissance missions, is a good example. 
Considering the high quality of the images taken allowing, for example, for 
measuring the level of oil in oil tanks, according to Nygren, the Swedish Air 
Force performed their role superbly.482 However, their activities were also very 
much constrained by the mandate issued by the Swedish Government. As 
pointed out by Wilson, the Government allowed for the enforcement of no-fly 
zones, but without the option of resorting to offensive action to rule out collateral 
damage.483 This stance was not a surprise, considering that this was the first 
expeditionary operation in 48 years where Swedish fighter jets were deployed. 
The Government’s strict mandate was closely adhered to by the Swedish Air 
Force in order to ensure ongoing public support for the country’s decision to 
send fighters to Libya.484 In practice, the initial Swedish mandate meant they 
were allowed to take reconnaissance pictures but not to get involved in any 
combat mission, no matter how significant encountered targets of opportunity 
were. Nygren at SWENDU gave a very good example of such constraint 
referring to a situation when Swedish Air Force, while performing a 
reconnaissance mission over Libya, encountered Libyan opposition forces being 
cut off in fight by Muammar Kaddafi’s troops and trying to hold an oil 
pipeline.485 Because of their mandate, the Swedish could not support the forces 
on the ground, even though the target was clear.  
The Swedish mandate was slightly widened as the operation progressed, 
from a defensive air campaign to providing tactical ISR for the Joint Force 
Command.486 Initially, the Swedish Air Force was tasked to perform 
reconnaissance missions against targets important for maintaining no-fly zones, 
such as ammunition stores and airfields. This allowed the Swedish Air Force to 
be part of only one out of three main operational tasks listed in the UN Security 
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Council Resolution 1973487 and even then their involvement was somewhat 
limited as it did not include attacking these targets, which would normally be 
considered part of a no-fly zone enforcement mission.488 Once the targets 
relevant for the enforcement of no-fly zones were destroyed the Swedish 
contribution under its initial mandate proved to be useless.489 Subsequently, after 
a visit to Sigonella base, where the Swedish contingent was stationed, by a 
delegation from the government who were shown footage of an attack performed 
by Kaddafi’s forces on a hospital, the mandate was widened to involve the 
collection of data and reconnaissance missions against any type of target, not all 
necessarily related to no-fly zones.490 It became obvious that, if Sweden wanted 
to uphold the humanitarian status of their mission, they could not be too selective 
in the choice of targets for reconnaissance and had to include in their reports not 
only threats to no-fly zones, but also threats to civilians providing the essential 
and accurate data for more effective air strikes from the coalition.491 The above 
example is of relevance for the masculinity-femininity index values discussed in 
Chapter 2. The very restricted mandate clearly demonstrated the Swedish 
preference of not being involved in the, what Hofstede would call ‘masculine’ 
kinetic use of force. Furthermore, it was a perfect illustration of how a country’s 
political will may constrain an air force’s contribution and effectiveness in a 
multinational operation.  
Finally, national caveats may be imposed not only by a participating 
government but also by host countries. For example, as mentioned by Harwood, 
during the British involvement in Northern Afghanistan, the RAF was using the 
Turkish air bases while performing no-fly zones missions and, if shot at, was 
allowed by the Turkish Government to respond with fire only within ten minutes 
of the incident occurring.492 This rule no longer applied when the RAF moved 
to the South of Afghanistan, giving it considerably more room for manoeuvre.  
Every air force participating in a multinational operation will bring 
certain national caveats to the table (as well as often unstandardised ROE), such 
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as, for example, not being allowed to drop bombs or to fly at night, causing 
challenges for the operation’s planners and hindering the effectiveness of the 
operation. This may certainly cause disruptions in smooth running of the 
mission, but may also, as suggested by Nygren, increase the willingness of other 
coalition or alliance partners of excluding those air forces which present a lot of 
such limitations from participating.493 Reportedly, the Swedish Air Force 
experienced such a situation during the first weeks of their involvement in Libya 
in 2011. During the initial, restricted phase of its deployment, Swedish diplomats 
and officers were not allowed to participate in classified meetings at all 
command levels.494 Imposing too many caveats on one’s forces may very likely 
lead to increased burden put on other participants, causing discontent between 
the contingents and disruption in a coalition.495 
Following on the sections above, in case of ROE, problems in 
cooperation may arise when different countries have conflicting approaches to 
the same problem as a result of their foreign policy priorities or in relation to 
the extent of their engagement in the operation.496 For example, achieving a 
universal understanding of the ROE is often seen as the biggest challenge in 
multinational operations. Lee pointed out that diverse interpretation of, for 
example, UN resolutions may cause disruption in a coalition from its very start 
since what is an authorised action for one state may be considered an excessive 
use of force by another.497 Following on that, participating states may have 
different perceptions of how ‘self-defence’ is to be defined.498 In his study of air 
power involvement in irregular operations Bartnik also pointed to the difficulty 
in agreeing on fundamental issues, such as who to regard as a combatant or non-
combatant.499 
Different understandings of ROE also result from cultural differences 
between the involved air forces mirroring, for example, different levels of power 
distance among the participating nations. Allocating targeting authority is a 
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pertinent example. Some nations may grant this directly to the pilots, while 
others require approval from a higher rank, sometimes even the Ministry of 
Defence. However, these rules may also change according to the situation. For 
example, an Air commodore in the RAF pointed out that during the operation in 
Kosovo, British targeting authority was initially placed with the Secretary of 
State for Defence but, as the operation was progressing, such a solution proved 
ineffective and time-consuming, so authority was passed on to the pilots.500 In 
contrast, during the British involvement in Iraq authority was moved in the 
opposite direction. In 2003 it was with the pilots and a few months later, as the 
operation became less dynamic, it was moved up the command chain.501 
Nevertheless, in order to avoid excessive use of force or collateral damage (or at 
least to minimise the risk), homogenous ROE adhered to by all coalition partners 
must be agreed on and implemented. If they are not standardised, the 
diversification of rules may, just as in case of national caveats, hinder the 
effectiveness of the mission, undermine the multinational command and cause 
divisions among the participants due to disproportionate allocation of tasks.502 
 
5.2.4 Interoperability in procedures and technology 
 
Another big challenge in multinational air operations is interoperability, 
which also involves language issues and ROE. Cooperation is much easier 
within an established structure, for example NATO, where rules, procedures and 
equipment are standardised. Multinational cooperation will also be easier for the 
Anglo-Saxon countries, because of their shared language and some other cultural 
commonalities. For example, when asked about potential difficulties the RAF 
may encounter when involved in multinational operations and any necessary 
adjustments to be made, Stringer noted that these would be minimal or non-
existent. That is because the UK has always been a close partner with the US 
and together they were working on the NATO standards, since most of these 
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Standardisation Agreements’ (STANAGs) discussions are led by the Anglo-
Saxon countries.503 That, plus the obvious benefit of speaking English as a native 
language as well as financial and industrial capacity to afford advanced 
technology, especially in the sphere of intelligence and cryptographies, makes 
the cooperation between the RAF and USAF very easy.504  
It should not come as a surprise that for some nations it will be easier to 
cooperate with each other while for others, even under the very same 
circumstances, some difficulties may occur. For example, according to a scholar 
at the SWENDU, during their involvement in ISAF, the cooperation between 
Swedish and British or Swedish and Norwegian Air Forces, went rather 
smoothly while the relations with the German units proved to be more difficult, 
because they had different practices in place as well as focusing on different 
goals. Adherence to national procedures in a multinational team can also 
seriously hinder technical interoperability. An example of this is the Polish 
experience during the country’s involvement in the ISAF mission. One of the 
major problems that the Polish Air Force had to face when transporting cargo 
from home air bases to Afghanistan was lack of necessary regulations allowing 
for transporting weapons such as, for example, missiles, grenades or 
explosives.505 Surprisingly, at that time the only weapons that, according to the 
International Air Transport Association (IATA) regulations that Poland adhered 
to, could be loaded on military transport aircraft were rifle and flare 
ammunitions. In practice, that meant that the Polish Air Force was unable to 
provide the contingent with necessary equipment. Therefore, a decision was 
made to change the existing regulations and to align them with procedures 
outlined in the USAF’s Air Force Manual 24-204 and NATO’s STANAGs no. 
3854 and 4441 allowing for transportation of majority of weapons in accordance 
with the classification of hazardous materials set by the ICAO.506 
Experience in adhering to common procedures of a coalition is also 
important for the smooth running of a multinational operation. At the time of 
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their involvement in Afghanistan, the Polish Air Force was still relatively new 
to NATO and, as such, was still learning to adhere to the binding procedures. As 
pointed out by a Colonel in Polish Air Force, one of the major things the Polish 
Air Force had no or very little experience in was the cooperation between air 
component and forces on the ground, for example calling for CAS.507 Practicing 
these abilities as well as establishing such posts as Forward Air Controller or 
Tactical Air Control Party were requirements for enabling the Polish Air Force 
to cooperate with other NATO members at a much more advanced level.508  
Communication and clear procedures are crucial for smooth cooperation. 
‘Interoperability with regards to networking’ was identified by an Air 
commodore in the RAF as another example of challenges faced in multinational 
air operations.509 There are security protocols for sharing data between coalition 
members. In the case of NATO, as in any other military alliance, all members 
must ensure their networks can receive and send information according to set 
standards. Especially countries joining from outside of this structure can pose 
problems in this respect. An example of this is again Sweden’s experience from 
the operation in Libya in 2011. As pointed out by Wilson, it took a month for the 
Swedish Air Force to get access to NATO data exchange systems, because the 
necessary security protocols were not in place.510 This caused serious disruptions 
in the work flow, because the Swedish coalition partners could not read any 
ATOs and had to depend on the Danish component to share that knowledge with 
them. Nygren noted that the Swedish Air Force was even unable to view a report 
they had produced themselves, because it was processed through the NATO 
system which they did not have access to.511 The Swedish Air Force experienced 
interoperability issues also on a technical level. For example, during the initial 
phase of operation Unified Protector, they encountered a lot of difficulties with 
fuel compatibility.512 The fuel provided at Sigonella was suitable for use on 
aircraft carriers but not compatible with Swedish Gripens, creating a serious 
diplomatic and logistical challenge of transporting the correct fuel from Sweden 
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to Italy in a convoy.513 All of the above disruptions delayed the integration of 
Swedish component into the operation. Therefore it is quite obvious that 
integration of the systems and procedures in an international framework is 
absolutely essential. However, this is easier said than done and problematic from 
the point of view of the security of an operation. As suggested by Gjert L. 
Dyndal, advanced integration of ISR and data sharing systems may pose a threat 
to secure sending and receiving of sensitive information between the coalition 
members.514 
Interoperability issues may even arise when air forces are using the same 
equipment. A good, more general but timely example here is the procurement of 
F-35 multirole fighter. Eleven nations are participating in the programme – 
Australia, Denmark, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, South Korea, 
Turkey, the UK and the US, therefore there will be eleven Air Forces operating 
the same aircraft which, in theory, should present no problems with 
interoperability. However, since all of them are investing in different versions of 
that aircraft, leaving some features out but keeping others, the result may look 
much less optimistic. As an Air commodore in the RAF admitted: ‘we are all 
investing a lot of money in an aircraft that we think will bring a perfect 
interoperability but, even now, we already know there will be some areas where 
we will miss each other.’515 A similarly challenging situation will arise within 
the CBT when Norway replaces its F-16s with F-35s and they become involved 
in training and exercises with Swedish Gripens and Finnish F-18s.516  
Financial constraints are another potential challenge in creating and 
maintaining interoperability. Those constraints are particularly significant for 
small air forces. Compatible systems and procedures for accurate and timely data 
gathering and sharing are at the heart of every successful multinational military 
operation. Those systems are highly advanced and very expensive. For the small 
air forces, such as Poland, this poses a two-fold problem – first, they may be able 
to afford only a limited amount of such equipment and, second, these highly 
valuable assets, especially if possessed only in small capacity, may in fact 
                                                             
513 Egnell, “The Swedish Experience.”, pp. 329–330. 
514 Gjert Lage Dyndal, “Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.” In Routledge 
Handbook of Air Power, ed. by John Andreas Olsen, 107-117. Routledge, 2018, p. 115. 
515 Air commodore in the RAF, interview dated 05/04/2017. 
516 Lt Col Stefan Wilson, interview dated 17/06/2016. 
157 
 
become a vulnerability requiring extra effort to make sure they are not destroyed 
in an operation.517 As a Polish Air Force Colonel poignantly pointed out, it is 
impossible to afford it all. Especially smaller air forces face the choice of 
spending their defence budget on extensive training and exercises with NATO 
at the expense of procurement, or prioritising the purchase of advanced 
equipment at the expense of improving the qualifications and interoperability of 
their air force personnel through NATO training and exercises518 This sentiment 
is reminiscent of Dandeker’s argument discussed in Chapter 3., that with 
shrinking defence budgets one cannot sustain an all-capable air force.519 
Whatever seems more important, individual states need to decide how to 
maintain some balance in this matter. 
The above sections discussed examples of challenges which the RAF, the 
Polish and Swedish Air Forces experienced during their involvement in 
multinational operations. These are related to the cultural differences, affecting 
communication and teamwork, but also the result of specific procedures or ROE 
that each air force has to follow. The language barrier, national political 
priorities, membership in established alliances and financial constraints affecting 
the technological interoperability of the air forces have also all made cooperation 
in multinational operations more difficult. These challenges are unavoidable in 
a multinational setting. Nevertheless, their negative effects may be minimised 
with the increasing and ongoing process of transnationalisation of the air forces. 
Sustained participation in cooperative initiatives and growing experience in 
multinational operations will lead to a better understanding of partner nations 
and will aid in the establishment of increasingly common procedures and 
standards. 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
 
Looking at the experience of the British, Polish and Swedish Air Forces in 
multinational operations it becomes clear that some of the difficulties they have 
encountered are related to the cultural dimensions as identified by Hofstede, 
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namely power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism vs. collectivism 
and so-called masculinity vs. femininity. These difficulties were especially 
visible in the sphere of interpersonal communication, enforcing national caveats 
and understanding of the ROE or targeting and command authority. Cultural 
influences may also be spotted in the political decisions shaping a particular 
country’s involvement in an operation. These decisions clearly reflect national 
interests as well as the current political direction a country follows, but very 
often are also dictated by the culture of that particular country and values it 
honours. Another challenge in multinational cooperation, discussed in the 
chapter, is interoperability, which involves the problems listed above, but in 
addition also includes the ability to communicate in the same language, adhering 
to unified procedures and regulations as well as operating compatible systems 
allowing for smooth exchange of information and services, such as for example 
refuelling.  
The cultural diversity within a multinational coalition, although it poses 
certain difficulties, should not be viewed as an insurmountable challenge. These 
difficulties are unavoidable, but may be mitigated in the process of 
transnationalisation that has been taking place among European air forces since 
1990 on both an informal and formal level. As long as participants in a 
multinational operation are aware of the cultural differences and, instead of 
trying to ignore or eradicate them, know how these should be addressed, 
cooperation will steadily improve.520 Participating nations have been making 
efforts at all levels to get to know each other and learn their culture in order to 
understand how they think, what procedures they are likely to follow, and how 
they communicate. For example, British senior commanders noted the 
significance of establishing good relations with members of the multinational 
unit under their command and suggested, for example, prioritising visits to the 
foreign contingents over the British ones or organising social meetings at the 
operational level.521 Also, the Swedish way of handling their duties, diligence in 
following regulations and willingness to participate in social events reportedly 
had a positive effect on the integration of Swedish Air Force contingent with 
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other members of the operation Unified Protector in Libya.522 Many of these 
gatherings obviously were an informal initiative helping the soldiers to socialise. 
However, they ultimately improved the cooperation between the involved 
nations as well as effectiveness of the missions they conducted together.  
Similarly, an important form of enhancing good interpersonal relations is 
proactive behaviour of coalition members focused on facilitating the cooperation 
and achieving the common objective. For example, as discussed in this chapter, 
during their involvement in operation Unified Protector in Libya, the Swedish 
Air Force encountered certain interoperability challenges which made 
performing their duties almost impossible. The situation was saved by the 
Danish unit, which for the first few weeks acted as a link between the Swedish 
contingent and the mission’s joint command.523 The significance of such 
willingness to step forward was stressed by Wilson, the commander of the 
Swedish contingent in Libya, who noted that within an hour after his arrival he 
was approached by the commander of the Danish unit and offered help to share 
the necessary operational data and information, like for example ATOs, until the 
Swedes gained full access to NATO systems.524 
The willingness to improve interpersonal relations and awareness of 
potential differences within a multinational setting is an important way of 
developing cooperation on an informal level. However, there are also formally 
established frameworks to learn from one another. Increased participation in 
various forms of multinational cooperation, whether these are expeditionary 
missions, exchange of services and burden-sharing programmes or training and 
exercises, will progressively improve performance and limit the occurrence of 
potential difficulties. As was already stressed in Chapter 4., the more an air force 
works together with other air forces, the more capable they are of that 
cooperation. Active involvement in multinational exercises proved beneficial for 
Sweden during their participation in Libya. Despite certain interoperability 
challenges they had to face at the beginning and despite the fact that it was the 
first campaign the Swedish Air Force performed in the last 50 years, their input 
was a success thanks to their extensive involvement in joint exercises with other 
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Scandinavian countries, two of which – Norway and Denmark are also NATO 
members and can pass on their experience of working according to the Alliance 
procedures and regulations.525 Another way, apart from joint training, of learning 
from each other are individual arrangements between countries and their military 
forces. For example, as mentioned by Nygren, there is a course organised for 
cadets at the SWENDU focusing on multinational operations where speakers 
from different countries, including NATO members, are invited to talk about 
their experiences of working in a coalition or their views on what should be 
expected from other coalition members.526 This is particularly important 
considering that the Swedish Air Force does not yet have very extensive 
experience of deployments abroad. This is why they are very keen on hearing 
about the experiences of other nations. 
The role of established international structures such as NATO or EU 
providing the tools for facilitating effective cooperation is significant, for 
example, for identifying gaps and limitations of the members’ air forces, 
prioritising the needs within an alliance or streamlining the cooperation process 
with unified rules and procedures to ensure interoperability. They also provide 
ground for establishing programmes and initiatives like those discussed in 
Chapter 4. These structures, NATO or EU, are extremely important when it 
comes to training. They provide a framework to build on. As stressed by Nygren 
as long as the national units are familiar and trained up to NATO standards it 
does not really matter where the future deployment will take place as the officers 
will know what to do.527 Moreover, as pointed out by Kainikara, for a well-
developed and effective cooperation at military level, well-established political 
relations between interested states are crucial as the country must be willing to 
participate in multinational training and work on increasing the interoperability 
of their own forces with other nations.528 
Nevertheless, one should remember that, among other challenges, there 
are also financial constraints which limit a country’s participation in 
multinational operations. Although cost- and burden-sharing initiatives seem a 
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perfect solution for that problem, there may still be situations when a state may 
not be able to afford sending its air forces to a particular training or other 
multinational programme. After all, national capabilities are still considered as 
at least equally important and states will therefore be careful to strike a balance 
between national defence budgets and expenses towards participation in 
multinational cooperation. Certainly, it is unlikely that the latter will ever 
become an absolute priority. As was argued in the previous chapter, despite the 
cooperative effort and obvious benefits it brings, transnationalisation of 
European air forces is not a final objective and therefore, is not aimed at creating 
a supranational air force because involved states will always prioritise their 
national militaries. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
Since its foundation in the beginning of the past century, air power has developed 
into an essential instrument of warfare. Today, it is hard to imagine an armed 
conflict where it does not play a central role. Considering that fact, the role of 
air power in modern warfare, as well as its potential and limits, continues being 
subject to serious scholarly debate. However, scholarship on air power has 
always been US-centric and still is today. As the USAF is the most advanced air 
force in the world, such an approach to the topic is not surprising. This focus, 
however, has meant that other important aspects of contemporary air power, for 
example the experiences of its European counterparts, have remained 
understudied. European air forces have neither the capabilities nor military 
capacity of the USAF. This means that many of the questions and debates central 
to air power scholarship, for example, pertaining to the potential and limitations 
of independent or ‘strategic’ application of air power, are relevant for these 
smaller, European air forces only to a certain extent. 
The majority of military operations involving Western air forces today 
are multinational efforts, not least because of the fact that few countries other 
than the United States have the capabilities to launch and sustain substantial 
independent overseas missions or air campaigns on their own. Certainly for 
European air forces, the participation in multinational operations has formed the 
bulk of their operational activity and experience since the end of the Cold War 
and this situation is unlikely to change substantively in the immediate future. As 
the thesis advocated, the increased ‘multinationalisation’ of European air forces 
should be understood as their interconnectedness and interoperability as well as 
mutual reliance being an effect of two major trends common for the post-Cold 
War European militaries. Following Anthony King’s, idea, these were identified 
in the thesis as concentration and transnationalisation529 and were experienced 
by all three case studies – the UK, Poland and Sweden. 
The thesis’s objective is to address two important gaps in the air power 
literature. Firstly, it set out to move away from the aforementioned US-centric 
outlook of much of this literature, focusing instead on the experience of smaller, 
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European air forces. Secondly, the thesis focused on multinational operations, 
which have dominated the activities of European air forces since the end of the 
Cold War. Given the air power debate’s continuing preoccupation with 
‘independent’ and strategic air power especially in a US context, the nuances of 
multinational air operations are rarely addressed. Studying the potential and 
limitations of European air forces engaging in multinational operations, using 
the UK, Poland and Sweden as case studies, the thesis makes an important 
contribution to our understanding of an often-understudied aspect of 
contemporary air power. 
Following the end of the Cold War and the shift in in the security 
environment from bi- to multi-polar, the RAF, Polish and Swedish Air Forces, 
although facing different challenges, came through a series of changes leading 
to their professionalisation and transnationalisation. Facing cuts of defence 
budgets, all three air forces underwent a reduction in size, which King called the 
‘concentration’ of military forces. All three, like many other European air forces 
in the post-Cold war years, decided to transform their militaries into 
professional, all-volunteer forces abandoning conscription and introducing the 
idea of ‘jointness’. This led to a qualitative shift, creating forces that were 
numerically smaller, but also more effective and efficient. Another process, 
which King called the ‘transnationalisation’ of European militaries, occurred 
hand in hand with concentration. Since multinational operations became the 
dominant form of modern conflicts, it became obvious that potential partners in 
a coalition must be compatible and interoperable. Therefore, the UK, Poland as 
well as non-allied Sweden increasingly started adhering to NATO standards, not 
only by upgrading their equipment or introducing unified regulations but also by 
adopting similar approaches to the use of air power and role of international 
community in guaranteeing security in Europe in their doctrinal publications. As 
the thesis showed, this adjustment was easiest for the RAF, as the UK had been 
a member of NATO already for many decades by this point. The transformation 
was more challenging for Poland and Sweden. The former one had to completely 
revise the existing Warsaw Pact regulations and practices and adapt to new, 
NATO regulations as well as face several equipment issues like outdated, post-
Soviet fleet which, already in early 1990s, presented very little modern combat 
capability. The challenges faced at that time by Sweden, were closely related to 
164 
 
the country’s ‘solidarity declaration’ policy. While the country remained non-
allied, the military transformation was conducted according to standards set out 
by NATO ensuring interoperability with the Alliance. The processes of 
concentration and transnationalisation help to explain the increased participation 
of European air forces in multinational operations and to identify some of the 
challenges resulting from these developments. As such, they provide important 
background for understanding the transformation of European air forces in the 
post-Cold War years as well as discussing the potential and limitations of 
European air power in that form of military involvement in the thesis. 
   
6.1 Findings and contributions 
 
The main research question the thesis sought to address is as follows: what 
are the potential and limitations of European air power in contemporary 
multinational operations? It was answered by addressing six second-order 
questions: (1) why has the end of the Cold War led to an increasing number of 
multinational operations? (2) why have the UK, Swedish and Polish air forces 
specifically been used predominantly in multinational operations since the end 
of the Cold War? (3) how have European countries sought to create the 
conditions required for the effective cooperation of their air forces in 
multinational operations? (4) what role have collaborative initiatives, such as 
Smart Defence and Pooling and Sharing, played in the creation of these 
conditions? (5) what are the ongoing problems encountered by European air 
forces when they participate in multinational operations? and (6) how can these 
problems be overcome?  
Focusing on the above questions, the thesis investigated the involvement 
of the RAF, Polish and Swedish Air Forces, in contemporary multinational 
operations. These potentially different, because of their political situation in 
1990, case studies were chosen as demonstrating several similarities like, for 
example, their active involvement in multinational cooperation, perceiving 
NATO and the EU as guarantors of European security and undergoing a similar 
process of military transformation. That allowed the Author to investigate the 
subject from different perspectives and resulted in a comprehensive view of the 
involvement of European air power in multinational operations. The thesis then 
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assessed the potential and limitations of such cooperation and considered the 
ways in which challenges resulting from that cooperation could be overcome. 
Overall the thesis argued that the benefits of involvement in multinational 
initiatives gained by European air forces far outweigh the potential problems 
they may encounter. 
Addressing the more detailed sub-questions the thesis reached several 
conclusions. First of all, it identified two major processes in post-Cold War 
transformation of European air forces, namely their concentration and 
transnationalisation which, when paired with the changes at that time taking 
place in the security environment, led to an increased number of multinational 
military operations. Answering why the end of the Cold War has led to an 
increasing number of multinational operations, and why the three air forces have 
engaged in these military operations, the thesis argued that such situation is 
rooted in the change from a bi-polar to a multi-polar security environment and 
the emergence of new threats, such as, intra-state conflicts or terrorism. 
These changes required transformation of the existing militaries in order 
to be able to address the wider spectrum of threats and respond to conflicts taking 
place not in the immediate neighbourhood of these states. The thesis showed that 
the RAF, Polish and Swedish Air Force underwent concentration and 
transnationalisation in the process of adapting to the new security and defence 
requirements. Following reduction of defence budgets, the mass, conscript air 
forces were transformed into much smaller, all-voluntary units. This process 
revealed their significant limitations and they focused on developing 
multinational cooperation. These gaps, especially in the area of AT, AAR and 
ISR, prevented them not only from conducting large-scale expeditionary 
operations independently, but also from maintaining sustainable national 
defence since their air forces are suffering from serious capability limitations. 
Increased multinational cooperation, therefore, allowed them to make up for 
these shortcomings and it also led to growing interconnectedness and 
interoperability. This conclusion helped to answer how European countries have 
sought to create the conditions required for the effective cooperation of their air 
forces in multinational operations, and the role played by collaborative 
initiatives, such as Smart Defence and Pooling and Sharing, played in the 
creation of these conditions?  
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Military cooperation has taken the form of various multinational 
initiatives, ranging from military operations, pooling and sharing programmes, 
exchange of services or trainings and exercises. These are being pursued within 
the frameworks of NATO, EU or outside of these structures as regional 
initiatives and play a crucial role in building and strengthening collective 
capabilities and capacity of European air power. These benefits could be 
considered in a two-fold way – in relation to the RAF, Polish and Swedish Air 
Force, and in relation to European air power in general perceived through the 
existing multinational constructs, for example NATO and the EU. 
In the first case, the thesis demonstrated that multinational initiatives 
aimed at building collective capabilities and military capacity help to make up 
for the limitations experienced by individual national air forces. As Gremez 
pointed out: ‘“multi-mission” and “multinational” may become the only way to 
overcome the budgetary constraints that nations will continue to face in the years 
to come.’530 That statement proved true for all three case studies. By sharing the 
purchase or charter and maintenance costs of the acquired fleet, they were 
granted access to larger number of types of aircraft if their existing capacity is 
insufficient; for example, through SAC or SALIS. Strengthening existing 
capabilities is one gain the UK, Poland and Sweden get out of the multinational 
cooperation. The other one is a way to build a capability that was either 
unattainable or is currently under development and not yet fully operational. 
That is of a lesser importance for the RAF which strives to maintain a ‘balanced’ 
force with the full spectrum of capabilities, however it matters a lot for smaller 
air forces like Poland and Sweden. For example, the latter two, through 
ATARES or AGS, benefit from access to AAR and ISR – either non-existent or 
to large extent underdeveloped capabilities. Apart from the obvious benefits 
from pooling and sharing materiel or exchanging services through various forms 
of multinational cooperation, all three also gain valuable experience they could 
not get otherwise. Multinational initiatives, such as, CBT, ACE, EATT or 
EATTCC, allow for organising larger and more complex exercises with several 
nations contributing their resources than if these were confined only to the assets 
available at their national level. As such, practicing in a larger and multinational 
                                                             
530 Gremez, “Doing the Same with Less.”, p. 56. 
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team gives better results allowing, for example, for more complex manoeuvres 
to be performed as well as giving opportunity to improve working practices with 
other nations or implementing unified procedures. As pointed out by an 
anonymous interviewee, increased interaction with other nations, whether by 
sharing resources or exchanging experiences, is a way of strengthening one’s 
national security since learning from the more advanced air forces helps to 
improve the effectiveness of one’s own units.531 
The benefits of involvement in multinational cooperation do not apply 
solely to individual states but also have an effect on European air power in 
general working together through established structures such as NATO and the 
EU. The most obvious element increasing efficiency of European air power in 
joint multinational operations, is the implementation of unified procedures and 
regulations streamlining the cooperation between nations as well as standards 
aimed at increased interoperability of equipment. Practicing according to these 
unified rules during multinational exercises and training increases the efficiency 
of not only individual participants, but above all, the cooperative effort of 
involved air forces as a whole. Furthermore, that experience has much wider 
applicability than only to the air crews taking part in these initiatives. The 
knowledge gained is passed onto the personnel remaining at their home bases 
allowing for their better preparation for future deployments, strengthening 
capabilities of the whole alliance or coalition. Pooling and sharing of equipment 
has a similar effect, because by filling any gaps in capability of individual air 
forces it also provides the coalition or alliance with the full spectrum of air power 
capabilities. In the case of NATO, it may be understood as a pre-emptive 
fulfilment of the Article V obligations – by investing in pooled and shared fleets 
as well as in personnel’s training a collective defence capability for the 
participating states is being created.532 Then, building collective defence 
capabilities within a multinational organisation has a deterrent effect on potential 
opponents.533 Effective cooperation is a strong signal that the cooperating states 
are not only capable of collective defence, but it also demonstrate will and 
resolve to stand up for each other’s security. An explicit example of such 
                                                             
531 Scholar at the WSU, interview dated 22/06/2016. 
532 Colonel in the Polish Air Force, interview dated 30/06/2016. 
533 Major in the Swedish Air Force, phone interview with the Author conducted on 20/06/2016. 
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cooperation used in the thesis is the BAP mission, however any of the discussed 
initiatives will ultimately lead to strengthening collective capabilities of 
European air power. 
 As this thesis also showed, unified procedures and regulations and active 
participation in various forms of multinational cooperation does not guarantee 
easy cooperation. On the contrary, it poses significant challenges for the air 
forces involved. The thesis addressed the ongoing problems encountered by 
European air forces when they participate in multinational operations, and how 
they can be overcome. Similar to the benefits of the multinational cooperation, 
also the potential challenges it brings may be discussed in a two-fold way. 
Firstly, one can consider their meaning for individual air forces, in this thesis 
specifically the RAF, Polish and Swedish Air Force. Secondly, the challenges 
are also applicable for the existing alliances/coalitions and European air power 
as a whole. 
Multinational initiatives, although beneficial, should not be treated as a 
panacea for the limitations of national capabilities. Joining the NAEW&C 
programme was enthusiastically welcomed in Poland and raised some voices 
claiming that now the country has its own AWACS which will control Polish air 
space.534 That was a huge overestimation. Due to their multinational nature, 
these initiatives and resources they provide are not at the unlimited disposition 
of all the participating states. Instead, the shares of individual air forces are 
proportional to their individual contribution, both on a financial and personnel 
level. Joint defence initiatives or defensive alliances only work if all participants 
are committed to making a serious contribution to the common good. Therefore, 
although access to joint assets is strengthening national capabilities, individual 
states should be cautious about neglecting their national capabilities.  
Whereas at a national level participation in collaborative initiatives may 
get disrupted or constrained by financial factors, at an alliance and coalition level 
these challenges are far more diverse. For example, on a state level the decision 
on whether one’s air force should join or withdraw from a particular initiative 
affects only that particular force. However, on a multinational level one 
country’s withdrawal will affect the whole coalition. The example of SALIS 
                                                             
534 Scholar at the WSU, interview dated 22/06/2016. 
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(Chapter 4.) demonstrated that arrangements based on pooling and sharing of the 
equipment are especially susceptible to any changes in the composition of the 
membership. Since such ventures are based on collective resources and 
contributions of the participants, withdrawal of one of them affects the whole 
initiative and may seriously disrupt its effectiveness or even question its further 
validity. 
The thesis showed that effective cooperation at a multinational level may 
be disturbed predominantly by differences and misunderstandings resulting from 
cultural background of the air forces involved. These may take the form of 
different work practices, language deficiencies, imposed national caveats and 
differences in ROE and their interpretation as well as insufficient interoperability 
between units. Looking for ways to address these challenges, which are 
inevitable in every coalition or alliance, the thesis showed, that they may be, 
paradoxically, mitigated by even more cooperation. As demonstrated in Chapter 
5., the more the RAF, Polish and Swedish Air Force actively participated in 
various forms of multinational cooperation, the more aware they became of these 
differences and, as a result, the more effective that cooperation turned out to be. 
Certainly, some difficulties will not be completely eradicated. However, 
anticipation and preparedness helps to minimise their negative effects. That is 
especially important for non-allied states. For example, Sweden not being a 
member of NATO, needs to put much more effort into training their personnel 
to be familiar with the Alliance’s standards as well as upgrading their equipment 
to ensure greater interoperability when involved in a NATO operation. 
Nevertheless, an approach aimed at progressively developing cooperation, 
despite the challenges it brings, is important for European air power for two 
reasons. Firstly, as already suggested, intensified cooperation leads to an 
improvement of the effectiveness of multinational ventures by European air 
forces. Secondly, the thesis demonstrated that due to significant capability and 
capacity gaps, for European air forces as a whole developing multinational 
cooperation is the best option to deal with their limitations. Therefore, as far as 
there is awareness of and preparedness for the difficulties as well as acceptance 
of the fact that multinational initiatives are not a panacea, persistent 
collaboration with other air forces ultimately will prove to be beneficial. This 
confirms the main arguments made in the thesis, that the gains European air 
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forces get from active participation in multinational operations are greater than 
the challenges they encounter as part of the process. 
In spite of the fact that individual European air forces have different 
levels of national capabilities and some, arguably, benefit from multinational 
cooperation more than others, it is clear that the benefits of such cooperation are 
widely seen to be beneficial by all air forces involved. This raises the question 
whether the motivations for participating in multinational efforts are different 
for smaller air forces that lack some central capabilities, like ISR or AAR in the 
case of Poland or Sweden, than for the richer and more powerful ones like the 
RAF? Why would the latter be willing to contribute to these initiatives and, in 
fact, act as one of the main ‘sponsors’ making up for others’ shortcomings? As 
demonstrated in the thesis, it is obvious that smaller air forces, like the Polish or 
Swedish, use these programmes as an opportunity to build or strengthen very 
limited capabilities. It is likely that these motivations are similar for any other 
air forces participating in the pooled and shared initiatives. As discussed in 
Chapter 2., even the more powerful European air forces would not be able to 
conduct a large-scale or lengthy military operation independently. For example, 
the RAF aims at building a force with balanced capabilities, but there is also a 
recognition that it does not possess enough resources to act fully independently. 
As pointed out by Lee, the fact that the RAF participates in numerous 
multinational initiatives, where it often is among the major contributors, 
acknowledges that capacity limitation.535 Therefore, one could differentiate that 
for the RAF, multinational initiatives help to build the air force’s capacity. 
Whereas, both Polish and Swedish Air Forces are using them as an opportunity 
to, at least partially, make up for their capability limitations for example AAR, 
which in case of Poland is non-existent and, in case of Sweden, notwithstanding 
with the needs. Nevertheless, despite differences in motivations, multinational 
cooperation strengthens national defence of European states whether by capacity 
or capability building. Therefore, in case of a major conflict, the UK just as 
Poland or Sweden, would have to join forces with their allies in order to be able 
to sustain in military operations that would take place. 
                                                             
535 Peter Lee, interview dated 21/09/2016; Air commodore in the RAF, interview dated 
05/04/2017. 
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In addition to the above, one could also point to other motivations in 
favour of creating multinational ventures. One being politically driven, which 
will be discussed in section 6.2 below and the other implied by the nature of 
contemporary conflicts. As was discussed in the thesis, the post-Cold War 
changes taking place in European security environment involved major change 
in the character of potential threats. In place of traditionally understood state-on-
state aggression, these started to increasingly take form of intra-state ethnic or 
religious conflicts, humanitarian crises or international terrorism as well as are 
involving non-state actors. The new threats to security, therefore became 
transnational and no longer constitute a problem that either affects or can be 
solved by one individual state. As such they require a multinational response. In 
such a case, building alliances and coalitions to deal with these challenges is 
essential. Hence, even the more powerful states with strong air forces get 
engaged in multinational operations and it is in the common interest of the 
European community to work together towards improving that cooperation. 
This thesis constitutes a substantial addition to the existing literature with 
a systematic study on the potential and limitations of European air power in 
multinational operations. Its secondary contribution is providing a conceptual 
framework for such analysis. As was outlined in Chapter 1., there is no single 
theoretical framework for investigating the various issues discussed in this 
thesis. A conceptual framework was derived from the available secondary 
literature and official documents focusing on post-Cold War military 
transformation in Europe and multinational operations as well sociological 
research based on Hofstede’s model of cultural dimensions. As such it could be 
used for further studies on the use of contemporary European air power in 
multinational operations. 
Using a sociological approach in the thesis has resulted in some 
limitations. On the one hand, it provided a point of reference to study the 
influence of a state’s national culture on its military culture. Therefore, it proved 
helpful in explaining the importance of cultural differences between the RAF, 
Polish and Swedish Air Forces. On the other hand, limitations in the available 
data, especially the small number of studies applying Hofstede’s model to 
military organisations, means that the conclusions reached in the thesis, as well 
as the general applicability of the framework, are not absolute. Compared to 
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Hofstede’s extensive research on IBM employees, existing studies using his 
model in a military context are more selective. They tend to encompass only a 
small number of nations and also studied the armed forces as a whole, rather than 
air forces specifically. In order to provide a full spectrum of cultural differences 
among European air forces, further and more focused studies using Hofstede’s 
model would be desirable. Within the framework of this thesis, a study of such 
a scale and involving large-scale survey research conducted in various countries 
would not have been feasible, both financially and in terms of access. However, 
it is hoped that the exploratory research presented in this thesis on the previously 
understudied subject of European air forces and multinational operations has laid 
some of the groundwork for further and more wide-ranging studies in the future.  
 
6.2 Implications and future outlook for European air power 
 
To sum up the thesis, it is vital to say that the ever more important practice 
of multinational cooperation between European air forces has significant 
implications for European air power, for individual air forces like the RAF, 
Polish and Swedish Air Force, and also for existing international organisations 
often facilitating that collaboration, such as NATO or the EU. 
The development of and active involvement in multinational initiatives has 
a strong political dimension. In a situation where multinational operations are 
the dominant form of military engagements, states cannot isolate themselves. 
Participation in multinational initiatives strengthens not only these countries’ air 
forces, but also their national security and defence. This is not down to building 
collective military capability and capacity alone. The political act of contributing 
to the development of multinational initiatives is equally important. As was 
pointed out by an anonymous officer in the Polish Air Force, the more a country 
participates in multinational initiatives organised, for example by NATO, the 
stronger its position is both within that particular organisation, as well as its 
image as a desirable and reliable partner state.536 Maintaining interoperability 
with partner air forces and adherence to binding Alliance’s standards is an 
important element of building collective security. This pertains also to non-allied 
                                                             
536 Lieutenant Colonel in the Polish Air Force, email conversation dated 28/09/2016 and Maj. 
Gen. (ret.) Krzysztof Załęski, email conversation dated 16/11/2016. 
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states. As pointed out by Wilson and Hansson, involvement in NATO initiatives 
and missions is crucial for Sweden since it presents them as a reliable ally but 
also increases the chances that, if such need arises, they will receive help from 
the Alliance.537 This view was clearly and explicitly outlined in the Swedish 
‘solidarity declaration’.538  
To summarise, the credibility of a particular state as a reliable partner in 
a coalition increases the more they participate in multinational ventures – 
whether these are military operations, pooling and sharing programmes or 
multinational exercises. Building that credibility is vital for both, individual 
states as well as the alliances or coalitions as a whole. Consistent participation 
in and contribution to multinational operations and initiatives brings political 
dividends for a state, as it increases this state’s image as a reliable partner. In 
spite of variations in contributions and national capabilities, participating states, 
like the UK, Poland and Sweden, are being treated as equal partners and can 
therefore expect that in case their national security is endangered the other 
coalition or alliance members will respond to the threat. Similarly, organisations 
like NATO, the EU or the smaller, regional coalitions and partnerships benefit 
from a strong network of reliable partners who are working together to 
strengthen the cooperation and, what follows, strengthen the alliance/coalition 
making it capable to efficiently respond to the aforementioned transnational 
threats. Furthermore, working as a coalition or an alliance adds political 
legitimacy to military operations.539 As such multinational cooperation becomes 
a vital tool to justify any military action to both, individual state’s nation, as well 
as international community. All of the above reiterates that multinational 
ventures are not only beneficial for small and less capable allies relying on 
pooled and shared resources, but also for stronger states with capable national 
military forces. 
In the case of building collective capabilities in air forces, the importance 
of maintaining national capabilities must be reiterated. Although participation in 
multinational initiatives and operations provides the deployed air forces with 
                                                             
537 Lt Col Mattias Hansson, email conversation dated 27/10/2016 and Lt Col Stefan Wilson, 
interview dated 17/06/2016. 
538 See Chapter 1. 
539 AJP-3(B) Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations, p. 1-10. 
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invaluable experience and access to otherwise often unattainable equipment, it 
can never replace the development and maintenance of national capabilities. 
This point was also stressed in an anonymous interview pointing out that primary 
responsibility of a national air force is the defence of its own territory and that 
should remain their main focus.540 Of course, by participating in military 
alliances like NATO, the members are obliged to certain actions, that is, 
collective defence. Nevertheless, these should not be prioritised over national 
security. What is required is a balanced approach. 
Besides, maintaining one’s independence over their own air force is also 
a matter of national identity and prestige and may be demonstrated in different 
ways. This is also a major reason for why the increasing transnationalisation of 
European air forces is unlikely to ever result in the creation of a joint European 
air force. For example, the RAF, while still being part of the NAEW&C, 
participates in the initiative with its own airborne early warning aircraft creating 
a whole separate component for NAEW&C stationed at Waddington base. 
Similarly, Sweden supports its national industry and procurement of Gripens or 
development of their own early airborne system – Erieye. These efforts are 
aimed at demonstrating the national sovereignty over one’s air force as well as 
its sustainability and, to certain extent, independence. 
Nevertheless, the majority of European states cannot afford building and 
maintaining a sustainable, fully operational air force. Therefore, one may 
speculate that the trend of both the increase in the number of multinational 
operations, as well as development of various multinational initiatives aimed at 
building collective security and defence capabilities, will continue for the 
European states and their air forces. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
540 Scholar at the Polish Air Force Academy, interview dated 28/06/2016. 
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